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Call To Order / Welcome  
 
Nancy Bennett, MD, MS 
ACIP Chair 
 
Dr. Bennett called the February 2017 Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) 
meeting to order and welcomed those present. 
  
Overview / Announcements  
 
Amanda Cohn, MD 
Executive Secretary, ACIP / CDC 
 
Dr. Cohn welcomed everyone to the February 2017 ACIP meeting.  She indicated that the 
proceedings of this meeting would be accessible to people not in attendance via the World Wide 
Web, and welcomed those who could not attend the meeting in person.  She then recognized 
several others in the room who were to be present throughout the duration of the meeting to 
assist with various meeting functions:  Ms. Stephanie Thomas, Ms. Natalie Greene, and Mr. 
Chris Caraway. 
 
She noted that handouts of the presentations were distributed to the ACIP members and were 
made available for others on the tables outside of the auditorium.  Slides presented during this 
meeting will be posted on the ACIP website approximately two weeks after the meeting 
concludes after being made visually accessible to all viewers, including the visually disabled.  
The live webcast will be posted within four weeks following the meeting, and the meeting 
minutes will be available on the website within approximately 90 days following this meeting.  
Members of the media interested in conducting interviews with ACIP members were instructed 
to contact Ian Branam, located at the press table, for assistance in arranging interviews. 
 
The next ACIP meeting will be convened at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) on Wednesday and Thursday, June 21-22, 2017.  Registration for all meeting attendees 
is required.  The registration deadline for Non-US citizens is May 22, 2017 and for US citizens, 
registration closes June 7, 2017.  Registration is not required for webcast viewing.  As a 
reminder for non-United States (US) citizens attending ACIP meetings, completion of several 
forms is required for each meeting at the time of registration.  It is important that these forms are 
submitted within the required time frame.  Stephanie Thomas, the ACIP Committee 
Management Specialist, will be able to help with any questions about the process. 
 




 Dr. Corey Robertson is representing Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA) 
 Dr. Bonnie Maldonado is representing the Committee on Infectious Diseases (COID) of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) 
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 Dr. Alexandra Woodward is representing Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO)
 Carol Hayes will be representing American Nurses Association (ANA) in addition to her own
organization
 Dr. Bill Schaffner will be representing Infectious Disease Society of America (IDSA) in
addition to his own organization
Regarding public comments, Dr. Cohn indicated that topics presented during ACIP meetings 
include open discussion with time reserved for public comment.  She explained that time for 
public comment pertaining to topics on the agenda was scheduled following the end of the day’s 
sessions, and that time for public comments also would be provided prior to each vote by ACIP 
to enable these comments to be considered before a vote.  Registration for public comments is 
solicited in advance of meetings.  People who planned to make public comments were 
instructed to visit the registration table at the rear of the auditorium where Ms. Stephanie 
Thomas would record their name and provide information on the process.  People making public 
comments were instructed to provide three pieces of information:  name, organization if 
applicable, and any conflicts of interest (COI).  Registration for public comment also was 
solicited in advance of this meeting through the Federal Register.  Given time constraints, each 
comment was limited to three minutes.  Participants unable to present comments during this 
meeting were invited to submit their comments in writing for inclusion in the meeting minutes. 
To summarize COI provisions applicable to the ACIP, as noted in the ACIP Policies and 
Procedures manual, members of the ACIP agree to forgo participation in certain activities 
related to vaccines during their tenure on the committee.  For certain other interests that 
potentially enhance a member’s expertise while serving on the committee, CDC has issued 
limited COI waivers.  Members who conduct vaccine clinical trials or serve on data safety 
monitoring boards (DSMBs) may present to the committee on matters related to those vaccines, 
but these members are prohibited from participating in committee votes on issues related to 
those vaccines.  Regarding other vaccines of the concerned company, a member may 
participate in discussions, with the proviso that he/she abstains on all votes related to the 
vaccines of that company.  It is important to note that at the beginning of each meeting, ACIP 
members state any COIs. 
Applications for ACIP membership are due no later than August 1, 2017 for the 4-year term 
beginning July 1, 2018.  Detailed instructions for submission of names of potential candidates to 
serve as ACIP members may be found on the ACIP web site: 
E-mail:  acip@cdc.gov Web homepage: www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/index.html 
Nominations:  www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/committee/req-nominate.html 
A current CV, at least one recommendation letter from a non-federal government employee, and 
complete contact information are required.  These may be submitted as e-mail attachments to 
Dr. Jean Clare Smith at jsmith2@cdc.gov 
Recommendations and immunization schedules can be downloaded from the ACIP website. 
ACIP has a policy that every three to five years each recommendation is reviewed, and then 
renewed, revised, or retired.  During every meeting, an update is provided on the status of ACIP 
recommendations.  There have been four ACIP publications since February 2016, which are 
reflected in the following table: 








Visitors / Farewells / Roll Call 
 
Nancy Bennett, MD, MS 
ACIP Chair 
 
Dr. Bennett introduced the following guests attending this ACIP meeting: 
 
 Dr. Rana Hajjeh, Director, Department of Communicable Diseases Prevention & Control 
(DCD), Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO) 
 Dr. C. Irtaza Ahmad, Technical Officer, Vaccine Preventable Diseases & Immunization, 
DCD, EMRO 
 
She then wished a fond farewell to three ACIP members: 
  
 Dr. Bruce Gellin 
 
Dr. Gellin has been the Ex-Officio representative at the ACIP for the last 15 years in his role as 
Director of the National Vaccine Program Office (NVPO).  He will be leaving NVPO at the end of 
the month to take on a new role as President of Global Immunizations at the Sabin Vaccine 
Institute.  ACIP honored Dr. Bruce Gellin for his many years of service and thanked him for his 
constant support and insight for the ACIP over the years, and is thrilled that he will continue to 
work in immunization at a global level.  Dr. Bennett emphasized that he would be sorely missed 
and thanked him for his service. 
  







 Dr. Richard Gorman 
 
Dr. Richard Gorman has been serving as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Ex-Officio 
representative for the last 8 years.  He has been a constant source of insight and support to 
ACIP.  Dr. Bennett personally thanked him because he frequently answers the questions she 
forgets to ask. 
 
 Dr. Ian Gemmill 
 
Dr. Ian Gemmill has been serving as the Liaison Member for the National Advisory Committee 
on Immunization (NACI) for Canada as he completes his term as Chair of that committee.  He 
also has brought important insights to ACIP, often clarifying the limitation of the committee’s 
vision.  By having the opportunity to hear about another country’s approach, ACIP learns a great 
deal. 
 
Before officially beginning the meeting, Dr. Bennett called the roll to determine whether any 
ACIP members had COIs.  The following COIs were declared: 
 
 Robert Atmar receives research support from Takeda Vaccines 
 Dr. Romero has a non-research related conflict with Merck and will not be voting on the 
Hepatitis B vaccine 
 The remainder of the ACIP members declared no conflicts 
 
Dr. Bennett then requested that the liaison and ex officio members introduce themselves.  A list 





Anne Schuchat, MD (RADM, USPHS) 
Acting Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Acting Administrator, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
Rear Admiral, US Public Health Service 
 
Thanks so much.  It is a special honor, special feeling, to come back to see you all today in this 
time when I am serving as Acting Director for the agency.  It’s an incredible privilege to be 
Acting Director, and you are such a special group of people doing such an incredibly difficult 
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and incredibly important work for the nation.  So, I was pleased when Amanda asked me to stop 
by. 
 
My main message is to thank you.  I want to thank the members of the committee and Dr. 
Bennett for her chairing of the committee in such a professional and efficient way.  You take 
time out of incredibly busy schedules to do very complex and tedious work, and the nation really 
thanks you for it.  I want to thank the liaisons.  I know that we have quite a few here who are 
representing all kinds of professional expertise, and bringing that programmatic and 
professional input into our guidelines helping us avoid what Dr. Frieden used to call the “eye-
rolling” that happens when CDC issues guidance.  You are the no “eye-rolling” contingency 
here—you around the central group.  I also want to thank the ex officios who are helping us be 
one extremely coordinated federal vaccine enterprise.  I appreciate what each of you do and 
want to make special reference to Bruce Gellin, who is going to be retiring soon from 15 years 
of service at the National Vaccine Program Office (NVPO).  A real treasure to have you there for 
those years, and a great partner to us at CDC.  I also want to thank the public for the voices that 
you bring to ACIP, both in the room and between meetings—the letters that you send and the 
public comments that you make.  You make sure that the meeting is serving the nation at all 
times. 
 
Personally, as you know, I was the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
(NCIRD) Director for a decade and during that period and since then, the ACIP has made 
extraordinary improvements.  The process was good and it has gotten even better with 
integration of GRADE (Grading of Recommendation Assessment, Development and Evaluation) 
to the deliberations, so we have a very transparent and systematic way that evidence is 
reviewed, including values being considered.  The webcasting has opened these meetings up 
even wider.  The public can see these meetings not just by traveling to Atlanta, but from 
anywhere in the world.  The major changes that you all have made:  the votes that you have 
taken that have added vaccines, that have increased doses when we needed a booster and 
taken doses away when they were not essential, such as the HPV for younger teens and I 
guess the hepatitis B deliberation that you had yesterday for infants; the review of the schedules 
every single year looking at new information on efficacy or effectiveness, on safety signals, on 
performance over time with waning immunity, and the attempt to harmonize with the 
professional groups so that clinicians have clear and consistent advice whenever possible; the 
meetings themselves, which regularly review the critical vaccine issues from each working 
group (WG), as well as key outbreaks that may have implications for future recommendations; 
and the regular review of safety for any kind of signals that may have occurred. 
 
This process is not easy, and there is uncompensated time that each of you gives, and the staff 
who support you for the logistics of the meeting, as well as the technical and superb scientific 
program inputs to the working groups.  So, this is a process that I think the nation can be very 
proud of and I am personally very proud of.  I know how much experience is at this table, and on 
this committee, and around the world, and I just want to tell you how grateful I am for what you 
do every day and particularly in preparation for these meetings.  You know, the nation depends 
on CDC and we depend on you and so thank you so much for all that you are doing for us and 
for letting me talk to you this morning.  Thanks. 
  











Art Reingold, M.D. Hepatitis Vaccines Work Group 
 
Dr. Reingold reminded everyone that in October 2016, ACIP approved new hepatitis B (HepB) 
vaccination recommendations.  Currently, the recommendations are in CDC clearance and will 
be published as a comprehensive summary of previously published recommendations from 
ACIP and CDC for the prevention of hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection in the US. 
 
He indicated that this session would include a presentation on revaccination for unprotected 
infants born to hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg)-positive mothers who do not respond to the 
initial hepatitis B vaccination series, as well as a cost analysis presentation on single-dose 
revaccination for infants born to HBsAg-positive mothers.  The presentations would be followed 
by a vote, including a VFC vote, for approval of permissive language for single-dose 
revaccination followed by post-vaccination serologic testing (and completion of the 2nd series 
followed by post-vaccination serologic testing, if necessary) for infants born to HBsAg-positive 
mothers. 
 
The next topic to be addressed by the HepB Work Group (WG) will be an update to the ACIP 
recommendations for hepatitis A (HepA) vaccine, proposed for presentation during the June 
2017 ACIP meeting. 
 
Revaccination for Unprotected Infants Born to HBsAg‐Positive Mothers 
 
Noele Nelson, MD, PhD, MPH 
National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Nelson reminded everyone of the current recommendation for revaccination of infants born 
to HBsAg‐positive mothers: 
 
Current Recommendation 
 Providers should order post-vaccination serologic testing (PVST), consisting of hepatitis 
B surface antigen [HBsAg] and antibody to HBsAg [anti-HBs], for infants born to HBsAg-
positive mothers at age 9–12 months (or 1–2 months after the final dose of the vaccine 
series, if the series is delayed)1   
 HBsAg-negative infants with anti-HBs levels ≥10 mIU/ml* are protected and need no 
further medical management2 
 HBsAg-negative infants with anti-HBs levels <10 mIU/mL* should be revaccinated with a 
second 3-dose series and retested 1–2 months after the final dose of vaccine2 
 
1Schillie S, et. al. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2015 Oct 9;64(39):1118-20. 
2 Mast EE, MMWR Recomm Rep. 2005 Dec 23;54(RR-16):1-31.  
*Anti-HBs ≥10 mIU/mL, when following a complete Hepatitis B vaccine series, is serologic correlate of protection  
 (Jack et al., J Infect Dis 1999) 
Note:  Available data do not suggest a benefit from administering additional hepatitis B vaccine doses to infants  who have 












 Some infants may need only a single revaccination dose to achieve protective anti-
HBs levels 
 Single dose revaccination may conserve public health resources by shortening the 
duration of case management  
 For some infants, providing case management services through 
completion of a 2nd hepatitis B (HepB) vaccine series is difficult (e.g., 
infant moves out of the country) 
 
To set the stage for the remaining presentations regarding what the WG was proposing, Dr. 




 HBsAg-negative infants with anti-HBs levels <10 mIU/mL 
should be revaccinated with a second 3-dose series and 
retested 1–2 months after the final dose of vaccine.1,2  
 
Revised Language (Proposed) 
 HBsAg-negative infants with anti-HBs levels <10 mIU/mL 
should be revaccinated with a second three-dose HepB 
series and postvaccination serologic testing (PVST) 
performed 1-2 months after the final dose of vaccine.   
 Alternatively, these infants may be re-vaccinated 
with a single dose of HepB vaccine and retested 1-2 
months later. Infants whose anti-HBs remains <10 
mIU/mL following single dose revaccination should 
receive two additional doses of HepB vaccine, 
followed by testing 1-2 months later.   
 Available data do not suggest a benefit from 
administering additional HepB vaccine doses to infants 
who have not attained anti-HBs ≥10 mIU/mL following 
receipt of two complete HepB vaccine series. 
 
1Schillie S, et. al. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2015 Oct 9;64(39):1118-20. 
2 Mast EE, MMWR Recomm Rep. 2005 Dec 23;54(RR-16):1-31. 
  




In terms of background, the perinatal HepB prevention program was established in 1990 and 
was funded by CDC Immunization Cooperative Agreements (Section 317 funding).  There are 






programs in 64 jurisdictions (50 states, 6 cities, 5 territories & 3 freely associated island nations) 
that work collaboratively with NCHHSTP’s Division of Viral Hepatitis (DVH).  Each year, all 
Perinatal Coordinators from this program are surveyed.  In terms of the outcomes from 2014, 
the number of infants enrolled was 11,157.  Based on modeling, this number was expected to 
be approximately 18,807 as a lower limit or a point estimate of 26,236.  These estimates are 
being evaluated currently and are anticipated to be published in 2017.  Therefore, the remaining 
data are reported as percentages and not actual numbers.  The percent of all enrolled infants 
with PEP within 1 calendar day of birth was about 97%.  The percent with HepB immunoglobulin 
(HBIG) and series complete by 8 months was about 74%.  The percent of all enrolled infants 
with post-vaccination serologic testing (PVST) results was about 64%.  The percent of all 
enrolled infants with HBsAg-positive results was about 0.4%.  The percent of all enrolled infants 
with protective levels of anti-HBs, after three doses of vaccine, was about 95%.  The percent of 
all enrolled infants that need revaccination was 2%, while those with indeterminant results was 
about 2%. Considering that potentially 4% of infants enrolled in the program require 
revaccination, that is about 450 infants pertaining to the recommendations under consideration. 
 
Dr. Nelson presented some studies that were used to inform the economic model to be 
presented during this session.  With regard to the proportion of infants protected after the initial 
vaccination series, a study by Ko et al of HepB vaccine response using data from the Enhanced 
Perinatal B Prevention Hepatitis B Prevention Program (EPHBPP) found about a 95% response 
rate among infants who completed a 3- or 4-dose HepB vaccine series.1  A cost-effective 
analysis of a perinatal HepB  by Barbosa et al included results from a Cochrane Review; a 
clinical trial of infant outcomes among HBsAg-positive infants born to HBsAg-positive mothers 
found a 92% efficacy for infants who received HBIG + the birth dose of HepB vaccine and the 
remaining doses on time.2  Another study by Schillie et al, also looking at EPHBPP data 
evaluated factors associated with infection status in infants born to HBsAg-positive mothers and 
found that 99% of infants were negative after receipt of ≥3 vaccine doses.3 [1Ko et al., Hepatitis 
B vaccine response using data from the Enhanced Perinatal B Prevention Hepatitis B 
Prevention Program (EPHBPP); 2Barbosa et al., Efficacy of vaccine and HBIG by time of 
administration and completion of vaccination series; 3Schillie et al., EPHBPP data, factors 
associated with infection status among infants born to HBsAg-positive mothers]. 
 
No studies specifically considered the proportion of individuals who do not respond to the initial 
HepB vaccine series who are seroprotected after one additional dose which was a key question 
of the analysis.  However, two studies from Thailand assessed infants who were vaccinated with 
four doses at a time point after each vaccine dose.  In the Lolekha et al study, in Schedule A, 
infants who received vaccine at birth, 1, and 6 months had a 92% response at 9 months (3 
months after the last dose) and about an 89% response at 13 months (about 7 months after the 
last dose).  In Schedule B, infants who received vaccine at birth, 1, 2, 12 months had an 86.5% 
response at 9 months and a 94.4% response at 13 months.  In Schedule A, the decline is not 
surprising since it is known that the antibody declines over time.1  A similar study by 
Assateerawatt et al assessed two groups of infants born to positive mothers with a somewhat 
higher birth weight of ≥2500g.  Group A received HBIG + vaccine at 0 and vaccine at 1, 2 and 
12 months.  Group B received no HBIG and vaccine at 0, 1, 2 and 12 months.2  There was no 
significant difference among the groups.  In Group A, there was a 96% seroconversion rate at 
12 months and 100% at 13 months.  In Group B, there was a 95.2% seroconversion rate at 12 
months and 95.7% at 13 months after the fourth dose [1Lolekha S, et al., Vaccine 2002; 20(31-
32): 3739-43; and 2Assateerawatt A, et al., Asian Pacific journal of allergy and immunology 
1993; 11(1): 85-91]. 
 






Ko et al specifically assessed the question regarding what percent of infants who do not 
respond to the initial hepatitis B vaccine series are protected after a complete second vaccine 
series.  The study found that of non-responder infants who completed a second vaccination 
series at the time of analysis in the study, 95% demonstrated a response after the second 
series [Ko et al., Vaccine 2014; 32(18): 2127-33]. 
 
In terms of the limitations, these studies were not designed specifically to evaluate response to 
single dose revaccination in initial infant non-responders.  There was variability among the 
studies with regard to maternal HBsAg status, HBIG administration, schedule, HBeAg status, 
and infant birth weight (<2000g vs. ≥2000g).  In general, limited data are available on this topic. 
 
Data also were considered from three sites that are part of the Perinatal HepB Prevention 
Program.  The records were reviewed for infants born to HBsAg-positive mothers from 2012 
through 2016 in Georgia, Michigan, and New York City (NYC) who received 3 doses of hepatitis 
B vaccine and PVST with anti-HBs <10 mIU/mL, followed by single dose revaccination with anti-
HBs measurement.  Of the 15 infants found, 14 (or 93%) had anti-HBs ≥10 mIU/mL after single 
dose revaccination.  This provides further evidence that most infants who do not respond to the 
initial vaccine series do respond after a single dose revaccination. 
 
Cost Analysis of Single Dose Revaccination for Infants Born to HBsAg-Positive Mothers  
 
Eric Hall, MPH 
Rollins School of Public Health 
Emory University 
 
Mr. Hall presented on assessing the cost-effectiveness of a single-dose of HepB revaccination 
among infants not responding to the initial vaccine series and born to HAV-infected mothers. 
The motivating study question for this analysis was, “Is a one-dose HepB revaccination strategy 
among infants born to HepB-infected mothers who do not respond to the initial vaccine series 
cost-effective compared to the current recommended three dose strategy?”  The analysis used 
a societal perspective, considered direct and indirect costs, and considered a one-dose 
revaccination strategy.  A one-year intervention timeframe and a one-year analytic horizon were 
used.  Discounting was not included due to the one-year horizon.  Any costs that differ between 











The top part in blue is the first vaccine series for an infant born to a mother who tested positive 
to HBsAg, who then goes on to receive HBIG and a three-dose HepB vaccine series.  The infant 
goes on to receive PVST.  If the antibody levels are > 10 mIU/mL, the infant is considered to be 
protected.  If the antibody levels are <10 mIU/mL, the infant is indicated for revaccination.  
Infants who are not protected after dose 2a go on to receive doses 2b and 2c, which mirrors the 
current 3-dose revaccination strategy.  Therefore, the cumulative risk of hepatitis B infection is 
the same in both strategies and health outcomes were assumed to not differ between the 
current strategy and the proposed strategy. 
 
The two strategies were assessed through a decision tree model utilized to assess the cost per 
person in the 1-dose and 3-dose revaccination strategies.  The costs per person equaled the 
sum of direct and indirect costs associated with each vaccine dose and each PVST.  These 
comparisons were made under a variety of epidemiologic scenarios identified as A, B, and C.  In 
terms of health outcomes, the model estimated the number of protected and unprotected 
individuals under each epidemiological scenario.  The number of protected individuals and 
cumulative risk of infection are assumed to be the same for each strategy.  There is not a 
difference in health outcomes between the two strategies.  The decision tree diagram used for 




On the far left is a cohort of infants who were born to mothers who tested positive with HBsAg 
and received the initial dose of the 3-vaccine series, received the first PVST, and had antibody 
<10 mIU/mL.  The blue square is the decision node.  The top portion of this diagram represents 
the proposed 1-dose revaccination strategy and the bottom portion represents the current 3-
dose strategy.  The green circles are chance nodes.  Associated probabilities are attached with 
each chance node that determine which series of branches an individual will follow.  Key 
variables are boxed in red and blue and represent infants that were previously protected and 
previously unprotected.  This composite variable was used to set the different epidemiologic 
scenarios mentioned earlier.  The motivation for creating these different scenarios came from 
the work Dr. Nelson mentioned that was done by their colleagues at DVH.  That work indicated 
that if a vaccinated infant had a PVST that was delayed beyond the recommended time frame, 
antibody levels could wane below 10 mIU/mL even though they are actually protected. 
 










A portion of the infants with delayed PVSTs can be indicated for revaccination even though they 
actually have previous protection.  The investigators created different scenarios that represent a 
different proportion of the cohort in which that is the case.  At the bottom of the diagram are the 
different variables and inputs that create scenarios A, B, and C.  In these, the efficacy of the 
initial vaccine series is varied, as are the proportion of the infants who received a delayed 
PVST, the proportion of infants whose antibody levels waned below 10 mIU/mL and were 
indicated for revaccination, and the resulting proportion of the total cohort indicated for 
revaccination who actually did have previous protection.  The red and blue boxes are the infants 
indicated for revaccination.  They go into the corresponding red and blue boxes from the 
previous diagram. 
 
Here are the table of probabilities and parameters and costs associated with each PVST that 
were input into this model: 
  
       
  






A few sensitivity analyses were conducted on some of these variables.  The first one, and 
perhaps one of the most important, was a univariate threshold analysis of the proportion 
protected by a single dose of revaccination (Dose 2a).  While there is an estimate of what that 
parameter might be, it is based on very limited data.  The researchers opened up the range in 
this sensitivity analysis from 0.0 to 0.9 to determine what level would be needed to favor one 
strategy over the other.  Secondly, a tornado diagram was constructed in which all probability 
and cost parameters were considered.  Finally, a two-way sensitivity analysis looked at the 
efficacy of dose 2a and the composite variable that represents the proportion of infants 
indicated for revaccination who actually previously were protected. 
 
Across all three scenarios, the 1-dose revaccination strategy was a lower cost option.  The 
results assume that every single vaccination visit occurred as a previously unscheduled visit, so 
each one included an additional trip to the clinic.  The researchers also considered scenarios in 
which 1, 2, or 3 of those revaccination visits occurred during a previously scheduled well-child 
visit.  Those visits did not include the added cost of the caregiver taking time off work to travel to 
the clinic, because they were assumed to be previously scheduled visits.  The 1-dose 
revaccination strategy remained the lower cost option across the board.  Here is a figure of the 




The added protection from the single revaccination dose ranges from 0.0 to 0.9, with the 
proportion indicated for revaccination who were previously protected ranging from 0.0 to 0.5.  
The blue area in this figure represents the combinations where the 1-dose revaccination 
strategy is the lower cost option.  The key point to notice from this is where the curve intersects 
the X axis at 0.45.  Basically, for any scenario under any value for the proportion of infants with 
previous protection, the 1-dose revaccination strategy will be the lower cost option as long as 
the efficacy for Dose 2a is 0.45 or higher. 
  






Here is a tornado diagram that displays the difference in cost per person between the 3-dose 




The X axis is the difference in cost per person between the two strategies.  The blue vertical line 
represents that differences under the base case scenario that was presented in the earlier table 
of results.  If the variables on the Y axis individually took on the most extreme values in their 
possible ranges, the diagram shows how they would affect the individual results in difference in 
cost per person between the 3-dose and 1-dose revaccination strategies. 
 
To summarize the findings, a 1-dose revaccination strategy reduces costs compared to the 
current 3-dose strategy across a wide array of scenarios.  The 1-dose revaccination strategy is 
a lower cost option under the assumption that 1, 2, or 3 of the vaccinations occur during a 
previously scheduled well-child visit. 
 
There are a few assumptions and limitations to this analysis.  The assumption was made that 
the risk of infection was the same in 1-dose and 3-dose revaccination strategies.  This 
assumption was dependent on the proposed structure of the 1-dose revaccination strategy in 
which individuals who were not protected after Dose 2a went on to receive Doses 2b and 2c, 
thus having the same experience as everybody in the current 3-dose revaccination strategy.  
Dropout was assumed to be the same in both strategies.  Also assumed was that infants born to 
mothers infected with HepB were correctly identified and that they received the initial vaccine 
series and PVST. 
 
In terms of how this work relates to other studies, a recent study assessed the cost-
effectiveness of the National Perinatal Hepatitis B Prevention Program (PHBPP) and concluded 
that the program is a cost-effective use of resources.1  The authors advocate for an expansion of 
the program to ensure that it reaches all children born to HepB-infected mothers.  In 2015, it 
was recommended that initial PVSTs occur 1 to 2 months after completion of the initial vaccine 
series (9 through 12 months of age) for infants born to hepatitis B-infected mothers to ensure 
PVST test results are representative of protection.5  Implementing this 1-dose revaccination 






strategy also will help correctly identify protected individuals without them having to undergo a 
full 3-dose revaccination series [1Barbosa, C., Smith, E. A., Hoerger, T. J., Fenlon, N., Schillie, 
S. F., Bradley, C., & Murphy, T. V. (2014). Cost-effectiveness analysis of the national Perinatal 
Hepatitis B Prevention Program. Pediatrics, 133(2), 243-253. doi:10.1542/peds.2013-0718; 
5Schillie, S., Murphy, T. V., Fenlon, N., Ko, S., & Ward, J. W. (2015). Update: Shortened Interval 
for Postvaccination Serologic Testing of Infants Born to Hepatitis B-Infected Mothers. MMWR 
Morb Mortal Wkly Rep, 64(39), 1118-1120. doi:10.15585/mmwr.mm6439a6]. 
 
Both this report and this presentation underwent a peer review in accordance with the ACIP 
Guidance for Health Economic Studies.14 One question from that review was, “Why weren’t 
revaccination using 2-doses and no-revaccination considered as strategies?”  After giving two 
additional doses, it is more practical to continue with a third dose rather than include another 
PVST after Dose 2b and possible continued non-response.  Single-dose revaccination is most 
consistent with other recommendations (e.g., for health-care personnel).  A non-intervention (no 
revaccination) strategy was not included because it would be unethical to leave infants who do 
not respond to the initial vaccine series unprotected [14Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). (2017). Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices: Guidance for Health 





Dr. Walter applauded the group for looking at ways to simplify the revaccination regimen.  
Noting the recommendation to perform a blood draw after receiving two series of vaccines, he 
wondered whether there were any actionable items if the test is negative and the infant is not 
seroprotected. 
 
Dr. Nelson responded that the evidence suggests that it does not make sense to then proceed 
with a third revaccination series.  At that point, the parent or family would have to be counseled 
that their infant is at high risk for infection and should be followed accordingly. 
  
Dr. Schillie (SME) added that there is language to that effect in the draft recommendations.  
There also is a separate table for management following discreet exposures for unprotected 
persons, so that would also be applicable to infants who do not develop protective anti-HBs 
following appropriate vaccination. 
 
Ms. Pellegrini asked to what extent the practitioners in the group thought the second series 
aligned with well-child visits.  It appeared that the third dose of the initial series was in the 9- to 
12-month range, while the return for confirmatory testing would be in the 11- to 14-month 
timeframe depending upon on when the third dose was administered.  When restarting the 
series, she wondered whether this would align with the 15-, 18-, 24-month period or if these 
families would have to attend extra visits. 
 
Dr. Moore responded that if everything is done on time, the PVST would be done around 9 or 10 
months of age.  In general, the minimum age for the PVST is 9 months.  If they needed to 
restart, they could do so potentially at their 1-year visit unless they went in early for the first 
dose.  It roughly aligns.  She said she could hear all of the Perinatal HepB Coordinators 
cheering, because the 1-dose option is a huge step forward in terms of being able to close out 
the follow-up of these children much more efficiently.  The most common scenario is the child 
does not have their PVST done in a timely manner, so many who were protected will wind up 






having a 3-dose series and additional visits although only 1 dose would be needed to 
demonstrate protection. 
 
Dr. Schillie (SME) indicated that the current recommendation for post-vaccination testing is 9 to 
12 months of age, because there are two well-child visits at those points.  The recommendation 
also states that infants who are delayed in vaccine series completion should be tested 1 to 2 
months after the final dose of the vaccine series. 
 
Dr. Hunter asked if it would be possible to have an option in the recommendation stating that 
the testing can be done at 7 to 8 months if the child happens to present at that time, which 
should result in fewer children falsely testing negative. 
 
Dr. Messonnier pointed out that some of the details are what Perinatal Hepatitis Coordinators 
need to know when they implement the recommendations.  They can try to differentiate the 
language of the recommendation verses the practical implementation guidance. 
 
Dr. Sun (FDA) asked whether in the WG’s review of the literature there were any studies on the 
population of infants who received the higher dose who essentially failed the first series and had 
to receive another series of vaccinations. 
  
Dr. Nelson replied that she was not aware of those studies in the published literature.  Some 
studies have been conducted, which are unpublished, that assessed differences in what the 
total actually was and how that might indicate how the baby might respond.  She did not believe 
that any of the published studies assessed higher vaccine doses. 
 
Dr. Schillie (SME) added that the majority of infants who receive a full second re-dose series 
respond at the standard dose. 
 
As Dr. Hunter understood it, for the cost analysis to be correct, an assumption had to be made 
that 45% of the children who received the extra single dose after they were negative for the 
antibody hepatitis converted to positive. 
 
Mr. Hall confirmed that this interpretation was correct.  The estimate for that was based on a 
couple of smaller studies.  It was estimated at about 0.78, with a wide range of variability. 
 
Dr. Duchin (NACCHO) asked whether anything was known about the risk factors for failure to 
respond to the first series, if the large proportion of infants born to infected mothers who are not 
ascertained might have higher or lower risk of failure to respond, and whether that would impact 
the cost-effectiveness calculations. 
 
Dr. Schillie (SME) replied that low birth weight and pre-term birth are influential factors.  
Prematurity is a risk factor for non-response, and some limited data suggest that male infants 
might have a slightly lower response than female infants. 
 
Dr. Nelson added that there may be other factors they are unaware of.  They used wide ranges 
in the sensitivity analysis down to 0.0 in some cases. 
 
Dr. Thompson asked whether the WG had an opinion as to which of the three scenarios is the 
true scenario, or how those scenarios should be interpreted in the context of what the evidence 
suggests. 
 






Mr. Hall responded that they tried to create three very drastic scenarios.  The initial scenario, A, 
assumes a very high efficacy of the first initial series and that everybody receives their PVST on 
time.  That scenario has the highest threshold value for Dose 2a.  That is where the 0.45 comes 
from.  Scenario B assumptions were made to be more realistic using data about the proportion 
of infants in the perinatal HepB prevention program who have a delayed PVST, and the 
proportion of those who do have antibodies.  He would say that Scenario B is probably the most 
reflective of what would be expected.  Scenario C had a very low initial efficacy level of that first 
vaccine series that basically incorporated all infants who were not receiving the initial vaccine 
series.  It assumed that a lot of them had an initial delayed PVST, and that a similar proportion 
of those had waned antibodies. 
 
Revaccination for Unprotected Infants Born to HBsAg‐Positive Mothers 
 
Noele Nelson, MD, PhD, MPH 
National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Nelson reported that the WG convened for two teleconference meetings on this topic and 
reached consensus regarding the proposed update to the hepatitis vaccine statement regarding 
single-dose revaccination for infants born to HBsAg-positive mothers.  They considered the pros 
and cons of single-dose revaccination verses 3-dose revaccination.  The pros of the single 
vaccine dose are that there are fewer vaccine doses for most infants, there is a short duration of 
case management, and it is less costly overall.  The cons are that those infants who do not 
respond to the single dose vaccination would need an additional blood draw, and 
provider/parent decision-making would be necessary because there would be two options (1-
dose revaccination and 3-dose revaccination).  The existing language states that, “HBsAg-
negative infants with anti-HBs levels <10 mIU/mL should be revaccinated with a second 3-dose 
series and retested 1–2 months after the final dose of vaccine” [1 Schillie S, et. al. MMWR Morb 
Mortal Wkly Rep. 2015 Oct 9;64(39):1118-20; Mast EE, MMWR Recomm Rep. 2005 Dec 
23;54(RR-16):1-31].  She then presented the revised language presented for a vote as follows:  
 
 HBsAg-negative infants with anti-HBs <10 mIU/mL should be re-vaccinated with 
a single dose of hepatitis B series and postvaccination serologic testing should 
be performed 1 to 2 months after the final dose of vaccine. 
  
 Alternatively, these infants may be revaccinated with a single dose of hepatitis B 
vaccine and retested 1 to 2 months later.  Infants whose anti-HBs remains <10 
mIU/mL following single dose revaccination should receive two additional doses 
of HepB vaccine, followed by testing 1 to 2 months later. 
 
 Available data do not suggest a benefit from administering additional hepatitis B 
vaccine doses to infants who have not obtained anti-HBs levels >10 mIU/mL 
following receipt of two complete hepatitis B vaccine series. 
  








Dr. Romero made a motion to accept the language as proposed, which Dr. Moore seconded.  
The discussion then continued. 
 
Dr. Belongia was unclear about the benefit of having two options.  One of the cons mentioned 
was that parents/providers would have to decide between two options, and the cost-
effectiveness analysis made the assumption that the outcomes would be the same for the two 
strategies.  The only difference is a cost issue not an outcome issue.  The proposed option 
incorporates the 3-dose series because if the infant is below 10 mIU/mL, the 3-dose series 
would be given anyway.  As stated, the first bullet of the proposed language added complexity 
without any additional benefit. 
 
Dr. Kempe concurred, emphasizing that this is likely to be confusing to providers.  They should 
have a blood draw anyway after the second 3-dose series, so this is not necessarily causing 
another blood draw. 
  
Dr. Nelson clarified that an additional blood draw would be required for infants who are 
revaccinated with one dose but still do not respond.  That is the primary con. 
  
Dr. Walter asked if the suggestion was to flip the bullets in the alternate language. 
 
Dr. Nelson asked for clarity regarding whether that meant the revised language would simply 
state that they should be revaccinated with a single dose of hepB vaccine and retest at 1 to 2 
months later.  Basically, the second bullet would replace the first. 
 
Dr. Bennett called on Dr. Reingold to comment on the thinking of the WG in bringing this 
statement forward in its current form, and whether there were any specific objections to making 
this a recommendation. 
 
Dr. Reingold replied that it was basically viewed as an evolution and providing two options 
rather than a stark change. 
  
Dr. Nelson added that there were no specific objections.  However, the WG did not specifically 
address the alternative of only single-dose revaccination.  It was not presented as such in the 
WG calls. 
 
Dr. Moore proposed that the preferred option be the single revaccination dose, followed by 
PVST, with an alternate option to give the 3-dose series if the single revaccination strategy is 
not chosen.  Dr. Kempe seconded the motion. 
 
Dr. Bennett repeated the amendment on the floor to reverse the proposed revised language 
such that the primary strategy would be single-dose, with an alternative of the full 3-dose series. 
  
Dr. Riley asked for clarification regarding whether the pediatric outcomes were the same for 
both strategies in the cost-effectiveness analysis. 
 
Dr. Schillie (SME) replied that they would receive 6 doses regardless, so there would not be any 
reason at all to think that the outcomes would be different. 
 






Dr. Nelson added that there is always a risk of infection if the infant does not respond, but that is 
not expected to differ between the two scenarios.  If they respond after 1 dose, they will be less 
likely to be infected than if they take 3 more doses to respond. 
 
Dr. Atmar thought the initial discussion pertained to including only what was in the second bullet 
and not even having the first bullet as an alternative. 
  
Dr. Moore clarified that her motion was to leave the 3-dose series as an alternative as part of 
the evolution of the strategy, versus recommending a sharp change in the recommendation.  
For example, a family may prefer to avoid a blood draw as they are quite difficult on the child 
and the family.  A back-up strategy is not inferior in any way, and still should be considered 
acceptable. 
 
Dr. Romero clarified that some parents might object to an additional blood draw on their infant 
and, therefore, would prefer a straightforward 3-dose series.  That has to remain as an option 
for those parents who have very strong feelings about the number of invasive procedures done 
to their child. 
 
Dr. Walter pointed out that there also may be logistical issues in terms of getting the blood draw, 
such as actually getting the child there. 
 
Dr. Byington (AAP) indicated that the AAP would favor the single-dose as the preferred option.  
Only if that fails would they support the 3-dose option.  This would be easier for families overall. 
 
Dr. Nelson presented the following revised language for a vote: 
 
 HBsAg-negative infants with anti-HBs <10 mIU/mL should be re-vaccinated with 
a single dose of HepB vaccine and receive postvaccination serologic testing 1-2 
months later.  Infants whose anti-HBs remains <10 mIU/mL following single dose 
revaccination should receive two additional doses of HepB vaccine, followed by 
PVST 1-2 months after the last dose. 
  
 Based on clinical circumstances or family preference, HBsAg-negative 
infants with anti-HBs <10 mIU/mL may instead be revaccinated with a 
second, complete 3-dose series, followed by postvaccination serologic 
testing (PVST) performed 1-2 months after the final dose of vaccine. 
  
 Available data do not suggest a benefit from administering additional HepB 
vaccine doses to infants who have not attained anti-HBs ≥10 mIU/mL following 
receipt of two complete HepB vaccine series.  
 
  









A Voice for Choice 
 
I am glad to see a reduction of vaccines given to babies.  I know that previously there was a 3-
dose series.  I assume, but I can’t assume that the—well, I should go back.  The information 
that was presented today was based on the efficacy of the vaccine as well as the cost of the 
vaccine, but it didn’t go into the risks of the vaccine or look at the outcome of the babies who 
were not given these doses and what happened in those families.  So, I just want to make 
sure—I just want to comment that, you know, the risk piece of this is also an important piece.  
The other piece which I find disturbing, which I mentioned the last time I was here, is the fact 
that this is based on very, very small base sizes. So, you know, you’ve got 15 babies that you’ve 
looked at and you haven’t looked at a larger sample size.  And I would hope that any 
recommendation is based on more than 15 people, or 15 babies, and that, you know, I 
understand that you’re voting on this today, but in the future, I would hope you would look at a 
larger base size.  I understand that the percentage of outcome is very high, and so being a 
statistician, I understand that that would likely replicate and it would likely, you know, be a 
positive outcome and come to the same conclusion.  But, having small base sizes is something 
that, you know, as a statistician you don’t do anything with 15 people other than qualitative 
responses.  You don’t base decisions on that.  That was my public comment.  Thank you. 
 
Vote:  Hepatitis B Vaccine Recommendation 
 
Dr. Romero initially made a motion to accept the revised Hepatitis B Vaccine Recommendation 
language as presented for a vote by Dr. Nelson.  Dr. Moore seconded the motion.  The motion 
carried unanimously with 13 affirmative votes, 0 negative vote, and 1 abstention.  The 
disposition of the vote was as follows: 
 
13 Favored: Atmar, Belongia, Bennett, Ezeanolue, Hunter, Kempe, Moore, Pellegrini, 
Reingold, Riley, Stephens, Szilagyi, Walter 
  0 Opposed: N/A 




Vote:  Amended Hepatitis B Vaccine Recommendation 
 
Although an initial vote was made on the above motion, following additional discussion, Dr. 
Moore motioned to approve the Hepatitis B Vaccine Recommendation as amended such that 
the preferred option would be the single revaccination dose, followed by PVST, with an alternate 
option to give the 3-dose series if the single revaccination strategy is not chosen.  Dr. Kempe 
seconded the motion.  The motion carried unanimously with 13 affirmative votes, 0 negative 
vote, and 1 abstention.  The disposition of the vote was as follows: 
 
13 Favored: Atmar, Belongia, Bennett, Ezeanolue, Hunter, Kempe, Moore, Pellegrini, 
Reingold, Riley, Stephens, Szilagyi, Walter 
  0 Opposed: N/A 
  1 Abstained:   Romero 
 








Dr. Jeanne M. Santoli 
Immunization Services Division 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Santoli indicated that the purpose of this resolution was to clarify recommendations related 
to dosing intervals and revaccination.  The eligible groups are all children and adolescents from 
birth through 18 years of age. 
 
The tables below list the acceptable vaccination schedules for children and adolescents from 
birth through 18 years of age, for which there is no change: 
 
Table 1, Part I: Infants 






Dose Age Dose Age 
≥2000 g Positive 1 Birth (≤12 hrs)1 1 Birth (≤12 hrs )1 
    2 1-2 months 2 2 months 
    3 6 months 3 4 months 
        4 6 months 
  Unknown 1 Birth (≤12 hrs)1 1 Birth (≤12 hrs)1 
    2 1-2 months 2 2 months 
    3 6 months 3 4 months 
        4 6 months 
  Negative 1 Birth (< 24 hours)1 1 Birth (< 24 hours)1 
    2 1-2 months 2 2 months 
    3 6 -18 months 3 4 months 
        4 6 months 
 
 
Table 1, Part 2: Infants       
 <2000 g  Positive 1 Birth (< 12 hrs)1 1 Birth (< 12 hrs)1   
2 1 month 2 2 months 
    3 2-3 months 3 4 months 
    4 6 months 4 6 months 
  Unknown 1 Birth (≤12 hrs)1 1 Birth (≤12 hrs)1 
    2 1 month 2 2 months 
    3 2-3 months 3 4 months 
    4 6 months 4 6 months 
  Negative 1 Age 1 month or at hospital 
discharge1 
1 Age 1 months or at hospital 
discharge1 
    2 2 months 2 2 months 
    3 6 -18 months 3 4 months 
        4 6 months 
 
Table Notes: 
1. Only a single antigen hepatitis B vaccine (ENGERIX-B® or RECOMBIVAX HB®) can be given at birth. 
2. Pediarix® [DTaP-IPV-HepB] is licensed for children 6 weeks through 6 years of age.  
3. Use of brand names is not meant to preclude the use of other comparable US licensed vaccines.  






Table 2:  Children and Adolescents  
Age Schedule1, 6 
Children (1 through 10 years) 0, 1, and 6 months2  
0, 2, and 4 months2 
0, 1, 2, and 12 months2,4  
Adolescents (11 through 18 years) 0, 1, and 6 months2 
0, 1, and 4 months2 
0, 2, and 4 months2 
0, 12, and 24 months2 
0 and 4-6 months3 
0, 1, 2, and 12 months2,4 
0, 7 days, 21-30 days, 12 months5 
 
Table Notes 
1.  Children and adolescents may be vaccinated according to any of the schedules indicated, except as noted. Selection of a 
schedule should consider the need to optimize compliance with vaccination. 
2.  Pediatric/adolescent formulation. 
3.  A two-dose schedule of Recombivax-HB Adult Formulation is (10 micrograms) is licensed for adolescents aged 11 through 15 
years.  When scheduled to receive the second dose, adolescents aged > 15 years should be switched to a three-dose series, with 
doses 2 and 3 consisting of the pediatric formulation administered on an appropriate schedule.  
4.  A four-dose schedule of Engerix B® is licensed for all age groups.  
5.  Twinrix® can be administered to persons 18 years of age before travel or any other potential exposure on an accelerated 
schedule at 0, 7, and 21-30 days, followed by a dose at 12 months.   
6.  Use of brand names is not meant to preclude the use of other comparable US licensed vaccines.  
 
This clarification is added to address confusion related to single antigen versus combination 
vaccine schedules.  In some cases, more than 3 doses are administered: 
 
Interrupted schedules and minimum dosing intervals 
 
 When the HepB vaccine schedule is interrupted, the vaccine series does not need to 
be restarted.  If the series is interrupted after the first dose, the second dose should 
be administered as soon as possible, and the second and third doses should be 
separated by an interval of at least eight weeks.  If only the third dose has been 
delayed, it should be administered as soon as possible.  
 
 The final dose of vaccine must be administered at least eight weeks after the second 
dose and should follow the first dose by at least 16 weeks; the minimum interval 
between the first and second doses is four weeks. Inadequate doses of hepatitis B 
vaccine or doses received after a shorter-than-recommended dosing interval should 
be re-administered, using the correct dosage or schedule. 
 
 Vaccine doses administered ≤4 days before the minimum interval or age are 
considered valid.  Because of the unique accelerated schedule for Twinrix®, the 
four-day guideline does not apply to the first three doses of this vaccine when 
administered on a 0 day, 7 day, 21-30 day, and 12-month schedule. 
 
 In infants, administration of the final dose is not recommended before age 24 weeks 
(164 days).  
  






This update reflects the discussion ACIP just participated in related to single dose revaccination: 
 
Revaccination 
Revaccination (i.e., booster dose, challenge dose, or revaccination with a complete 
series) is not generally recommended for persons with a normal immune status who 
were vaccinated as infants, children, or adolescents. Revaccination when anti-HBs is 
<10 mIU/mL is recommended for the following: 
 
 Infants born to HBsAg-positive mothers 
 HBsAg-negative infants with anti-HBs <10 mIU/mL should be re-
vaccinated with a single dose of HepB vaccine and receive post 
vaccination serologic testing 1-2 months later.  Infants whose anti-HBs 
remains <10 mIU/mL following single dose revaccination should receive 
two additional doses of HepB vaccine, followed by PVST 1-2 months after 
the last dose.   
• Based on clinical circumstances or family preference, HBsAg-
negative infants with anti-HBs <10 mIU/mL may instead be 
revaccinated with a second, complete 3-dose series, followed by 
post vaccination serologic testing (PVST) performed 1-2 months 
after the final dose of vaccine.   
 
 Hemodialysis patients.  For hemodialysis patients, the need for booster doses 
should be assessed by annual anti-HBs testing.  A booster dose should be 
administered when anti-HBs levels decline to <10 mIU/mL.   
 
 Other immunocompromised persons.  For other immunocompromised persons 
(e.g., HIV-infected persons, hematopoietic stem-cell transplant recipients, and 
persons receiving chemotherapy), the need for booster doses has not been 
determined.  When anti-HBs levels decline to <10 mIU/mL, annual anti-HBs 
testing and booster doses should be considered for persons with an ongoing risk 
for exposure. 
 
 Persons with postvaccination serologic testing results that do not demonstrate 
protection. This includes children and adolescents through age 18 years who are 
chronic hemodialysis patients, HIV-infected, otherwise immunocompromised 
(e.g., hematopoietic stem-cell transplant recipients or persons receiving 
chemotherapy), or sex partners of HBsAg-positive persons. Persons in these 
groups found to have anti-HBs concentrations of <10 mIU/mL after the primary 




Refer to product package inserts. 
 
Contraindications and Precautions 
 
Contraindications and Precautions can be found in the package inserts available at 
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/ApprovedProducts/UCM093833 
  






Statement Regarding Update Based on Published Documents 
 
[If an ACIP recommendation regarding Hepatitis B vaccination is published within 12 months 
following this resolution, the relevant language above (except in the eligible groups sections) will 
be replaced with the language in the recommendation and incorporated by reference to the 
publication URL.] 
 
Vote:  Vote:  VFC Resolution for Hepatitis B Vaccine Recommendation 
 
Dr. Hunter motioned to approve the VFC resolution for the Hepatitis B Vaccine 
Recommendation.  Ms. Pellegrini seconded the motion.  The motion carried unanimously with 
13 affirmative votes, 0 negative vote, and 1 abstention.  The disposition of the vote was as 
follows: 
 
13 Favored: Atmar, Belongia, Bennett, Ezeanolue, Hunter, Kempe, Moore, Pellegrini, 
Reingold, Riley, Stephens, Szilagyi, Walter 
  0 Opposed: N/A 







Chip Walter, MD 
Chair, Influenza Work Group 
 
Dr. Walter reminded everyone that during the October 2016 meeting, there were two sessions, 
including an influenza epidemiology and surveillance update and a summary of the clinical data 
for AFLURIA® Quadrivalent vaccine in adults, which was licensed for persons 18 years of age 
and older in August 2016. 
 
Since the October 2016 ACIP meeting, the WG has engaged in calls twice a month.  The 
following is a list of highlights from the calls: 
 
 Updates from MedImmune regarding investigations and planned studies related to the lower 
than expected effectiveness observed with FluMist® against H1N1pdm09 strains during the 
2013-2014 and 2015-2016 seasons in the US 
 
 Updates from Seqirus regarding their pediatric development program for AFLURIA® 
Quadrivalent implications for use in children 
 
 
Their current trivalent vaccine is licensed in the US for those 5 years of age and 
older 
During the 2010-2011 timeframe, ACIP recommended that the vaccine be given only 
to those 9 years of age and older, given that higher rates of fever and febrile seizure 
were observed in children in Australia during the 2010-2011 season 
 











The topics for the February 2017 session included an influenza surveillance update, influenza 
VE update, AFLURIA® Quadrivalent vaccine update, and a FluMist® update. 
 
Influenza Surveillance Update 
 
Lynnette Brammer, MPH 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
During this session, Ms. Brammer provided a brief update on influenza activity for the 2016-
2017 season.  As of the week ending February 11, 2017, the peak influenza positivity so far was 
during Week 6 at 24.2% positive.  This level is similar to the peak for last season.  Thus far from 
clinical laboratories, 83% of the viruses have been influenza A.  Data from public health 
laboratories show that influenza A (H3N2) viruses are the predominant virus this season.  So 
far, 88% of the viruses tested by the public health laboratories have been influenza A viruses.  
Among those that were subtyped, 98% were H3N2 viruses.  There have been some reports of 
influenza B, which seemed to be increasing as would be expected for this point in the season.  
Cumulatively for the season, 56% of the influenza B viruses that have had lineage testing 
performed have been from the B Yamagata lineage.  Prior to the start of 2017, B Victoria 
viruses had been predominant. 
 
In terms of genetic information on the viruses circulating, the vast majority of viruses have been 
H3N2.  In terms of the breakout of those viruses genetically, 96% tested by public health 
laboratories were in the 3C.2a genetic group, which is the same genetic group that the vaccine 
strain belongs to (A/Hong Kong/4801).  The remaining 4% were in the 3C.3a group.  
A/Switzerland, last year’s virus, is a representative of that group.  All of the H1pmd09 were in 
the 6B.1 genetic group, all of the B Victoria were in the V1A genetic group, and all of the B 
Yamagata were in the Y3 genetic group. 
 
In terms of the antigenic characterization of the viruses, all 74 of the A(H1N1)pdm09viruses 
tested using ferret post-infection antisera were A/California/07/2009-like, the H1N1 component 
of the 2016-2017 vaccine.  Among the A(H3N2) viruses, 311 of the 322 (96.6%) were 
antigenically characterized as A/Hong Kong/4801/2014-like, the H3N2 component of the 2016-
17 vaccine.  Among the B/Victoria linage viruses, 71 of 78 (91%) were antigenically 
characterized as B/Brisbane/60/2008-like, which is included in both quadrivalent and trivalent 
influenza vaccines for the 2016-2017 season.  Among the B/Yamagata lineage, all 67 were 
antigenically characterized as B/Phuket/3073/2013-like, an influenza B virus included in the 
quadrivalent influenza vaccines for the 2016-2017 season. 
 
Regarding influenza-like illness (ILI) as reported through outpatient surveillance, 5.2% of visits 
during the week ending February 11th were for ILI.  This is well above the baseline of 2.2%.  All 
10 HHS regions were above their region-specific baselines.  For that week, all regions except 9 
and 10 (West Cost) continued to increase.  The following map shows ILI activity level for states: 
 








Numerous states were reporting high ILI activity, including 28 states and New York City at high 
activity and another 7 in Puerto Rico at moderate activity.  The Western portion of the US was at 
a lower activity level, which likely reflects the fact that many of those states, particularly in the 
Northeast, may already have experienced peak activity and may be declining. 
 
In terms of hospitalization data report through FluSurv-NET, which covers about 9% of the US 
population, the overall laboratory-confirmed associated hospitalization rate was 29.4/100,000 
cumulative through the week ending February 11th.  That rate was highest for people 65 years 
of age and older at 136.6/100,000 followed by people 50 to 64 years of age at 28.5/100,000. 
 
Based on data from the National Center of Health Statistics (NCHS) mortality surveillance 
system as of the week ending January 28th, 7.8% of deaths filed had pneumonia or influenza 
listed on the death certificate.  This is above the epidemic threshold of 7.5% for that week and 
was the fourth week above that threshold.  This is considered to be excess influenza-associated 
mortality.  Thus far, 29 influenza-associated laboratory-confirmed pediatric deaths have been 
reported. 
 
Regarding the schedule for vaccine strain selection for the 2017-2018 influenza season, the 
WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2017-2018 
Northern Hemisphere influenza season was scheduled for February 27-March 1, with their 
announcement of their decision anticipated on March 2nd.  The FDA’s Vaccines and Related 
Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) was scheduled to meet on March 9, 2017 to 
make the US-specific vaccine strain decision. 
 
In summary, influenza A(H3N2) viruses have predominated during the 2016-2017 season.  
However, influenza B activity may be starting to increase as would be anticipated late in the 
season.  So far, influenza activity has been moderate but may not have peaked yet.  The 
majority of circulating stains are similar to those contained in the 2016-2017 vaccine.  Vaccine 
virus recommendations for the 2017-2018 influenza season should be made in the next two 
weeks. 
  






Vaccine Effectiveness Update 
 
Brendan Flannery, PhD  
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Flannery reported interim estimates of 2016–2017 seasonal influenza VE against medically 
attended influenza from the US Flu VE Network.  The interim estimates were published in the 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) on February 17, 2017.  These data come from 
five US Flu VE Network.  The sites and principal investigators are as follows: 
 
 Baylor Scott and White Health (Manju Gaglani) 
 Group Health Cooperative (Mike Jackson, Lisa Jackson) 
 Marshfield Clinic Research Foundation (Ed Belongia, Huong McLean) 
 University of Michigan (Arnold Monto, Emily Martin) 
 University of Pittsburgh (Rick Zimmerman, Tricia Nowalk) 
 
The methods are the same as have been used for estimates in the past.  The system enrolls 
outpatients 6 months of age and older with acute respiratory illness defined as having acute 
respiratory illness with cough of less than 7 days duration.  These data include enrollment from 
November 28, 2016 through February 4, 2017.  One of the sites started as early as November, 
with others starting in January.  These data come from a test-negative design.  Vaccination 
odds are compared among influenza reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) 
positive cases and RT-PCR negative controls.  Vaccination status for the interim estimates is 
receipt of at least one dose of any 2016–2017 seasonal influenza vaccine according to medical 
records, immunization registries, and/or self-report.  One site has medical records in registries 
only for this interim estimate, two sites have a mixture of medical records and self-report, and 
two sites that use self-report; whereas, for the end of season estimates, it is documented or 
plausible self-report.  The analysis uses a logistic regression of (1 – adjusted OR) x 100% for 
VE.  The variables used to adjust odds ratios include study site, age, self-rated general health 
status, race/Hispanic ethnicity, interval (days) from onset to enrollment, and calendar time. 
 
Similar to the surveillance data, the majority of cases for patients enrolled in the network were 
H3N2.  Overall, 24% (744) of the 3144 patients enrolled during the time period of the interim 
analysis tested RT-PCR positive and 76% (2400) tested influenza RT-PCR negative.  There 
was some B/Yamagata predominantly among the B lineage seen for patients enrolled.  About 
30% of those enrolled were positive for influenza in more recent weeks. 
 
The overall estimate for all influenza A and B includes all ages.  The percentage vaccinated was 
45% among the influenza positives and 55% among the influenza negatives.  The VE was 48% 
(CI 37% to 57%).  Dr. Flannery stressed that it was too early at this stage to make much of the 
differences in some of the point estimates by age, though they hope to have better estimates to 
determine whether VE differs by age group as has been observed in some previous seasons in 
the end of season estimates.  The estimates also were available by H3N2 specifically, which 
was very similar to the overall estimate.  The adjusted VE against H3N2 for all ages was 43% 
(CI 29% to 54%).  There was some variability in the point estimates by age, but only two of the 
age groups were statistically significant at this point, the 6 months through 8-year-old group at 
53% and the 50 through 64-year-old group at 50%.  Overall for all ages against influenza B, the 
VE was 73% (CI 54% to 84%]. 
 






In summary, the interim results for 2016–2017 season through February 4, 2017 indicate VE of 
48% against medically attended influenza.  This interim estimate is similar to previous seasons 
when vaccine was well-matched to circulating influenza viruses.  There was significant 
protection against circulating influenza A(H3N2) and B viruses (predominantly B/Yamagata), but 
VE was not estimated against H1N1pdm09 or B/Victoria due to the small number of cases.  
Enrollment continues, so end-of-season VE estimates may differ from interim estimates.  VE 
was 43% against A(H3N2), similar to antigenically matched H3N2 viruses.  VE was 39% in both 
2011-2012 and in 2012-2013.  Both of those seasons were judged to be antigenically matched, 
although in 2012-2013 it was noted that there were egg adaptations in H3N2 viruses that may 
have affected the VE. 
 
However, a meta-analysis1 of test-negative VE studies similar to this study looking at VE over a 
number of seasons found an H3N2 VE weighted average of 33% (26% - 39%).  The 43% 
estimate can be said to be similar to those estimates of H3N2 effectiveness over multiple 
seasons, which suggests that there is a problem for VE against H3N2 in relation to slightly 
higher effectiveness than seen against A(H1N1)pdm09, which was an average of 61% in the 
same meta-analysis, and B viruses with an average of 54%.1  It is not clear why there is a 
problem with H3N2 viruses specifically.  There are more frequent updates to the H3N2 
component, which reflects more rapid antigenic change among H3N2 viruses.  Also noted is 
that the candidate A(H3N2) vaccine viruses are more often affected by egg-adapted changes 
that result in antigenic difference after the adaptation to growth in eggs.  CDC is working on 
methods and approaches to improve VE against A(H3N2) viruses and better candidate viruses 




Regarding the change in the antigenic nature of the vaccine virus in the egg as possibly being a 
reason that H3N2 VE is lower, Dr. Hunter asked whether there were any data about vaccines 
administered that have not been produced in egg to know whether they work better against 
H3N2. 
 
Dr. Flannery responded that there are not yet enough data to be able to have an estimate of VE 
of either the recombinant or the cell-based vaccine from the CDC network.  CDC is dependent 
on uptake of those vaccines, which has not reached a level at which they have been able to 
estimate the effectiveness of those vaccines.  End-of-season estimates will include vaccine-
specific or vaccine type estimates, but being able to get a VE will still be dependent upon 
uptake. 
 
Dr. Reingold asked whether there were any estimates of vaccine coverage for this season in 
various groups. 
 
Dr. Flannery replied that estimates through November were published and are included in the 
MMWR on VE.  The key question regards the live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) 
recommendation and effective coverage in children.  It is too early to know.  The Immunization 
Services Division (ISD) is doing some work on that.  The point estimate for young children is 
slightly lower than it was in November for the previous season by about 5 percentage points at 
about 40%. 
 
Dr. Messonnier added that there are some newer data, which would be presented later in the 
session. 
 






Dr. Duchin (NACCHO) asked whether any assessment is being done of sequence differences 
between the vaccine strain selected and the strain produced after egg manufacturing as a way 
to determine what might explain the reduced VE. 
 
Dr. Katz replied that in the US, the FDA does not require that information.  However, in Europe 
there is a pilot study to examine the sequences after the viruses have been propagated during 
the vaccine manufacturing process.  The regulatory requirements are different in the US and are 
very stringent.  The FDA does an antigenic analysis of the seed virus that goes into the 
manufacturing process, and that can be passaged only one or two more times.  They ensure 
that the egg propagated vaccine seed virus is antigenically similar within 2-fold to the candidate 
vaccine virus that the manufacturers receive.  They send their seed that they have passaged 
several times to optimize yield back to the FDA, and the FDA compares the two.  This is with 




Gregg C. Sylvester, MD, MPH 
Head of Medical Affairs 
Seqirus™ A CSL Company 
 
Dr. Sylvester reviewed the comprehensive investigation on 2010 AEs in the Southern 
Hemisphere CSL 2010 SH trivalent influenza vaccine (TIV), as well as the staged clinical 
development program for AFLURIA®.  The four trials in the staged clinical development program 
for AFLURIA® include the following, though Dr. Sylvester focused only on the first and third trials 
during this presentation given that they were the ones germane to the discussion earlier in the 
morning pertaining to fever rates: 
 
 Children 5 years <9 years of age:  Modified TIV Safety Phase IV 
 Adult ≥18 years of age:  QIV Immunogenicity & Safety Phase III 
 Children 5 years of age to <18 years of age:  QIV Immunogenicity & Safety Phase III 
 Children 6 months of age to 59 months of age:  QIV Immunogenicity & Safety Phase III 
 
AFLURIA® is a purified, inactivated, split virion influenza vaccine.  It has been manufactured in 
Parkville, Australia for the last 40 years.  There are two formulations, a thimerosal-free 0.5mL 
pre-filled syringe and a thimerosal-containing 5mL multi-dose vial.  It has an interesting 
licensure history.  In November 2007, CSL was granted approval for the TIV in those ≥18 years.  
In 2010-2011 season, there was a licensure down to 6 months of age and above.  The vaccine 
was never brought into the US, so in December 2011, the FDA revised the licensure and now it 
is licensed for the TIV for those 5 years of age to <18 years of age.  The FDA approve QIV in 
those ≥18 years of age in August 2016, which Dr. Sylvester presented on to ACIP in October 
2016.  A Supplemental Biologics License Application (sBLA) has been submitted to the FDA for 
use of QIV in those 5 years of age to <18 years of age. 
 
The prescribing information for AFLURIA® is that it is not to be used in children less than 5 years 
of age. However, ACIP recommends that other age-appropriate influenza vaccine should be 
used in children through the age of 8 years.  There is a different in the licensure versus the 
recommendation, which is due to the fact that there was an unexpected increase in reports of 
fever and febrile seizures primarily in children less than 5 years of age compared to previous 
seasons in the Southern Hemisphere using the CSL 2010 SH TIV.  Also noted was that there 
were increased reports of fever in children 5 years of age to less 9 years of age. 
 






Dr. Sylvester described three discrete programs looking at a systematic and comprehensive 
investigation: 
 






Characterize the AEs 
Identify risk factors and at-risk populations 
 
 Manufacturing & Quality Review 
Assessment of safety and manufacturing process 
Assessment of quality (purity and potency) 
 
 Scientific Research Investigation 
Explore potential indirect surrogate measures (in vivo and in vitro tests) 
 
The safety review examined the unexpected increase in fever and febrile seizures observed in 
the Southern Hemisphere in 2010.  It would be rare to see a febrile seizure over the age of 5 
due to the stage of hypothalamic development in young children.  Febrile seizures typically 
occur in children between the ages of 6 months and 5 years of age.  The peak age is about 24 
months of age, and they can occur up to 5 years of age.  In the Southern Hemisphere, 5 to 
9/1000 children vaccinated had a febrile seizure.  More than 80% occurred within the first 12 
hours of receiving the vaccine.  The average duration following seizure onset was 2.5 minutes, 
with a range from 1 to 6 minutes.  In the US, this occurred in a predominance of males at 2/3 
compared to 1/3 in females.  The highest fever recorded was 40.8o C but the mean was 39o C.  
There also were increased fever reports in children 5 to less than 9 years of age.  Within a 
month of this investigation, the regulatory agency in Australia, the recommending body in 
Australia, and the company CSL withdrew the vaccine but continued post-marketing 
surveillance throughout the entire season.  At that time, FDA, CDC, and ACIP were notified.  As 
early as July 2010, the recommendation was made on AFLURIA®. 
 
Dr. Sylvester showed the following schematic of the CSL manufacturing process, asking 










After the whole virus is grown in egg, there is an inactivation state, the β-propiolactone (BPL) 
treatment.  That inactivates the vaccine, creating the virion in the middle, which contains the 
fragmented ribonucleic acid (RNA).  The splitting agent is created by sodium tauro deoxycholate 
(TDOC), which creates the lipid/RNA complexes.  Dr. Sylvester focused further on the TDOC 
and the lipid RNA complexes. 
 
A detailed review was made of all manufacturing aspects starting at the seed all the way to fill 
and finish, including raw materials, facilities, utilities, and processes.  No deviation or change 
was found from previous seasonal formulations.  All batches met specification and there was no 
evidence of batch-specific issues.  Laboratory testing ruled out chemical contamination, 
bacterial contamination, and viral contamination.  There was no evidence of agglomeration as a 
contributing factor.  However, there was one major change of note.  The WHO had 
recommended three new virus strains for inclusion in the 2010 influenza vaccines for the 
Southern Hemisphere.  There was a complete strain change for TIV in 2009.  The strains for 
those two years were: 
 
TIV 2009 
 A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1) – Like  
 A/Uruguay/716/2007 (H3N2) – Like  
 B/Florida/4/2006 – Like 
 
TIV 2010 
 A/California/7/2009 (H1N1) – Like  
 A/Perth/16/2009 (H3N2) – Like  
 B/Brisbane/60/2008 – Like  
 
The scientific investigation was then performed.  An attempt was made to find an animal model 
that could create febrile seizures.  Non-human primates, ferrets, rabbits, and newborn rats were 
considered.  However, febrile seizures were not induced in any of the in vivo models examined 
with any TIV.  Therefore, assays were created for in vitro models.  The published literature 
suggested that increased cytokine levels were observed after febrile seizures.  Thus, cytokine 
and chemokine models were explored as correlates of in vivo pyrogenicity.  Mapping these 
cytokines and chemokines in vitro may act as an indirect surrogate measure of the reactogenic 
potential of the TIVs.  CSL 2010 SH TIV was found to stimulate the release of cytokines and 
chemokines in whole blood assays more robustly than previous CSL TIVs or other 
manufacturers’ TIVs.  The difference between the CSL 2010 SH TIV and other TIVs suggested 
that the manufacturing process may have played a role.  The difference between the CSL 2010 
SH TIV and previous CSL TIVs suggested that the new influenza strains may have played a 
role. 
 
The investigation revealed that the CSL manufacturing process resulted in more residual lipid 
and RNA complexes with the CSL 2010 SH TIV than other licensed influenza vaccines.  These 
complexes induced a stronger than expected inflammatory signal.  It turned out that the splitting 
agent, or TDOC, plays a key role in the number of lipid/RNA complexes.  The higher 
concentration of TDOC and lower reduction of lipid/RNA complexes resulted in lower reduction 
in the assays or in the signal.  By increasing the concentration in TDOC levels, CSL showed 
that there was a significant reduction in the inflammatory response, shown in these two graphs:  
 








The two graphs represent two assays.  The standard TIV was split for A(H1N1) at 0.9%, H3N2 
at 1.5%, and B at 0.5%.  The inflammatory signal can be seen on both of the above assays.  
H1N1 was then increased to 1.5% and H3N2 and B were left the same (New #1).  That resulted 
in a reduction in the pyrogenicity.  Then H1N1 was 0.9% and H3N2 and B were 1.5% (New #2), 
which resulted in a marked reduction.  There was a belief that B was creating the AEs.  Then all 
three were assessed at the concentration of 1.5% (New #3) within the manufacturing process 
allowance, which showed an even further reduction.  These in vitro models demonstrated that 
lipids and degraded RNA fragments “preserved by the standard TDOC manufacturing process” 
as well as the three new strains were the contributing factors of the CSL 2010 SH TIV pediatric 
AE profile.  The investigation demonstrated that increasing the levels of TDOC attenuated the 
pro-inflammatory signals in vitro.  These conclusions led to the staged approach for a new 
clinical development program for AFLURIA®. 
 
The Pediatric Phase 4 Safety Study focusing on children 5 years to <9 years of age was 
modified within registered conditions because the B strain was split at 1.5% TDOC.  There were 
400 subjects in whom safety and tolerability were evaluated.  Hopefully, the results will inform 
the QIV pediatric clinical development program and can be used as an indirect comparison with 
historical data and comparator QIV.  The comparator QIV is a licensed US vaccine.  This study 
showed an overall fever rate for the CSL TIV modified vaccination in children 5 years of age to 
<9 years of age was 8.2%, with the vast majority being mild or moderate at <39o C compared to 
the reference QIV, which was 9.2%.  The confidence intervals overlap and the fever rates are 
similar to the licensed QIV product.  By increasing the TDOC in the B strain, the point estimates 
are now much lower than the historical TIV as well as the comparator QIV.  The confidence 
limits do overlap.  In terms of severe fever rates, fever intensity of >39o C, the point estimates 
hover at about 2% and once again, below the comparator QIV and historic TIV from past 
experience at CSL. 
 
The conclusion was that the CSL TIV fever rates observed in this study were similar to the 
comparator QIV vaccine in children 5 years of age to <9 years of age.  Due to this, the TDOC 
concentrations are now incorporated for splitting all A and B strains.  This informed the staged 
approach for the QIV program.  As mentioned earlier, the FDA has already approved the 
licensure for the QIV in those ≥18 years.  The Phase III Study for those 5 years to <18 years of 
age has been submitted to the FDA, with the hope that it will be licensed in 2017.  The Phase III 
Study in those 6 months to 59 months of age is now an ongoing study. 
 






The trial in children 5 years to <18 years of age was an immunogenicity as well as a safety trail, 
and all 8 co-primary endpoints were met.  AFLURIA® QIV demonstrated non-inferior 
immunogenicity for all strains to the comparator QIV (Fluarix® QIV) in children 5 years to <18 
years of age.  Descriptive secondary immunogenicity endpoints overall, and by age subgroups 
(5 years to <9 years, and 9 years to <18 years inclusive) were robust and were consistent with 
expectations for these age groups, and this is similar with the comparator QIV. 
  
AFLURIA® QIV following vaccination were similar to the comparator QIV in both age groups, 
with 5 years to <9 years of age at 4.5% (95% CI: 3.2, 6.1) compared to 3.6% (95% CI: 1.8, 6.6), 
and in 9 years to <18 years at 2.1% (95% CI: 1.3, 3.4) compared to 0.8% (95% CI: 0.1, 2.7).  
The vast majority of fever in both vaccines were mild to moderate.  In terms of historical fever 
rates, the point estimates are even lower than the TIV study with 400 subjects and historical 
TIV.  For severe fever, AFLURIA® QIV hovers just over 1% for >90o C and slightly higher than 
the comparator, but well within the same confidence limits. 
 
In summary, AFLURIA® TIV and QIV safety profiles in those 5 years to <18 years of age is 
acceptable.  Fever rates for those 5 years to <9 years of age are similar to the comparator and 
less than historical vaccines.  Both AFLURIA® TIV and QIV will be offered in the US during the 
2017-2018 influenza season.  As mentioned, the sBLA for the 5 years of age through 18 years 




Dr. Belongia asked whether TDOC is routinely used for split virus vaccines across 
manufacturers, and what kind of guidance the FDA provides to manufacturers in terms of the 
TDOC concentration. 
 
Dr. Sylvester replied that every vaccine manufacturer has different proprietary methods.  TDOC 
is used only for AFLURIA® and not in other influenza vaccines. 
 
Dr. Sun said that he had nothing to add, but that if the other manufacturers wished to comment 
on their splitting agents, they may do so. 
 
Dr. Stephens noted that it raised the question about mechanism.  He wondered if Dr. Sylvester 
could offer any more specificity about how they are modifying the immune response by 
increasing the TDOC and changing the lipid and RNA fragment concentrations. 
 
Dr. Sylvester responded that that what they do know is that when TDOC was at 0.5% for the B 
strain, there was a lot of residual lipid that was connected to the messenger RNA (mRNA).  
Increasing the TDOC clears out much of the lipid component that was believed to be causing 
much of the AEs and leaves the RNA, and there is still nice immunogenicity. 
 
Dr. Walters asked whether there were plans to continue the assessments on an ongoing basis 
as vaccines are produced and differ annually. 
 
Dr. Sylvester replied that the two assays they created have been validated and are now part of 
the manufacturing process, so that as the four strains are created, they are tested throughout 
the system and at the end product to ensure that the reactogenicity is much lower than 
previously. 
 






Based on the data, Dr. Foster (APhA) asked whether the WG was considering removing the 
recommendation for those 5 years of age to <8 years of age. 
 
Dr. Cohn indicated that a summary of the WG discussion would be presented later in the 
session. 
 
Fluzone® High-Dose (HD) Update 
 
Stefan Gravenstein, MD, MPH, CMD 
Professor of Medicine  
Director, Center for Geriatrics and Palliative Care 
University Hospitals and Case Western Reserve University 
Adjunct Professor of Medicine, Brown University 
Clinical Director, Healthcentric Advisors 
 
Dr. Gravenstein presented results from a Fluzone® HD versus standard-dose (SD) cluster 
randomized trial in US long-term care facilities (LTCF).  He said that as a geriatrician, he would 
frame this around the way he thinks about older patients and the value of vaccines as 
distinguished from children.  A study by Smeeth examined first heart attack or first stroke after 
an inflammatory event, in this case systemic respiratory tract infection (SRTI) or urinary tract 
infection (URI).  The study showed that in the weeks and months following the inflammatory 
event, there is an increased risk for first heart attack or first stroke that is 2- to 4-fold higher.  
That increased risk persists out for a few months [Smeeth, L. et al. N Engl J Med 2004; 351: 
2611-2618]. 
 
When Dr. Gravenstein talks about this with his health staff, he talks about inflammation and the 
risk of vaso-occlusive event.  In this case, it is framed as thrombosis, and he uses a 











When people are born and are young, the inflammatory mediators or markers of inflammation 
are relatively low.  On the Thrombometer, young people would be at low-risk for propensity to 
clot.  With increasing age, inflammatory markers start rising and the propensity to clot increases 
as well.  If underlying diseases (obesity, diabetes, arthritis, vascular disease, dementia, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)) are added on top of that, the markers increase further 
and the propensity to clot is even higher.  In terms of the risk for complications from infectious 
events, vaso-occlusive risk rises with age and disease.  Add to that infections (bladder, 
respiratory), the risk goes even higher.  One outcome that might be expected with 
administration of an effective vaccine that reduces the amount of inflammation with an infectious 
event such as influenza or pneumococcal disease is a reduction in these types of events.  Older 
individuals become immune senescence, have a lessor immune response that is more 
permissive for infection and often more permissive for severe infection that can result in 
hospitalization.  This also lowers the vaccine response, so better vaccines are needed to 
overcome declining response.  This also slows recovery from infection and changes symptom 
presentation with age [Lambert Nathaniel D et al. Understanding the immune response to 
seasonal influenza vaccination in older adults: a systems biology approach. Expert Rev. 
Vaccines. 2012 August; 11(8): 985-994; and Taub D, Longo D. Insights into thymic aging and 
regeneration. Immunol Rev. 2005;205(1):72-93. (Abstract only)]. 
 
Studies with HD compared to SD influenza vaccine have been presented to ACIP previously.  In 
an RCT published by DiazGranados and colleagues of an elderly population of approximately 
32,000 people showed a 25% reduction in laboratory-confirmed influenza and a 30% reduction 
in hospitalizations.1  A meta-data analysis study published by lzurieta and colleagues in 
collaboration with CDC, NIH, and FDA examined individuals diagnosed and treated for influenza 
and observed a similar reduction in these diagnoses (22%) and hospitalizations (22%) with an 
influenza diagnoses2 [1Carlos A. DiazGranados, M.D., Andrew J. Dunning, Ph.D., Murray 
Kimmel, D.O., Daniel Kirby, B.Sc., John Treanor, M.D., Efficacy of High-Dose versus Standard-
Dose Influenza Vaccine in Older Adults, N Engl J Med 2014; 371:635-645|August 14, 2014|DOI: 
10.1056/ NEJMoa1315727; 2Slzurieta HS, Thadani N, Shay DK, Lu Y, Maurer A, Foppa IM, 
Franks R, Pratt D, Forshee RA, MaCurdy T, Worrall C, Howery AE, Kelman J., Comparative 
effectiveness of high-dose versus standard-dose influenza vaccines in US residents aged 65 
years and older from 2012 to 2013 using Medicare data: a retrospective cohort analysis, Lancet 
Infect Dis 2015 Mar;15(3):293-300. doi: 10.1016/S1473-3099(14)71087-4. Epub 2015 Feb 9]. 
 
What these studies did not answer are questions about the people who are the sickest and least 
likely to respond to vaccine and whether a benefit can still be achieved in this group, such as 
the group that is in the long-term care setting.  Case Western Reserve University’s (CWRU) 
approach to this was a pragmatic large-scale cluster RCT on comparative effectiveness of HD 
versus SD influenza vaccine in long-term care specifically in the long-term care setting.  Two 
studies were conducted.  The first was a pilot/feasibility study undertaken in 39 nursing facilities 
for the 2012-2013 predominantly A/H3N2 influenza season.  The second was the full cluster 
RCT of HD influenza vaccine versus SD influenza vaccine in 823 nursing homes (NHs) for the 
2013-2014 predominantly A/H1N1 influenza season. 
 
Of the 39 facilities enrolled in the pilot study, 19 were in the HD group and 20 were in the SD 
group.  Approximately 12,000 people were admitted to these facilities during the influenza 
season.  As of October 1, 2012, there were 4400 residents living in the facilities.  Of those, 3800 
were over the age of 65 who qualified for the analytic group and 3000 were in the long-stay 
population.  The long-stay population had to have been living there for at least three months.  
Those were the analytic samples with roughly an even split of just under 1500 in each of the HD 
and SD group.  There was no difference in the outcome of death for this season.  There was a 






30% reduction in hospitalization, which was the primary outcome and satisfied the investigators 
that this was feasible to do in a long-stay population.  The absolute hospitalization rate between 
the two groups for ever being hospitalized during the season was just under 21% for the SD and 
13.5% for the HD.  This gave the signal to move forward to the large trial. 
 
For the pragmatic cluster RCT of HD versus SD influenza vaccine in NHs, NHs were recruited in 
areas adjacent to 122 cities in the CDC influenza surveillance system.  Federally mandated 
nursing home resident Minimum Data Set (MDS) assessment to identify permanent NH 
residents with selected demographic and functional characteristics and to measure the 
outcomes.  Medicare Fee-For-Service (FFS) resident hospital claims were used to measure the 
outcome of hospitalization for influenza cardiovascular exacerbations of influenza. 
 
Facilities were recruited within 50 miles of CDC cities.  Facilities were excluded that already 
were using HD as standard of care, had fewer than 50 permanent residents, were hospital-
owned NHs, or in which >20% of residents were under 65 years of age. 
 
Individual residents could still decline vaccine or ask for a different vaccine, and the facility could 
do whatever they typically would do as its standard of care.  If a facility had already been 
offering HD as its standard of care, they were excluded to the study.  Facilities had to be 
indifferent to the type of vaccine that was going to be given to their residents. 
 
The facilities were randomly assigned to 4 groups: 
 
 High-Dose for NHs residents   
 
 
Free Staff Vaccine 
No Free Staff Vaccine 
 
 Standard Dose for NHs residents   
 
 
Free Staff Vaccine 
No Free Staff Vaccine 
 
Provision of free or no free vaccine for staff did not affect any outcomes.  Facility staff were 
educated on influenza and the study procedures.  There were some 200,000 hits to the video 
for this education.  Facility data were linked to the Online Survey Certification & Reporting 
System (OSCAR) that nursing homes submit to describe themselves; the federally required 
MDS, which includes demographic information and information about the facility; and Medicare 
Part A data for the FFS and diagnoses; MDS discharge data, which indicates where someone 
leaving the NH went (hospital, other setting); and vital status files to determine who died.  
Vaccination data reports were collected directly from the facilities.  The facilities faxed these to 
the investigators monthly, and the investigators conducted an onsite audit.  Patient eligibility 
was at least 3 months of residency, over 65 years of age on November 1, 2013, and Medicare 
FFS. 
 
The first analysis examined all-cause hospitalization per person-year, which is all that can be 
acquired out of the MDS; mortality; and functional decline.  The qualifying period was through 
September, the vaccination period until November, and the outcome period from November 
through March.  The pre-specified primary outcome for FFS was the risk of hospitalization due 
to pulmonary and influenza-related illness defined by these International Classification of 
Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes:  460–466, 480–488, 490–
496, 500–518. 
  






The 823 participating facilities across the country are relatively well-distributed, as shown in the 




Within the 50-mile radius, there are 9200 facilities of which 10% were screened.  Of those, 166 
were excluded leaving 823.  About half were HD and half were SD.  In that allocation, there 
were approximately 45,000 residents in each of the HD and SD facilities.  There were 
approximately 54 to 60 residents per NH in the analytic sample for the MDS, leaving 
approximately 25,000 residents per group. 
 
Based on the OSCAR and Medicare claims data, the facilities were relatively similar between 
the groups with about 118 residents per home, 80% of residents vaccinated, 78% long-stay 
residents, about 86% of the long-stay residents vaccinated, about 55% of staff vaccinated 
across all facilities, about the same number of patients on Medicaid, about the same ratio of 
Registered Nurse (RN) or RN plus Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) staffing, and about the same 
level of functional disability. 
 
Approximately 92,000 residents were living in the study NHs on October 1, 2013.  
Approximately 76,000 of these were over the age of 65; about 53,000 were long-stay; about 52, 
000 were in the MDS analytic sample; and about 38,000 were in the FFS sample.  The MDS 
sample included all-cause hospitalizations and all residents were included in that.  The FFS 
sample included only those who were on Medicare FFS, which reduced the sample by about 
20%.  In terms of the demographics of the individual residents, the groups were similar by age, 
gender, ethnicity, and underlying conditions. 
 
The influenza season during the study timeframe was predominantly A/H1N1, with a little 
A/H3N2.  It was an interesting season because it often is said that A/H1N1 is not such a big 
deal in older people.  The unit of analysis for the analytic approach was individual residents, 
which was adjusted for clustering by NHs using robust variance estimates.  Multivariable 
logistic, Poisson, and Cox regressions were used.  The initial model assessed interaction 
between treatments, and was adjusted for pre-specified NH- and resident-level covariates.  The 
analysis was Intention-To-Treat (ITT), so the 15% who were not vaccinated were still included.  
The Number-Needed-to-Treat (NNT) was also calculated. 
  






Based on a seasonal index of hospitalizations by month from November 2013 through May 
2014, about 20% of the population was hospitalized.  There were more hospitalization in the SD 
group versus the HD group in all months except May.  Because these are index hospitalizations, 
the typical epidemic curve expected is not seen because this includes only the first 
hospitalization for any one individual. 
 
This is the calculation for the NNT: 
 
NNT = 1/ARR where ARR* = CER – EER 
1/(0.2090-0.1967) = 81.3 (CI: 53, 182) 
*Using unadjusted event rates 
 
There was a 21% hospitalization rate in the SD and a 19.67% in the HD.  That 1.2% difference 
generates a NNT to prevent hospitalization of about 81.  With the adjusted numbers, it is a little 
higher than that at 82.6. 
 
For the unadjusted Medicare FFS data diagnosis-related hospitalizations of a smaller population 
of only 38,000), all-cause hospitalizations was 7.4% relative difference or an absolute difference 
of about 280 hospitalizations from any cause.  Looking at the diagnoses with which people were 
diagnosed, if cardiac or cerebrovascular was in any position, there was about a 10% difference.  
If a cardiac diagnosis of heart attack, heart failure, atrial fibrillation, or a respiratory diagnosis 
was in any position, it was about a 10% difference.  Cardiac, cardiovascular, or respiratory can 
account for the entire difference in the all-cause hospitalization.  If a respiratory condition is by 
itself in any position, it only accounts for about 10% difference or two-thirds.  If the discharge 
diagnosis is required to be a cardiac condition in the first position, it also accounts for about two-
thirds of hospitalizations.  In the case of respiratory in the first position, it is a difference of 92 or 
about 12%, so about one-third have a diagnosis with a respiratory condition in the first position.  
With pneumonia in the first position, it is a difference of 31 or only 10% of the total difference 
seen in all-cause.  As the numbers get smaller, the statistical and clinical meaningfulness is 
less.  While there was a 70% lower likelihood of having an influenza diagnosis, only 27 people 
had an influenza diagnosis in these claims.  Of those, 6 received HD and the remainder 
received SD.  This is a frequency plot, not an adjusted plot. 
 
In terms of the unadjusted and adjusted marginal Poisson regression analysis outcomes 
accounting for clustering by NHs, a nearly 7% reduction was observed for all-cause 
hospitalization in the MDS cohort.  In the smaller FFS cohort (N=~38,000), in the adjusted group 
all-cause, there was a similar size reduction estimated of about 8.5%.  For hospitalization for 
respiratory issue, there was a 12.5% reduction in hospitalizations. 
 
To summarize, hospitalization reductions by diagnoses listed at discharge were as follows: 
 
Unadjusted 
 Any cause: 7.4% 
 Any cardiac or cerebrovascular event: 9.7% 
 Any heart failure, heart attack, atrial fibrillation or respiratory diagnosis: 9.7% 
 Any respiratory diagnosis: 10.3% 
 As primary diagnosis, a cardiac condition heart attack, heart failure or atrial fibrillation: 9.0% 
 As primary diagnosis, a respiratory condition: 11.8% 
 Pneumonia: 26.2% 
  







 All cause: 8.5 % 
 Respiratory first: 12.7% 
 




In the bottom left is the pilot year, during which there was a large hospitalization rate that was 
almost twice as high is the top right, which is the full study year.  The year that followed the full 
study year was much higher.  There was a relatively light influenza season compared to the pilot 
year or the year after. 
 
In summary, HD vaccine has been shown to reduce laboratory confirmed influenza among 
outpatient elderly.  NH residents have higher event rates (e.g., hospitalization) than other 
settings, which enables health services impact studies; cluster-randomized approach; and 
overcomes selection biases such as access.  All residents had equal access to vaccine.  The 
2013-2014 season is of special interest because it offers a conservative estimate of relative 
benefit in this population.  It was an A(H1N1) predominated season, and the relative benefit of 
HD vaccine for this strain in a NH population has yet been unknown.  It was a relatively mild 
season compared to other seasons, so the opportunity for greater effect is also not seen, but is 
suggested by the pilot study.  The FFS claims differences are consistent with the biologic 
plausibility of effect on hospitalization-based diagnoses and the cardiorespiratory outcomes. 
 
To recap the primary findings, the pilot and full study support the idea that HD influenza vaccine 
reduces hospitalization risk for institutionalized elderly compared to standard dose.  In the pilot 
among nearly 3000 people divided between HD and SD, 197 (13.5%) versus 302 (20.2%) were 
hospitalized, or an adjusted RR of 0.701 (0.543-0.905), in an A/H3N2 predominant season.  In 
the full study among approximately 53,000 people divided between HD and SD, 5239 (19.7%) 
versus 5517 (20.9%) were hospitalized, or an ARR of 0.933 (0.884-0.985) in an A/H1N1 






predominant season.  The differences in hospitalization rates can be largely accounted for by 
differences in cardiorespiratory event diagnoses. 
 
These estimates may be conservative due to the severity of the influenza season, the ITT 
approach with nearly 15% residents not being vaccinated, and the type of influenza virus 
circulating (A/H1N1), and the assessment only of reduced hospitalization which likely 
underestimates the net benefits to nursing home residents’ health outcomes.  When 
approximately 20% of the population is hospitalized, even a 1% absolute reduction in 
hospitalization can be cost-effective (e.g., 81 vaccines at ~$30/vaccine = $2430, or less than the 
average cost of hospitalization). 
 
There are some limitations of the study.  There are no laboratory data to confirm influenza.  The 
HD:SD relative benefit on A(H1N1) may underestimate difference when other strains dominate, 





Dr. Atmar observed that other studies that have examined this population have shown that 
vaccination of the healthcare workers in these facilities has a greater effect than vaccinating the 
residents.  He found it disappointing that only 26% of the workers in these facilities were 
vaccinated.  He wondered whether they examined the effect of higher versus lower vaccination 
acceptance within facilities on outcomes and, if so, how that compared to HD versus SD. 
 
Dr. Gravenstein responded that they wondered if by offering free vaccine they would see a skew 
in vaccine uptake to prospectively settle the question of whether vaccinating staff could reduce 
risk.  By offering free vaccine, nothing was skewed.  Therefore, it is not possible to tell whether 
there was a difference in HD versus SD based on staff vaccination from a randomization 
perspective.  The hazard of the other studies that assessed staff vaccination, though he 
believes them to reflect truth, is that the percentages of facilities with the highest staff 
vaccination often are making many other efforts that help the residents potentially do better.  It 
is hard to know for sure how much the difference is, because the facilities are just better.  
Facilities that have higher uptake among the residents are more likely to have higher uptake 
among the staff, have infection control policies in place, have an Infection Preventionist to 
implement isolation, and other types of measures.  It is difficult to speak specifically to whether 
staff vaccination would actually help in this case. 
 
Dr. Kempe asked whether any self-selection was involved in residents who chose to get the HD 
vaccine in those facilities. 
 
Dr. Gravenstein replied that there is not.  In any facility, when residents are asked what vaccine 
they got for anything, they typically do not know.  The 10% of residents who refuse may be the 
subset who might know what they are getting.  This is an unblended study allocated at the 
facility level, but even the nursing staff do not know what they gave three weeks later.  
Expecting that the residents are skewing the results is unlikely. 
 
Dr. Reingold pointed out that Dr. Gravenstein had not mentioned anything about pneumococcal 
vaccine coverage in these NHs.  He was curious as to whether that information was available, 
and if it made any difference. 
 






Dr. Gravenstein responded that they do not have that information, and he was not sure whether 
the information available to them through the MDS record is reliable.  In terms of whether it 
would be in the administrative data, this would have to go back five years and they were looking 
at the data only for one year. 
 
Dr. Messonnier asked who funded the study. 
 
Dr. Gravenstein replied that Sanofi Pasteur funded the study. 
 
Dr. Duchin asked whether there was any information about medications that patients were 
taking, such as statins or others with an anti-inflammatory effect. 
 
Dr. Gravenstein responded that they did not yet have the Part D claims, but they do plan to 
examine this in the future. 
 
Dr. Schmader (AGS) said it struck him that perhaps the name “pilot” should be removed for the 
pilot study.  He found both studies to be equally valuable.  There were positive findings for 
H3N2 in the pilot, so it was adequately powered.  There is no Type 2 error there.  The study is 
even positive against the obstacles of a weak season with H1N1, so the results are impressive. 
 
Dr. Thompson (NVAC) suggested examining cost in a more significant way.  In reality, the cost 
savings could be quite significant. 
 
Dr. Gravenstein indicated that they have begun the cost-effectiveness work. 
 
Dr. Maldonado (AAP) asked whether it was possible to examine AEs with HD, which has been 
raised as an issue in the past. 
 
Dr. Gravenstein replied that because this was a standard of care, they used the VAERS 




Helen Bright, PhD 
Raburn Mallory, MD 
MedImmune 
 
Drs. Bright and Mallory presented an update of the 2015-2016 vaccine effectiveness data, 
including recently published data on the effectiveness of LAIV against pediatric influenza 
hospitalization.  In addition, they provided an update on the non-clinical root cause investigation, 
and work that MedImmune has been doing to help optimize the A/H1N1 strain selection for the 
2017-2018 vaccine formulation, and insights into ongoing clinical studies and timelines for data 
availability. 
 
Revisiting the data from the 2015-2016 influenza season, Dr. Bright reminded everyone that the 
data from this outpatient setting showed six vaccine effectiveness studies with a consolidated 
estimate.  Looking across the studies, the point estimates are generally similar.  The 
consolidated estimate is 48% for LAIV and 60% for IIV.  For the B strains, there is an additional 
dataset from a test negative study published last year.  LAIV has a consolidated vaccine 
effectiveness point estimate of 66%, while IIV is 49%. [1. Ambrose C.  Presented at Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices Meeting; June 22, 2016; Atlanta, GA  2. Flannery B.  
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)     Summary Report   February 22-23, 2017
50 
In terms of LAIV and IIV effectiveness estimates for A/H1N1pdm09 strains for the 2015-2016 
influenza season1,2 in the outpatient setting from the US and the rest of the world, the 
consolidated overall VE was 32%, demonstrating low but significant effectiveness. The IIV 
effectiveness was 72% [1Caspard H et al. Abstract accepted for presentation at: Pediatric 
Academic Societies Meeting; May 6-9, 2017; San Francisco, CA; 2Helmeke C et al. [poster]. 
Presented at: European Scientific Conference on Applied Infectious Disease Epidemiology; Nov 
28-30, 2016; Stockholm, Sweden.
Despite overall low effectiveness against the predominating circulating H1N1 strain outpatient 
setting, there are data from the same season which demonstrate moderate to good VE in the 
inpatient setting.  Data on the impact of LAIV use on inpatient hospitalization due to influenza 
was recently published on the 2015-2016 influenza season in the UK.  These data 
demonstrated meaningful endpoints for the reduction of severe disease resulting in 
hospitalization.  Effectiveness in the prevention of laboratory-confirmed influenza hospitalization 
in children was 55% in England and 63% in Scotland.  These are both populations in which 
LAIV is almost exclusively used [1 Peabody R et al. Euro Surveill. 2017; 22(4):pii=30450. 
2 Health Protection Scotland. http://www.hps.scot.nhs.uk/resourcedocument.aspx?id=5529. 
Accessed 16 February 2017]. 
Turning to the progress made in the non-clinical root cause investigation, this investigation is 
currently focused on two potential hypotheses.  The first is reduced replicative fitness of 
H1N1pdm09 LAIV strains in human cells, and the second is vaccine virus interference in the 
quadrivalent formulation.  Studies to address the second hypothesis are currently ongoing.  
During this session, Dr. Bright presented an update on the first hypothesis.  The approach has 
been to characterize and define the biological profile of the effective vaccine strains and 
compare these to recent H1N1 strains that had lower than expected VE.  This presentation 
focused on a comparison between the following pdm09 H1N1 strains:  
Pre-Pandemic Strains Post-Pandemic Strains 
New Caledonia 1999 
(NC99) 
California 2009 (CA09) 
South Dakota 2007 (SD07) Bolivia 2013 (BOL13) 
Slovenia 2015 (SOLV15) 
Pandemic (pdm) 
Presented at Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices Meeting; June 22, 2016; 
Atlanta, GA  3. Caspard H et al. Presented at International Society for Influenza and 
Other Respiratory Virus Diseases (ISIRV) Options IX for the Control of Influenza 
Conference; August 25, 2016; Chicago, IL. 4. Nohynek H et al. Euro Surveill. 
2016;21(38):pii=30346. 5. Pebody R et al. Euro Surveill. 2016;21(38):pii=30348. 6. 
Helmeke C et al. http://www.verbraucherschutz.sachsen-anhalt.de/fileadmin/Bibliothek/
Politik_und_Verwaltung/MS/LAV_Verbraucherschutz/hygiene/influenza/
Effektivitaet_der_Influenzaimpfstoffe_2015-16.pdf  7.Caspard H.  Abstract Accepted for 
Publication PAS, May 6-9, 2017; San Francisco, CA].






NC99 is particularly relevant as it was in the vaccine for many years and has a high level of 
efficacy and effectiveness of clinical data.  MedImmune has profiled its LAIV strains through the 
influenza virus life-cycle and also developed a novel primary human nasal cell model in which 
their performance can be evaluated.  An important feature of their LAIV strains is that they only 
differ biologically in their external surface glycoproteins, hemagglutinin (HA) neuraminidase 
(NA).  These are taken from the wild-type circulating strain each year, and they provide the 
antigenic match to the vaccine.  The remaining internal components of the vaccine virus remain 
the same every year and provide the attenuated phenotype.  The HA protein is responsible for 
cell binding and cell fusion of the virus, while NA is responsible for virus release and spread. 
 
The physiological role of HA is to help the virus enter the cell.  At a pH of approximately 5.5, the 
HA changes its shape and allows the virus to uncoat its genome.  However, high temperature 
from the external environment can also have an effect on the HA shape and this could reduce 
virus infectivity.  Initial findings with the California strain in the 2013-2014 vaccine indicated an 
HA protein at a lower than expected stability.  Based on this, Bolivia was selected as it 
demonstrated higher HA thermostability, which is much more similar to previous H1N1 LAIVs.  
However, this may have made the HA too acid-stable.  The Bolivia strain has a much lower 
activation period in terms of the pH at which HA changes it shape.  This can result in a 
prolonged uncoating stage for the virus, which would also impact virus replication fitness. 
 
HA is also responsible for the binding of the virus to the cell.  Assays have been developed to 
compare binding of the viruses to α2-6 human cell receptors.  These studies indicate that the 
pandemic CA09 and BOL13 strains may have decreased binding to the human receptor 
compared to NC99. 
 
The late stage of viral replication was also evaluated, which affects cellular release and spread.  
This was done by comparing replication using two assays.  The Fluorescent Focus Assay (FFA) 
measures a single cycle of replication.  The Tissue Culture Median Infectious Dose (TCID50) 
measures multiple rounds of replication and relies on proficient release of the virus and efficient 
spread.  For the pre-pandemic H1N1 viruses, the two assays gave similar results.  However, for 
the pandemic09 strains, there is a discrepancy between the FFA titer and the TCID50 titer.  This 
suggests that H1N1pdm09 viruses are less able to support multiple rounds of replication.  Post-
pandemic H1N1 LAIV strains have reduced replication in primary human nasal epithelial cells. 
 
Regarding the update on A/H1N1 strain selection for 2017-2018 season, as was the case for all 
previous effective vaccine strains, A/California and A/Bolivia were selected based on 
characteristics and characterization data from a range of assays.  This culminated in 
immunogenicity studies in ferrets.  However, based on the lower than expected vaccine efficacy 
seen with these two strains, several new assays have been added into the strain selection 
process.  Using these assays, a lead H1N1 candidate was identified, A/Slovenia 2015 for 
inclusion in the 2017 vaccine. 
 
The preliminary data show that A/Slovenia has improved HA properties.  It has an activation 
period that is very similar to the pre-pandemic H1N1 strain and to other effective vaccines 
strains.  Preliminary receptor binding data suggest that A/Slovenia has improved receptor 
binding compared to Bolivia.  Measuring A/Slovenia’s replication by FFA and TCID50, the assay 
values are very similar.  Again, this profile matches vaccine with previous effective LAIV strains.  
When evaluated in the primary human nasal cell model, the new A/Slovenia strain showed 
significantly improved replication kinetics compared to the previous A/Bolivia vaccine strain, 
though not quite to the level of NC99. 
 






To summarize the non-clinical dataset, the initial findings indicated that there was reduced 
replicative fitness with H1N1pdm09 viruses.  The underlying mechanism for this is likely to be 
multi-factorial (e.g., HA stability, HA activation pH, receptor binding, NA).  MedImmune has 
identified a lead H1N1 candidate, A/Slovenia, for inclusion in its 2017-2018 LAIV composition.  
A/Slovenia has no deficiency with multiple rounds of replication.  Its FFA and TCID50 titers 
match, and it is much more similar in this regard to previous LAIVs.  It has a higher HA 
activation pH compared with A/Bolivia, and looks much more similar to previous effective LAIVs.  
It has a much higher replication in the primary human nasal epithelium model versus the 
A/Bolivia strain.  Investigation is ongoing and is now focusing on cell and ferret studies 
evaluating interference and formulation.  There is a planned clinical study with the 2017-2018 
LAIV. 
 
Dr. Mallory described a planned pediatric study to further characterize the A/Slovenia strain that 
likely will be included in the vaccine for the 2017-2018 influenza season, and to further compare 
the new A/Slovenia strain to the previous A/Bolivia strain that was previously included in the 
vaccine.  This will be a randomized, double-blind, study that plans to enroll approximately 200 
children 24 to <48 months of age.  Subjects will be randomized with approximately 65 subjects 
per group at a 1:1:1 ratio to receive two doses of one of the following vaccines: 
 
 LAIV4 2017-2018  
(A/H1N1 Slovenia strain) 
 
 LAIV4 2015-2016  
(A/H1N1 Bolivia strain) 
 
 LAIV3 2015-2016  
(A/H1N1 Bolivia strain) 
 
Having trivalent and quadrivalent versions of the 2015-2016 will allow for evaluation of what 
interference might be occurring between these two strains.  This issue is being addressed with 
the A/Bolivia strain because it has reduced replicative fitness compared to the A/Slovenia strain, 
and these results will be more likely to show this.  The primary endpoint of the study is HAI 
antibody seroconversion rates after each dose.  The secondary endpoints include neutralizing 
antibody seroconversion rates after each dose, mucosal immunoglobulin A (IgA) increases after 
each dose, shedding after each dose, and safety. 
 
In terms of the timelines for data availability from ongoing studies, final 2017-2018 H1N1pdm09 
A/Slovenia strain characterization and 2016-2017 VE H3N2 data (UK, Finland, Canada) should 
be available for presentation during the June 2017 ACIP meeting.  Data should be available on 
US pediatric shedding/immunogenicity from the new H1N1pdm09 strain and from the Japan 
2016-2017 pediatric efficacy study data on A/H3N2 for presentation during the October 2017 
ACIP meeting. 
 
In conclusion, LAIV demonstrated overall effectiveness in most studies conducted in 2015-2016.  
However, H1N1 effectiveness was more variable and lower than IIV in all studies.  Effectiveness 
against influenza hospitalization has been published recently.  Initial findings from the 
investigation indicate that post-pandemic strains have reduced replicative fitness compared to 
pre-pandemic strains.  Based on the findings of the investigation, new assays were introduced 
into the strain selection process.  A replacement A/H1N1 Slovenia strain has been selected for 
2017-2018 that has characteristics similar to pre-pandemic strains.  Final non-clinical strain 






characterization data for the new A/Slovenia strain are expected to be available by the end of 




Dr. Reingold asked whether the prior vaccination histories will be known for the participants in 
the US and Japan, and if they believe it matters whether they have been primed with IIV. 
 
Dr. Mallory replied that for the Japan study, that is being conducted by MedImmune’s marketing 
partner, they will be collecting five years of vaccination history.  In the study MedImmune plans 
to conduct, vaccination history will be collected on the 2 to 3-year-old children. 
 
Dr. Walter noted that in the pediatric study, children will receive two doses of vaccine.  He asked 
whether blood draws would be done after the first dose on all of those children.  Referring to 
Slide 6, he also asked what was driving the consolidated estimate.  It seemed to be the data 
from Finland.  The confidence interval for all of the effectiveness for LAIV crosses zero for every 
other study but the Finland study and the consolidated estimate. 
 
Dr. Mallory replied that immunogenicity blood draws will be done at baseline, 28 days after the 
first dose, and 28 days after the second dose.  The second dose is an attempt to assess 
vaccine shedding after the second dose to determine whether there is a reduction in shedding 
after the second dose compared to the first dose.  In terms of what was driving the consolidated 
estimates, he said he thought in general with the consolidated estimates was that there are 
more subject cases, the confidence intervals are narrow in general.  He deferred to Dr. Caspard 
who is conducting the study for more details. 
 
Dr. Atmar asked which of the countries used LAIV3 versus LAIV4. 
 
Dr. Mallory reported that for 2015-2016, all countries were using LAIV4. 
 
Referring to slide 22, Dr. Savoy (AAFP) said she thought the CA09 strain was the reason the 
US stopped offering LAIV in the US.  It appeared that the new strain is somewhat better, but 
was pretty much the same as the SLOV15 line.  It was not clear to her how that would help to 
make a decision about LAIV in the US. 
 
Dr. Mallory replied that these are in vitro data.  They proposed the pediatric study, which will be 
examining pediatric data on the shedding and immunogenicity of that strain.  That study will be 
able to directly compare the previous BOL13 strain that was in the vaccine with the new strain to 
determine whether there are differences in immune responses in the shedding of that strain. 
 
Dr. Gorman (NIH) asked whether all of the children in the proposed pediatric study will be naïve 
to influenza vaccine when they begin, or if previously vaccinated children will be accepted. 
 
Dr. Mallory replied that the goal for the proposed pediatric study is for about half of the children 
to be naïve to previous vaccination. 
 
Dr. Hunter asked whether the A/Bolivia strain was used in the MedImmune vaccine and that 
was why it was emphasized so much. 
  






Dr. Mallory clarified that the A/Bolivia vaccine strain was in the 2015-2016 influenza season, for 
which there are all of the H1N1 effectiveness estimates.  It is in the vaccine this year.  However, 
because H3N2 has been circulating predominantly, there are no effectiveness estimates for that 
strain for this year.  The vaccine strain was selected primarily on improved stability properties 
compared to the previous California strain.  Effectiveness has still been lower than IIV, which is 
what they are attempting to solve now. 
 
Dr. Kempe observed that if half of the 200 children to be included in the proposed pediatric 
study are naïve and half are primed, it seems like the study would be underpowered to examine 
the issue of whether this was related to priming. 
 
Dr. Mallory clarified that overall the study has the power to detect difference around 20% to 25% 
in either shedding rates or immune responses.  The power will be lower for the subgroup 
analysis.  They struggled with which type of subjects to enroll because they also want a subject 
population that is somewhat representative of the people who would be receiving the vaccine. 
 
Dr. Bennett said she remained somewhat confused about the interference issue.  It appears that 
the only way this will be addressed is in the study of children, some of whom will receive 
trivalent versus quadrivalent. 
 
Dr. Bright indicated that they have been using an optimized ferret model to compare mono, 
versus trivalent, versus quadrivalent with Bolivia and the NC99, which was a very effective 
vaccine strain.  NC99 was given only as a trivalent, so now it is being compared to determine 
how it would have performed had it been in a quadrivalent.  In addition to pre-clinical ferret 
models, they have some assays using and are using the primary human nasal epithelial cell 
model as well for pre-clinical to determine whether these models can translate into the clinic for 
future use. 
 
Dr. Byington (AAP) said she shared some of the concerns and confusion of others.  She still 
had not heard stated directly what MedImmune believes the definitive mechanism to be for the 
failure, and the focus on the thermal and pH stability. The lack of emphasis on human trials for 
interference and priming make her believe that MedImmune eliminated those or that they do not 
think those are viable causes for the failure. 
 
While the study is ongoing, Dr. Mallory emphasized that the data presented during this session 
show that the post-pandemic strains have reduced replicative fitness compared to the pre-
pandemic strain, and that a strain has been selected that looks better in that regard.  There are 
extensive ongoing ferret studies to try to elucidate whether interference may also be playing a 
role.  That also will be assessed using the human nasal epithelial cells.  Some information will 
be collected from the clinical study as well.  In terms of prior immunity, the previous 
effectiveness studies conducted did not show an effect of prior immunity in lowering vaccine 
effectiveness estimates.  In terms of whether prior immunity is completely eliminated, additional 
data will be available from the ongoing studies.  Throughout the development of FluMist®, 
effectiveness has been examined in different age groups of people exposed to either 
vaccination or wild-type influenza, prior immunity has not shown an impact on VE in children.  
Slide 31 shows that the VE estimates in children immunized previously did not change 
compared to those who were not. 
 
Referring to slide 22, Dr. Romero said his understanding was that the TCID50 represented multi-
cycle replication and the FFA represents single cycle replication.  He wondered how the two 
could be compared. 







Dr. Bright said that both values were given as a titer or as a log value.  FFA is an infectivity 
assay that tells how much virus is getting into a single cell, and it has to be tittered out.  TCID50 
relies on the NA efficiently working.  It is a 6-day assay that requires multiple rounds of 
replication and amplification.  If those two titers do not match, it suggests that while some 
viruses can get in quite efficiently and start the replication cycle, what they are not able to do so 
efficiently is multiple rounds of replication and amplification over a number of days.  That is 
when the pandemic H1N1s struggle.  This offers a clue to the biology of the virology behind 
these strains that says something about the difference between the pandemic H1N1 strains 
compared to the seasonal influenza viruses they have worked with previously.  It gives them 
clues as to what might be mechanistically happening.  Because only the HA and NA differ each 
year, it has to be something about what the HA and NA are doing. 
 
Dr. Decker (Sanofi Pasteur) questioned whether the response earlier that the Y axis scale on 
the right half of slide 22 was linear arithmetic logarithmic.  On the left hand side there is 108 and 
109 TCID50, while on the right-hand side there was 2 to 8.  Not 102, but simply 2. 
 
Dr. Bright replied that it is a log scale. 
 
Dr. Moore said she still hears concerns about repeated use of LAIV year over year and whether 
that would contribute in any way to the US results being lower than some of the others observed 
elsewhere.  She wondered whether any of the studies assess not only prior season use of 
vaccine, but also year over year use of LAIV as seen in the US. 
 
Dr. Mallory replied that they do not have those data readily available.  What will be interesting 
are the data that come out of the UK for the past season, because children in the UK are 
enrolled in a vaccination program year after year.  So, they are beginning to look more like US 
children in terms of their prior vaccination history.  The other data that can address this will be 
from the Japan efficacy study.  Those children will have up to five years of vaccination history, 
so it will be possible to assess VE in heavily vaccinated children compared to VE in less heavily 
vaccinated children. 
 
Ms. Pellegrini noted that she had not seen anything to account for the geographic variation 
observed during that season, and she wondered whether there were theories that would 
account for variation in VE from country to country during that season. 
 
Looking at the overall data for A and B strains, Dr. Mallory pointed out that there was less 
variation from country to country than there actually is within the US.  In the B strain data, there 
is some variation but the confidence intervals are very wide because there was not a lot of B 
strain circulating in the 2015-2016 season.  There are not clear explanations for the differences 
that occurred in the US and in other countries.  MedImmune is doing some work with CDC to 
combine the data from the MedImmune study and the CDC study to determine whether some of 
the differences can be further elucidated.  The differences were observed in the US and other 
countries, so this is not a US-specific finding. 
 
Dr. Bennett asked whether there was any explanation for why the Finland data, which is the 
outlier, looked different. 
  






Dr. Mallory responded that the Finland study was a cohort study while the rest of the studies 
were test-negative.  In addition, a limited age group was enrolled in Finland of children 2 years 
of age. 
 
Dr. Walter requested clarification about what additional strain characterization data will be 
presented during the June 2017 ACIP meeting. 
 
Dr. Bright replied that in June, they will present ferret data from their interference studies. 
 
Dr. Mallory added that they presented the data on the A/Slovenia strain with the expectation that 
that strain will be selected at the March WHO meeting and the subsequent VRBPAC meeting.  If 
a different strain is selected, they will present final data on the new strain.  Most of the strain 
characterization data from the in vitro assays has been presented, but there will be some 
additional in vivo ferret data. 
 
Regarding the effect or prior immunity, Dr. Belongia emphasized that it is important to recognize 
that the VE studies do not have the ability to assess children under 4 years of age.  They 
typically assess children 2 years to 17 years of age, which perhaps could be stratified down to 2 
years to 8 years of age, but there are a lot of children in that analysis who are older who 
certainly have been previously infected.  In the trial, there will be children under 48 months of 
age.  Thus, he would not rule out the possibility that they will see priming effects or differences 
between those children who have been previously vaccinated and those who have not.  If those 
effects are present, then they will be down to stratification with perhaps 30 to 35 children in each 
group.  If both of those effects are operating, this could be very difficult to tease out. 
 
Dr. Duchin (NACCHO) added that there are some data in adults with IIV that suggested that 
repeat vaccination with the same vaccine strains results in reduced VE against a drift strain.  In 
the context of previous vaccination, he wondered if MedImmune was considering the impact of 
the vaccine strains that a child was vaccinated with in previous seasons and the specific strain 
that is circulating that season to draw conclusion about the impact of prior vaccination. 
 
Dr. Mallory replied for the proposed study the children will be young and the investigators will 
know which vaccines they received and thus which strains are in them.  In the Japan study, 
there will be five years of vaccination history, so they should be able to assess the specific 
effects to the extent that they are powered to do that.  On the question of prior immunity, this 
seems to be more specific to the A than the B strains if it is occurring.  B strain effectiveness 
continues to look good.  If it is occurring for the A strain, it may be in the setting of reduced 
replicative fitness for that particular strain. 
 
Dr. Bennett emphasized that what she was hearing from the ACIP was that they have concerns 
about the power calculations and whether they will be able to tease out the impacts. 
  
Dr. Mallory replied that they struggled to enroll very young children to receive a vaccine that is 
not approved for use in the US. 
  






Influenza Summary and WG Considerations 
 
Lisa Grohskopf, MD, MPH 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Regarding plans for the 2017-2018 ACIP influenza recommendations that will be published 
sometime during the summer, Dr. Grohskopf indicated that no new policy language was 
proposed for consideration at the time of this meeting.  The 2017-2018 statement will reiterate 
the core recommendation that annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons 
aged 6 months of age and older who do not have contraindications. 
 
In terms of the vaccines discussed during this session, the WG had the opportunity to hear 
presentations on AFLURIA® Quadrivalent pre-licensure data for adults prior to the October 2016 
meeting.  The WG presented to ACIP on these data during the October meeting.  Since that 
time, the WG has heard data on the safety evaluation presented during this session and pre-
licensure data for children 5 years of age and older.  At this time, the WG has proposed no 
change in the language for AFLURIA® Trivalent specifically related to the issue of children 5 
years of age and older versus 9 years of age and older and awaits licensure of a quadrivalent 
for an age ≥5 years. 
 
Regarding WG discussion about Fluzone HD® and because there are related vaccines (Fluad® 
and Flublok®) that have been examined specifically for this high-risk group of 65 years of age 
and older, the WG had an opportunity to listen in and ask questions about the Gravenstein long-
term care facility data presented during this meeting.  Currently, two vaccines are licensed 
specifically for age ≥65 years.  Data heard previously by ACIP include Fluzone HD® data that 
were noted to have superior VE to standard-dose IIV3 against protocol-defined ILI-associated 
with laboratory-confirmed influenza in a two-season RCT of almost 32,000 persons age ≥65 
years.  ACIP also recently heard data for Fluad®, which is the adjuvanted IIV3 that was shown 
to have superior VE to unadjuvanted IIV3 against lab-confirmed influenza in an analysis of 227 
participants in a one-season observational study of persons age ≥65 years. 
 
In addition to that and although it is not licensed for 65 years of age and older, ACIP previously 
heard data from a 2014-2015 season randomized trial of Flublok® Quadrivalent, which was 
licensed by the FDA last fall but is not available this season.  These data compared Flublok® 
Quadrivalent to IIV4 in a randomized study of subjects 50 years of age and older, and noted 
superiority over IIV4 during that season.  During that season, there was notable drift.  There 
have not been any direct comparisons of these vaccines with one another.  Currently, ACIP 
expresses no preference for one vaccine over another.  The WG proposes no change in 
language, and looks forward to further discussion of the efficacy and effectiveness data for 
these vaccines in this high-risk population.  Data for vaccines for this population will be 
summarized in upcoming 2017-2018 ACIP Influenza Statement. 
 
In terms of influenza vaccine coverage among children, CDC has updated early season 
influenza vaccination coverage estimates from NIS-Flu to evaluate potential impact of the 
recommendation to not use LAIV for the 2016-2017 season.  The preliminary estimates reflect 
reported vaccinations received by the end of December 2016.  Coverage among children ages 
6 months through 17 years increased from 37% by early November to 50% by the end of 
December.  This end of December coverage was similar to coverage through December last 
season, which was 51%.  Comparing by age group, there was no statistically significant 
differences for 2016-2017 compared to the 2015-2016 season.  The differences in the various 






age groups ranged from 2.7% for ages 13 through 17 years to -2.8% for ages 5 through 12 
years.  As in past seasons, coverage was higher in younger children at 66% for ages 6 through 
23 months, 56% for ages 2 through 4 years, 50% for ages 5 through 12 years, and 40% for 
ages 13 through 17 years.  In past seasons, influenza vaccination of children continued to be 
reported past December.  For 2015-2016, coverage increased from 52% by the end of 
December 2015 and 59% by end of May 2016.  It is important to note that these are very new 
data. 
 
To summarize influenza division activities related to VE and more specifically to LAIV, there 
continues to be ongoing evaluation of vaccine effectiveness via the US Influenza Vaccine 
Effectiveness Network, which Dr. Flannery presented data from at the beginning of the session.  
There is also discussion of an intra-seasonal waning and decision tree analysis regarding timing 
of vaccination, as well as research studies ongoing to assess immunologic effects of repeat 
vaccination.  Regarding specific LAIV activities, the division has embarked on a systematic 
review of the literature and meta-analysis of efficacy and effectiveness of LAIV since 2010-
2011, the first season post-pandemic, as well as a combined US individual patient-level LAIV 
effectiveness analysis that will include CDC, DoD, and MedImmune data.  In addition, data 
continue to be gathered for review and publication of the annual ACIP influenza statement. 
 
In terms of WG considerations regarding FluMist®, the best evidence to support 
recommendation for use would be effectiveness data for LAIV containing a new H1N1 
component against H1N1 viruses.  Anticipated data timelines include the 2016-2017 
effectiveness data for H3N2 from the US, UK, and Finland by June 2017; and efficacy data on 
H3N2 from Japan and US pediatric shedding/immunogenicity by October 2017.  That said, this 
is a predominantly H3N2 season, so effectiveness against H1N1 cannot be assessed from the 
current season’s data in any of these countries.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to predict when 
the next H1N1-predominant season will occur.  Therefore, it could be several years before there 
is an H1N1-specific season so that effectiveness/efficacy data would be available. 
 
In the absence of effectiveness/efficacy data for FluMist® with a new H1N1 component, the 
following would be reassuring:  1) Demonstration that the new virus exhibits improved fitness in 
animals (ferrets), and particularly in human shedding and immunogenicity studies; and 2) 
Demonstration that performance (e.g., replicative fitness) is similar to that of pre-pandemic 
H1N1 viruses, which were demonstrated to be effective in previous studies. 
 
A caveat, there is no adequate correlate of protection for LAIV against influenza viruses. 
Shedding and antibody levels do not always correlate with effectiveness.  Shedding is an 
indication of replicative fitness and vaccine “take.”  However, lack of shedding has not always 
correlated with poor effectiveness.  Therefore, there is inherent difficulty in interpreting a 
negative (poor shedding) result.  However, the human shedding and antibody (immunogenicity) 
data anticipated by October 2017 are probably the most constructive data that can be collected 
within a 1- to 2-season timeframe.  The question regards whether the ACIP feels that these data 




In terms of the immunological effects of repeat vaccination, Dr. Kempe wondered whether the 
data exist to allow them to examine priming and repeated LAIV versus IIV adequately. 
 






Dr. Grohskopf reminded everyone that the Japan study would have five years of data collected, 
which could potentially address this.  However, the current season is predominantly H3N2.  If 
there is a differential effect, it will be more difficult to determine if the problem is H1N1-related. 
 
Dr. Reingold asked whether there was an expectation of having effectiveness data from other 
countries and, if so, is it possible that they will be useful in the US context in terms of number of 
prior doses, priming, and other potential issues. 
 
Dr. Grohskopf indicated that this has been a common theme of discussion.  For example, the 
European data have differed from the US data even for H1N1.  Although it does appear 
consistently that generally, the inactivated vaccine has done better.  CDC will continue to 
communicate with colleagues overseas to find out what they are observing.  There is always 
going to be a question about comparability, given the fact that the US has routinely 
recommended vaccination for the entire pediatric population since 2008.  This is relatively new 
in other countries.  Granted US coverage is not perfect, but pediatric vaccination was phased in 
age stepwise between 2003 and 2008.  That is a longer period of time than most other countries 
have been vaccinating healthy children annually on a routine basis.  They will just have to try to 
determine how comparable the data are to the best extent they can. 
 
Dr. Bennett added that not only is it important to understand the context in which the studies are 
conducted, but also it is important to understand the study methods.  Because there are 
significant differences, ACIP would like to hear about the methods in some detail. 
 
Dr. Belongia noted that there is consideration of a human challenge study with H1N1.  While 
there are differing opinions about whether that would be helpful, because by necessity it would 
have to be done in adults.  Adults are different from children and may respond differently.  
However, if it did work in adults, there might be reasonable inference to say that it is likely to 
work in children as well.  Since it looks like that is not planned, they will be left with the data 
from the proposed study.  He expressed his hope that the results would be clear and 
conclusive, at least in terms of shedding and serologic response, to give ACIP sufficient 
confidence.  If it is more equivocal, it could be a tough decision. 
 
Dr. Riley recalled that when this was discussed previously, one of the concerns when this was 
removed as an option regarded whether a major decrease would be observed in the number of 
children being vaccinated.  This made her think that something is better than nothing if only 20% 
of children will be vaccinated.  The fact that it is 50% versus 51% made her think that if there 
was not a significant decrease in the number of children being vaccinated, it certainly is 
important to ensure that what they are being given works. 
 
Dr. Hunter said he was not familiar with the methodologies of the various countries for which VE 
for H1N1 was presented.  He was curious to know whether there was something about the 
methodology used by CDC that would explain why it is so much lower than everyone else. 
 
Dr. Grohskopf replied that the majority of studies are test-negative case-control designs.  The 
Finland study was a cohort design.  The definitions of infection are not universal across all of the 
studies. 
 
Dr. Flannery added that the short answer is that there is no explanation for the difference in the 
point estimates.  There are wide confidence intervals around the estimates from the CDC data.  
There is some heterogeneity in the point estimates, but there are overlapping confidence 
intervals.  Except for the Finland study, the studies all included zero for the H1N1-specific 






effectiveness in 2015-2016.  All of the studies except Finland used a test-negative design.  
CDC’s inclusion criteria are slightly more sensitive.  They do not include ILI specifically.  It is 
acute respiratory illness.  It is helpful that the MedImmune also showed the B estimates, which 
were different, but the heterogeneity was less.  It is expected that if there was a methodological 
problem, it would not just apply to H1N1 over several seasons.  Other than that, there is no 
explanation for why CDC’s estimate seems to be the lowest point estimate by far. 
 
Dr. Moore emphasized that the virus does continue to drift.  It could be that in just one more 
season, it will be necessary to move on from A/Slovenia to something else.  She asked whether 
in the future the ACIP could anticipate that MedImmune would perform these same pH, 
thermostability, and replication studies and present them to the committee in order to be able 
evaluate future strains.  Because that question arises, she wondered if it would be valuable to 
assess those same studies on the past H3N2 strains that have been effective so that future 
changes in H3N2 strains also could be assessed in the same type of way, given that there are 
not good laboratory correlates of protection. 
 
Dr. Bresee replied that MedImmune is planning to conduct these replicative fitness studies with 
the assays they used to understand these strains better each year going forward.  As the strains 
and antigens change, they will understand replicative fitness going forward and will make sure 
that it does not drift back again to the A/Bolivia phenotype. 
 
Dr. Mallory indicated that the new assays described by Dr. Bright described to their strain 
characterization on an ongoing basis, and they will be assessing H3N2 and B strains with these 
assays.  There is ongoing work to assess past H3N2 strains that were known to work.  The 
priority is to examine the new A/Slovenia strain and H1N1, but data are being gathered for the 
H3N2 strains. 
 
Dr. Gemmill (NACI) reported that there are numerous studies underway in various centers in 
Canada on VE for influenza vaccine.  He is certain that those data will be available through the 
Canadian Immunization Research Network (CIRN) as part of their collaboration.  He shared 
Canada’s frustrations with trying to get a handle on influenza vaccine.  Fifteen years ago, there 
was one vaccine.  Now there are many vaccines and everyone is trying to figure out how they 
compare to each other.  VE seems to be a “moving target” as well.  A think tank was planned for 
February 24, 2017 to consider how best VE can be used to make recommendations.  This has 
been a terrible frustration for them.  A silver lining for Canada of the recommendation by ACIP in 
June 2016 not to use LAIV in America was that it gave Canada the ability to pull back from its 
preferential recommendation on LAIV in Canada for young children.  He was not confident that 
he could make a preferential recommendation for any of the vaccines.  When one looks 
somewhat better, they are using statements such as “If you use this vaccine, it is expected that 
you may have better protection.” 
 
Dr. Gellin (NVPO) asked how long MedImmune would continue, given that it is unknown how 
long before the season would be right to develop VE data. 
 
Dr. Mallory responded that MedImmune and AstraZeneca place the highest priority on patient 
health and the overall impact of its products to public health.  They remain committed to 
FluMist® as they believe it provides an important option for vaccination and for pandemic 
preparedness.  They are committed to investigation and to providing FluMist® as an option for 
patients. 
 






Dr. Walter pointed out that the WG seemed to be struggling with what level of data they need to 
bring before the ACIP in order to help make a decision (in vitro, in vivo, effectiveness, efficacy, 
which season). 
 
Dr. Kempe emphasized that there are some very large issues immunologically here that 
probably cannot be answered by MedImmune or a company.  There are natural experiments 
comprised of cohorts of people who have received yearly LAIV for four to five years and other 
children who have received none.  It seemed to her that some basic science would be helpful in 
answering portions of this that should be funded other than by the companies.  Portions of this 
should not be related to a particular vaccine, but that are important for ACIP to understand in 
the context of how they consider each new vaccine. 
 
Dr. Atmar expressed concern about potentially having to withdraw a recommendation again if 
they recommend LAIV based on the data that are or will be available, but then it still did not 
demonstrate effectiveness in the US.  This could lead to loss of confidence in this group.  
Without really understanding the reason for the lack of effectiveness, despite some good 
hypotheses, he urged ACIP to have VE data for H1N1 going forward though it probably would 
have to be developed in other countries. 
 
Ms. Pellegrini pointed out that the issues raised during this session were not exclusive to 
influenza.  The same types of issues are being observed with the inability to get to a vaccine for 
Ebola and Zika as strains or viruses burn themselves out, abruptly reemerge, and disappear 
again.  This field as a whole is going to have to continue grappling with the idea of what kind of 
data is acceptable at different points in an epidemic or the natural rise and fall of these viruses. 
 
Dr. Stephens would like to see effectiveness data, given that it is most powerful in human 
populations.  This may not be available for a while.  He said that he was troubled that the in vitro 
studies were proposed to be a correlate based on some of the discussion about slides 20 and 
22 and the new A/Slovenia strain.  Even those data were not very convincing to him at this 
point. 
 
Dr. O’Leary (PIDS) noted that in some of the data from other countries, VE was still less than 
IIV.  Some questions for the WG and ACIP is:  What is the threshold?  Is it better than zero?  Is 
it overlapping confidence intervals?  If they had good VE studies, what would be the threshold 
for consideration of another recommendation? 
 
Dr. Atmar said he did not know whether a threshold could be defined at this point, but he 
reminded everybody that LAIV was superior to IIV in many of the early studies.  He still believes 
that this is potentially an important vaccine, particularly for young children.  Understanding why 
it did not work in the US for the three seasons it did not is important so that this can be 
overcome and it can be used again.  It is a valuable tool even if IIV is accepted by parents and 
children in this age group. 
 
Ms. Stinchfield (NAPNAP) said that anecdotally in clinical settings in hospitals, clinics, and 
school-based influenza programs, they did not see a lot of rejection of the injectable vaccine this 
year.  There was initial sadness without having intranasal vaccine, but people dealt with that 
and went on.  Those who wanted to be vaccinated were taking the injectable. 
  









Edward Belongia, MD 
Chair, Herpes Zoster Work Group 
 
Dr. Belongia reminded everyone that the primary objective of the Herpes Zoster (HZ) WG is to 
develop evidence-informed vaccine policy for the use of herpes zoster vaccines.  The WG will: 
 
 Consider vaccine and programmatic performance of currently licensed vaccine (Zostavax®) 
 
 Consider the efficacy, safety and duration of protection of HZ/subunit (HZ/su) vaccine that is 
currently in review at FDA 
 
 Identify programmatic options for both vaccines that incorporate cost effectiveness analyses 
and impact on disease burden 
 
Recently, the WG reached consensus on important and critical outcomes to consider pertaining 
to vaccination for HZ, received presentations by manufacturers and researchers on the safety 
and immunogenicity of HZ vaccines, and considered the body of evidence supporting HZ/su 
vaccine. 
 
ACIP received presentations during the October 2016 meeting on HZ epidemiology and 
Zostavax® performance and coverage, and Phase III efficacy studies of HZ/su vaccine (ZOE-50 
& ZOE-70).  During this session, there were presentations on the safety summary of HZ/su 
vaccine by GSK; and Grading of Recommendation Assessment, Development and Evaluation 
(GRADE) of HZ/su vaccine and considerations for policy by CDC.  In June 2017, presentations 
are anticipated on a cost-effectiveness analysis, Zostavax® GRADE, and considerations for 
policy.  A vote is anticipated in October 2017. 
 
Safety Summary of Candidate Vaccine HZ/su 
 
Romulo Colindres, MD, MPH 
Global Medical Affairs Lead, Zoster 
GSK 
 
Dr. Colindres noted that he would be presenting on behalf of a very large team at GSK and 
many study investigators across the world on the safety summary for GSK’s adjuvanted HZ/su 
vaccine candidate.  To place this presentation into context, he reminded everyone that ZOE-50 
and ZOE-70 results were previously presented at ACIP sessions in 2015 and 2016, and also 
have been published in the NEJM.  ZOE-50 and ZOE-70 are the Phase III clinical trials that 
enrolled subjects greater than 50 years of age and greater than 70 years of age respectively, 
and demonstrated a remarkable VE of greater than 90% independent of age, even in those 
greater than 70 years of age and 80 years of age who are most at risk for zoster disease.  GSK 
is also pleased because this efficacy has been demonstrated to last at least 4 years post-
vaccination.  The presentation during this session focused on a broad overview of HZ/su 
vaccine safety. 
 
Herpes Zoster Vaccines 
 
 






During this session, Dr. Colindres presented information on the vaccine composition; the 
adjuvant used in HZ/su vaccine; the incidence of solicited local and systemic events, including 
some new data on frequency of reactions between doses; detailed safety analyses and 
conclusions; and new data on 9-year immunogenicity for HZ/su vaccine. 
 




On the left in turquois is the antigen, which is 50 µg of recombinant glycoprotein E.  This is the 
most abundant protein found on the envelope of VZV, which elicits a specific cellular and 
humoral immune response.  On the right is the adjuvant system, which is ASO1B.  ASO1B is a 
liposome-based adjuvant system that contains immunostimulants MPL and QS-21.  MPL 
enhances cellular and humoral immunity, which QS-21 stimulates Th1 cell-mediated immunity 
as well as cytotoxic T- lymphocyte activity.  Synergistically, when MPL and QS-21 are 
combined, there is an enhanced proinflammatory response or innate immunity, as well as 
cellular and humoral response increases.  Overall, this results in a faster, stronger, and longer 
lasting immune response [Dendouga et al. Vaccine 2012;30:3126–35; Garçon et al. 
Understanding Modern Vaccines, Perspectives in Vaccinology, Vol 1, Amsterdam: Elsevier; 
2011; chapter 4: p89–113; Dendouga et al. Vaccine 2012;30:3126–35; Grunewald et al. 
Science 2003;302:1396–8; Mata-Haro et al. Science 2007;316:1628–32]. 
 
AS01 was chosen for the zoster program because of its ability to increase both humoral and 
cellular response to the co-administered antigen.  This is important in the context of zoster 
because of the VZV-specific cellular decline that can lead to increased susceptibility of zoster 
disease in individuals over 50 years of age.  AS01 works by inducing a local and transient 
inflammatory response similar to other adjuvants in licensed vaccines.  This transient 
inflammation, while often associated with local or systemic symptoms, promotes a faster, 
stronger, and longer lasting VZV-specific response1,2 [1Didierlaurent et al, J. Immunol, 2014;. 
Didierlaurent et al, Exp Rev Vac, 2016. 2Leroux-Roels G, et al. Clin Immunol. 2016 May 
25;169:16–27]. 
  






There is now a large amount of clinical experience with AS01 covering a wide range of 
populations with several antigens in over 40,000 subjects.  Of course, the largest experience is 
with the HZ/su vaccine candidate in which over 28,000 adults have been exposed.  The second 
largest population is greater than 12,000 infants and toddlers who received AS01E, a smaller 
dose of the same adjuvant, together with a malaria antigen.  There is a series of other vaccines 
in earlier phase development such as tuberculosis (TB), human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 
and hepB in which the adjuvant has been combined with the antigen and applied to several 
populations such as children, adolescents, and adults.  Importantly, all of these vaccines have 
been well-tolerated with no major safety concerns.  Additionally, independent of antigen 
adjuvant combination, AS01 has been shown consistently to stimulate a strong T-cell response. 
 
The safety data presented during this session were drawn from a large pooling of over 14,000 
subjects from the ZOE-50 and ZOE-70 Phase III clinical trials which were conducted at multiple 
sites across 18 countries.  A comparative analysis was performed between the vaccine group 
and a placebo group, including all of the safety endpoints:  local and systemic reactions, SAEs 
and potential immune-mediated diseases (pIMDs). 
 
In terms of how safety data were collected in these clinical trials, subjects received 2 doses of 
either vaccine or placebo at a 2-month interval.  Solicited local and systemic symptoms were 
proactively collected via diary cards for 7 days post-each dose.  SAEs were collected for up to 
12 months post-second dose.  SAEs considered related to vaccination by the investigator, any 
fatalities, and pIMDs were tracked for the entire time of the study, which had a mean follow-up 
of 4.1 years.  As a note, because of the potential concern between adjuvanted vaccines and 
autoimmune diseases, GSK closely monitors pIMDs in all clinical trials with adjuvanted vaccine. 
 
Turning to the results for solicited local symptoms of any grade post-vaccination in a 
comparison between the vaccine and placebo group, the solicited local symptoms were more 
common among vaccine than placebo recipients as might be expected with an adjuvanted 
vaccine.  Pain was by far the most common solicited local symptom.  The majority of these 
symptoms were reported as moderate to mild in intensity and had a median duration of 2 to 3 
days.  Looking specifically at Grade 3 solicited local symptoms reported during the 7 days post-
vaccination, Grade 3 is defined as “redness and swelling at the injection site were scored as 
grade 3 for those more than 100 mm.  All other symptoms were scored as 3 for preventing 
normal activity.”  Subjects experienced 8% or less Grade 3 reactions for local symptoms, and 
these were still more common among vaccine than placebo recipients.  The median time for 
these Grade 3 reactions was 1 to 2 days. 
 
In terms of solicited systemic symptoms of any grade 7 days post-vaccination, for any grade 
fatigue, headache, myalgia, and shivering were the most common.  All symptoms occurred 
more frequently in vaccine compared to placebo recipients.  Most of these were mild to 
moderate in intensity, with a median duration of 1 to 2 days.  Grade 3 solicited systemic 
symptoms 7 days post-vaccination were reported in 6% or less of study subjects and were still 
more frequent in the vaccine versus placebo group specifically for fatigue, headache, myalgia, 
and shivering.  The median duration for these symptoms was 1 to 2 days. 
 
Regarding some new data from an ad hoc analysis of systemic and local reactions by dose, 
GSK sometimes receives the question, “What is the frequency by grade between Dose 1 and 
Dose 2?”  This analysis attempted to answer these questions.  Looking at subjects’ intensity of 
reaction at Dose 2 for those individuals who had a Grade 0 or 1 reaction at Dose 1, 3650 
subjects reported having a Grade 0 or Grade 1 pain following the first dose.  Approximately 85% 
of the 3650 subjects had a similar Grade 0 or Grade 1 reaction following the second dose.  If 






this is extended to look at the remaining systemic symptoms, the trend is similar with the 
proportion of subjects who had a Grade 0 or Grade 1 specific symptom at Dose 1 experiencing 
a similar intensity of reaction for the same symptom at Dose 2 ranges between 85% and 92%.  
A similar analysis looked specifically at Grade 3 reactions at Dose 1 to determine what occurred 
with Dose 2.  There were 155 subjects who reported Grade 3 pain on the first dose.  
Approximately two-thirds of the 155 subjects experienced Grade 2 or less reaction on the 
second dose.  Extending to the other systemic symptoms, the trend is similar with the proportion 
of subjects who had a Grade 3 specific symptom at Dose 1 experiencing a lower intensity of 
Grade 2 for the same symptom at Dose 2 ranging from 66% to 76%. 
 
Regarding 2-dose compliance, 96% of subjects complied with the second dose in ZOE-50 
among vaccine and placebo recipients.  For ZOE-70, 94% and 95% received a second dose 
respectively for the vaccine and placebo groups.  Overall in these clinical trials, there was very 
high second dose compliance.  In terms of the impact of a Dose 1 reaction on Dose 2 
compliance, of the 268 subjects ZOE-50 and ZOE-70 who experienced a first-dose Grade 3 
local reaction, 23 received Dose 1 only and 245 (91%) received both Dose 1 and Dose 2.  Of 
the 251 subjects who experienced a first-dose Grade 3 systemic reaction, 27 received Dose 1 
only and 224 (89%) received both Dose 1 and Dose 2.  While Dose 1 reaction may be a factor 
in subjects not receiving the second dose, the large majority of subjects in this study, including 
those who had a Grade 3 reaction on the first dose, still received the second dose. 
 
Shifting to the main safety analysis, in the first 30 days post-last vaccination there was no 
difference between the vaccine and placebo groups for SAEs, fatalities, or pIMDs.  At 1 year 
post vaccination, SAEs were well-balanced between the vaccine and placebo groups with a 
frequency of 10.1%.  There also were no differences between groups for deaths or pIMDs, with 
pIMDs having an incidence of 0.7% in both groups.  The most frequent SAEs by preferred term 
were cardiac conditions such as atrial fibrillation and myocardial infarction (MI), as well as 
infections such as pneumonia.  These frequencies are as would be expected for the study 
population.  More importantly, for the individual rates of these frequent SAEs, there was no 
difference between the vaccine and placebo groups. 
 
Regarding fatal SAEs by time period, for all time periods evaluated, there were no differences 
between the vaccine or placebo group.  The majority of the deaths occurred greater than 1 year 
post-last vaccination.  In terms of the most frequent fatal SAEs during the whole post-
vaccination time period overall, cardiac conditions, infections of the respiratory track, and 
neoplasms were common.  This aligns with the most frequent causes of death among this aged 
population.  Once again, these most frequent fatal SAEs were equally balanced between the 
vaccine and placebo groups.  As expected, fatal SAEs were more common in subjects 70 years 
of age or older. 
 
For all time periods evaluated, the pIMDs were seen in equal frequency among the vaccine and 
placebo groups, with a frequency of 1% for the entire study period in both groups.  
Approximately half of the pIMDs were reported greater than one year after the last vaccination.  
The most frequent pIMDs in the entire study were polymyalgia rheumatic, rheumatoid arthritis, 
psoriasis, and autoimmune thyroiditis.  These are some of the most frequently reported pIMDs 
in the general population.  There were no differences for these between the vaccine and 
placebo groups. 
  






In conclusion for local and systemic solicited symptoms, as may be expected with an 
adjuvanted vaccine, local and systemic solicited symptoms were higher in the HZ/su vaccine 
versus placebo group.  However, the majority of symptoms were mild to moderate intensity and 
of short duration of 1 to 3 days.  In an ad hoc analysis, it was observed that subjects with Grade 
3 reaction at Dose 1 were likely to experience a lower grade reaction at Dose 2 for the same 
symptom.  Compliance for the second dose was quite high overall at 95%, and ≥ 89% even 
among subjects who had Grade 3 reaction at Dose 1.  With regard to general safety 
conclusions, a large safety database with over 14,000 subjects with greater than 60,000+ 
person years of active follow-up was available for the evaluation of the safety of HZ/su 
candidate vaccine.  Safety data from the HZ/su vaccine clinical program has not detected any 
safety concern.  The overall incidence of SAEs, deaths, and pIMDs is equal between the 
vaccine and placebo groups.  Based on the data available, the current benefit/risk profile for this 
vaccine remains positive. 
 
The new data on the 9-year immunogenicity of HZ/su vaccine come from the Zoster-060 study, 
which is an extension to a Phase II immunogenicity and safety study (Zoster 003).  Subjects in 
the original study received 2 doses of HZ/su vaccine at a 2-month interval.  A subset of subjects 
from this original study were followed through 6 years post-vaccination, and these data were 
published previously.  Zoster-060 included 70 subjects for evaluation of immune response at 
year 9 post vaccination.  The endpoints assessed included antigen-specific humoral and cell-
mediated immune response. 
 
The 70 subjects received 2 doses of HZ/su vaccine and had a mean age of 72.3 at the time of 
the initial vaccination.  The mean age 9 years later is 81.3 with the oldest subject in the study 
being 90 years of age.  There was a predominance of female subjects and all subjects were 
White-Caucasian, which is not surprising considering that the study was conducted in Germany, 
Sweden, and the Czech Republic. 
 
In terms of the sustained cellular immune response overall 9-years post-vaccination, the cellular 
immune response persists well above pre-vaccination baseline values.  At month 108, or 9 
years post-vaccination, there was a 3.4-fold increase over pre-vaccination.  This fold increase 
was sustained since month 48, or 4 years post-initial vaccination.  Similar results were observed 
when stratified by age categories of subjects 60 through 69 years of age and 70 years of age or 
older.  Independent of age and including the subjects who were 70 years of age or greater at 
initial vaccination, there was a modest decrease in immune response during the first few years 
that seems to have plateaued by Year 4 and remained stable through Year 9, still above the 
pre-vaccination levels.  Looking at sustained humoral immune response for the same two age 
categories, the trends for humoral immunity closely followed those of cell-mediated immunity 
with persistent immune response at Year 9 well-above baseline levels, a larger fold than the 
cell-mediated immune responses.  The humoral immune response also remained stable 
between Year 4 and Year 9 and applied to all age groups, including those individuals 70 years 
and older at initial vaccination. 
 
In conclusion, 9 years post-vaccination, immune responses to HZ/su vaccine were above 
baseline values (median 3.4-fold increase) in healthy older adults.  Stable, persistent immune 
responses were observed between Year 4 and Year 9.  Immune responses were maintained in 
the oldest age cohort (> 70 years).  Additional Year 10 data will be available in the first quarter 
of 2018. 
  






In summary, the HZ/su candidate vaccine has a well-characterized safety profile with no 
concerns observed to date.  The majority of local and systemic reactions were of mild to 
moderate intensity and of short duration.  As might be expected with an adjuvanted vaccine, 
these were higher among HZ/su vaccine than placebo recipients.  However, this same adjuvant 
in combination with the gE antigen contributes to robust immunogenicity, persisting through 9 
years post-vaccination.  The unique combination of adjuvant and antigen in HZ/su vaccine has 
led to unprecedented VE of greater than 90% independent of age, largely overcoming the 
natural decline in cell response that can lead to increased zoster in older adults.  This VE 




Dr. Reingold asked whether there were any studies of immunogenicity and safety data in people 
who have previously received another zoster vaccine, and whether GSK would be seeing an 
indication for use in that population. 
 
Dr. Colindres responded that GSK is currently conducting a revaccination study among subjects 
65 years of age and older who received or did not receive the currently licensed vaccine.  This 
study will evaluate immunogenicity and safety, and the results should be available in the 
upcoming months. 
 
In terms of the 4% to 5% who did not return for the second dose, Dr. Hunter asked how hard the 
research assistants worked to get them to come back.  He wondered how this would work in 
actual practice outside of a research setting. 
 
Dr. Colindres replied that the reasons for not returning were quite varied, but as expected in 
most clinical trials.  The number one reason was withdrawal of consent not due to an AE.  Other 
reasons included loss to follow-up, moving from the area, unsolicited AEs, SAEs, pIMDs, and 
protocol violations.  While there are no real-world data yet, in the clinical trial settings in the US, 
at the lowest percentile of compliance in individual sites, the lowest 2-dose compliance was 
85%.  Worldwide, the lowest compliance was approximately 68%.  GSK is currently working 
with its own health economic teams as well as health economic teams at CDC to determine how 
to best estimate 2-dose compliance in a real-world setting. 
 
Dr. Walter observed that about 5% to 6% of participants had Grade 3 reactions per event, and 
wondered what total percentage had a Grade 3 reaction. 
 
Dr. Colindres replied that for specific symptoms, 8% or less experienced Grade 3 injection site 
symptoms and 6% or less experienced Grade 3 systemic symptoms.  It is about 8% to 9% for all 
of the symptoms combined.  An analysis is being performed now to interpret what exactly is the 
experience of a patient with a Grade 3 reaction.  By definition a Grade 3 for most of the 
symptoms was preventing daily activity.  A Grade 2 was interfering with daily activity and a 
Grade 1 was tolerable. 
 
Dr. Duchin (NACCHO) asked whether there was any variability in the incidence AEs or SAEs 
according to the race or ethnicity of the subjects. 
 
Dr. Colindres responded that the patterns of safety and reactogenicity among minority 
populations, such as African Americans or Hispanics, did not differ significantly from the general 
population as a whole.  Of the North America subjects, 8% were African American.  Based on 
the US Census data from 2016, African Americans above 50 years of age is about 10%.  They 






realized that they were modestly below the representation of the general population, but GSK 
always strives to have a diverse population in its studies. 
 
Dr. Decker (Sanofi Pasteur) asked whether they had followed the Zoster 003 population over 
time to look at zoster-free survival curves. 
 
Dr. Colindres replied that the current plan for the Zoster-060 study as an extension of the Zoster 
003 study is to follow those subjects through Year 9.  Currently, the only subjects still being 
followed are the 70 presented during this session.  The placebo recipients have not been 
followed.  
 
GRADE of HZ/su Vaccine 
 
Kathleen Dooling, MD, MPH 
Medical Epidemiologist 
Division of Viral Diseases 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Dooling presented the results from the GRADE analysis of HZ/su vaccine.  She reminded 
everyone that the GRADE process is to develop policy questions, consider critical outcomes, 
review and summarize evidence of benefits and harms, evaluate quality of evidence, assess 
population benefit, and evaluate values and preferences.  The subsequent steps involving the 
review of health economic data, considerations for formulating recommendations, and GRADE 
category will be presented during a future meeting. 
 
The policy question for consideration is, “Should HZ/su vaccine be routinely used to prevent 
herpes zoster?”  The population of interest is immunocompetent adults aged 50 years or older.  
The intervention of interest is a 2-dose series of HZ/su vaccine consisting of the current 
formulation of 50 µg gE and the adjuvant AS01B administered intramuscularly at 0 and 2 
months.  The WG looked for studies that compared this intervention to placebo or no vaccine.  
The outcome the WG considered most important included the following: 
 
 HZ 
 Post herpetic neuralgia (PHN) 
 Duration of protection against HZ 
 SAEs 
 Reactogenicity (Grade 3) 
 
Outcomes included in the evidence profile can be divided into both benefits and harms.  The 
benefits of prevention of HZ and PHN were deemed critical and duration of protection 
considered important.  The harm category of SAEs was deemed critical and reactogenicity was 
considered important. 
 
The WG completed a systematic review of studies from PubMed, Embase, CINAHL, Cochrane, 
Scopus, and clinicaltrials.gov in any language.  Efforts also were made to obtain unpublished or 
other relevant data.  Initial search terms included: “herpes zoster” and “subunit,” or “HZ su ADJ5 
subunit,” or “HZ su,” or “GSK 1437173A.”  Articles were included if they presented data on the 
HZ/su vaccine and involved the relevant population of immunocompetent adults aged 50 years 
or older, included data for the relevant intervention, included data relevant to the outcome 
measures being assessed, and reported primary data. 






Working with an expert in Library Sciences, the WG identified 116 references via database 
searches.  An additional 32 references were identified from clinicaltrials.gov.  Title and abstracts 
were then screened for all 148 references, and records were excluded if there was no primary 
data or if the study did not include the population or intervention of interest.  Following that step, 
29 full text articles were reviewed and 19 were excluded because either the study was still 
ongoing, the reference was a duplicate, the population under study was immunocompromised, 
or multiple vaccines were co-administered as an intervention.  Ultimately, 10 studies were 
included in this GRADE analysis. 
 
For reference, the evidence types outlined in the GRADE process are as follows: 
 
Initial Evidence Type Study Design 
1 Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) or overwhelming evidence from 
observational studies 
2 RCTs with important limitations, or exceptionally strong evidence from 
observational studies  
3 Observational studies, or RCTs with notable limitations   
4 Clinical experience and observations, observational studies with important 
limitations, or RCTs with several major limitations 
 
Outcome #1 was the incidence of HZ.  Two manuscripts were included for assessment.  Lal et 
al reported an RCT in adults 50 years of age and older, also known as ZOE-50.  This Phase III 
clinical trial compared HZ/su vaccine to placebo and reported vaccine efficacy against HZ.  
Cunningham et al reported an RCT in adults 70 years of age and older known as ZOE-70, 
which also reported vaccine efficacy against HZ compared to placebo.  These GSK-funded 
studies were performed in parallel at the same study sites in 18 countries.  After enrollment in 
the study, participant 70 years and older were randomized either to ZOE-50 or ZOE-70.  Study 
protocols were consistent in both study arms.  While the results were reported separately, for 
GRADE purposes these were considered as one study. 
 
For HZ, the estimates of effect were as follows:  For adults over 50, VE was 96.6%.  For adults 
in their 60s, it was 97.4%.  For adults 70 years of age and older, VE was 91.3%.  The type of 
evidence supporting the prevention of HZ is Type 1.  ZOE-50 and ZOE-70 are considered one 
RCT with an initial evidence level of 1.  The WG determined that there was no serious risk of 
bias.  As there was only one study, inconsistency could not be assessed between studies.  
There were no serious concerns regarding indirectness of the study with respect to the central 
policy question, and no concerns regarding imprecision of the study. 
 
Outcome #2 was the incidence of PHN.  Cunningham et al described previously pooled data 
from pooled data from ZOE-50 and ZOE-70 studies to report VE against PHN.  Regarding 
incidence of PHN, the estimates of effect were as follows:  For adults 50 years of age and older, 
VE was 91.2%.  For adults in their 50s and 60s, there actually were no cases in the vaccinated 
group.  Thus, there was a VE of 100% with wide confidence intervals.  The study was powered 
to assess PHN in adults 70 years of age and older.  For this group, VE was 88.8%. 
 
The type of evidence supporting incidence of PHN is type 1.  ZOE-50 and ZOE-70 are 
considered one RCT with an initial evidence level of 1.  The WG determined that there was no 
serious risk of bias.  As there was only one study, inconsistency could not be assessed between 
studies.  There were no serious concerns regarding indirectness of the study with respect to the 
central policy question, and no concerns regarding imprecision of the study. 
 






Next, the WG considered outcome #3, duration of protection against HZ.  Again, Cunningham et 
al was the only manuscript to report on this outcome and was derived from pooled ZOE-50 and 
ZOE-70 data.  For the duration of protection against HZ, estimates of effect in adults 70 years of 
age and older were as follows:  During the first year following vaccination, VE was 97.6%.  In 
the second, third, and fourth years, VE was 92.0%, 84.7%, and 87.9%, respectively. 
 
The type of evidence supporting the duration of protection against HZ is type 1.  ZOE-50 and 
ZOE-70 are considered one RCT with an initial evidence level of 1.  The WG determined that 
there was no serious risk of bias.  Inconsistency was not applicable.  There were no serious 
concerns regarding indirectness of the study with respect to the central policy question, and no 
concerns regarding imprecision of the study. 
 
Turning to the evidence for potential harms, outcomes #4 and #5 were SAEs and reactogenicity.  
Four studies were included.  Cunningham and Lal were discussed earlier in this presentation.  
Chlibek et al in the Journal of Infectious Diseases (JID) in 2013 was an RCT that included adults 
50 years and older and compared HZ/su vaccine to placebo and assessed SAEs as well as 
reactogenicity.  Another study by Chlibek et al published first in 2014 and then followed up in 
2016 was an RCT that compared HZ/su vaccine to an unadjuvanted glycoprotein vaccine.  
Poder, Leroux-Roels, and Vink were RCTs in the target population that administered HZ/su 
vaccine but did not have a non-vaccine comparison group.  Godeaux and Lal 2013 were not 
randomized, nor did they have an adequate comparison group.  All studies assessed SAEs as 
well as reactogenicity, and all were funded by GSK. 
 
Outcome #4 was SAEs.  Among the over 29,000 participants followed through the entire study 
period, almost equal numbers of SAEs were observed in the placebo and vaccine groups.  This 
was true for all SAEs as well as AEs considered by the independent safety committee to be 
possibly related to vaccination.  The remaining 7 studies that administered HZ/su vaccine to a 
total of 616 participants found no SAEs related to vaccination.  The type of evidence for SAEs is 
type 1.  There were two RCTs with an initial evidence level of 1.  The WG determined that there 
was no serious concerns regarding risk of bias, inconsistency, indirectness, or imprecision.  The 
four RCTs with no placebo group and the two non-randomized trials were non-blinded, open-
label trials and therefore were downgraded for risk of bias and indirectness.  They were 
downgraded for indirectness because they did not have a comparison group.  The two non-
randomized studies started at a lower initial evidence type.  Given that the top two listed RCTs 
contributed type 1 evidence and the other studies were consistent with their findings, the 
evidence type assigned to this outcome is type 1. 
 
Outcome #5 was reactogenicity, specifically Grade 3 reactions.  In ZOE-70 studies, symptoms 
were solicited from almost 10,000 participants for 7 days following vaccination.  Any Grade 3 
reaction was noted in 3.1% of the placebo and 16.5% of the vaccinated group for a difference of 
13.4%.  Grade 3 reactions at the injection site showed 9.1% excess in the vaccinated group, 
and Grade 3 systemic reactions showed an excess of 8.4% in the vaccinated group.  Four 
additional studies reported any solicited Grade 3 reactions after vaccination among participants 
who received HZ/su vaccine.  Those estimates are 3.4% (Godeaux, 2017, n=96), 9.3% 
(Chlibek, 2013, n=150), 11.5% (Poder, 2016, n=119), and 40% (Lal, 2013, n=10).  The 
remaining three studies that administered HZ/su vaccine to a total of 241 participants reported 
Grade 3 reactions by symptom and had findings consistent with the previous studies.  The type 
of evidence for reactogenicity was type 1.  There were two RCTs with an initial evidence of type 
1.  The WG determined that there was no serious risk of bias in these studies and there were no 
concerns about inconsistency, indirectness, or imprecision.  The four RCTs with no placebo 
group were non-blinded, open-label trials and were downgraded for risk of bias and 






indirectness.  The two non-randomized studies had an initial evidence level of 2 and were 
downgraded for risk of bias and indirectness.  Given that the two RCTs contribute type 1 
evidence and that the other studies are consistent with those findings, the evidence type 
assigned to this outcome was also type 1. 
 
There were limitations to the ZOE-50 and ZOE-70 study as with any study. Reactogenicity of 
the vaccine itself may have resulted in effective un-blinding of some vaccine recipients, leading 
to opportunities for bias in reporting of AEs and possibly case ascertainment.  With regard to 
generalizability, only 18% of the participants were from North America and only 1% of overall 
participants were black.  The study excluded those with a history of HZ, previous Zostavax® 
recipients, and those taking immunosuppressant or immuno-modifying drugs. 
 
In summary, the critical outcomes of HZ, PHN, and SAEs are all supported by at least one good 
quality, large RCT.  To recap, the findings were that HZ/su vaccine is significantly efficacious in 
preventing HZ and PHN.  No differences were detected between the vaccinated and placebo 
groups for SAEs.  Grade 3 reactions were more commonly reported in vaccinated groups 
compared to placebo.  Overall, HZ/su vaccine was significantly efficacious in preventing HZ 4 
years following vaccination.  The overall evidence type supporting the critical outcomes is 1.  In 
other words, the WG’s level of certainty of the estimate of effect for these outcomes is high. 
 
Consideration for HZ Vaccine Policy 
 
Kathleen Dooling, MD, MPH 
Medical Epidemiologist 
Division of Viral Diseases 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Dooling emphasized the importance of considering vaccine policy in the context of the 
epidemiology in the US.  The annual rate of HZ is approximately 4 cases per 1000 population or 
roughly 1 million cases annually1,2.  The incidence increases with age, ranging from <1 
case/1000 children to >15 cases/1000 population 80 years and older2,3.  For adults 50 years 
and older with HZ, 10% to 18% will go on to develop PHN.  Similar to HZ, the incidence 
increases with age3.  The incidence of HZ is decreasing in children, increasing in younger 
adults, and has plateaued in adults ≥65 yrs4 [1Jumaan et al., JID, 2005, 191:2002-7; 2Yawn, et 
al., Mayo Clin Proc. 2007; 82:1341-9; 3Insinga et al., J Gen Intern Med.  2005, 20:748-53; 
4Hapaz et al, IDWeek 2015]. 
 
Zostavax®, a live attenuated vaccine for the prevention of HZ, was recommended by ACIP in 
2008 for immunocompetent adults ≥60 years.  Phase III clinical trials demonstrated a VE of 51% 
against HZ and 67% against PHN5.  The duration of protection against HZ5,6 was 62% in Year 1, 
45% by Year 4, and 7% by Year 9.  In terms of AEs following immunization5, there was no 
significant difference between placebo and vaccine.  However, non-serious AEs were seen 
more frequently in the vaccinated group.  In 2015, 31% of adults ≥60 years had been vaccinated 
with Zostavax7 [5Oxman et al. 2005, NEJM, 6Morrison et al. 2015, CID; 7CDC 2015 Adult 
Vaccination Coverage General Population Report.  
 
Therefore, the key factors to consider when formulating policy recommendations can be 
summarized as thus:  The evidence type for both harms and benefits is evidence type 1.  In 
terms of balance between benefits and harms, HZ and PHN were significantly less frequent in 
the vaccinated group.  That finding persisted 4 years following vaccination.  SAEs occurred at 






similar rates in vaccinated and placebo groups.  Grade 3 reactions occurred more frequently in 
vaccine recipients.  Ultimately, the WG concluded that benefits of disease prevention outweigh 
harms of reactogenicity.  With respect to values, the WG placed high value on prevention of HZ 
and PHN.  Studies have shown that community members also place high value on prevention of 
HZ and PHN8.  Patients who had experienced herpes zoster consistently placed the highest 
value on avoidance of the disease8 [8Lieu, Pharmacoeconomics 2009].  Of course, cost-
effectiveness will be an important factor to consider.  That analysis is ongoing. 
 
The WG has identified a number of information gaps for policy-making.  For example, 2-dose 
compliance was 95% in Phase III clinical trials.  It is not known what 2-dose compliance will be 
under real world conditions, or whether non-completion of the series will have an effect on 
vaccine effectiveness and/or duration of protection.  The protection that HZ/su vaccine can 
provide beyond 4 years is not clear.  Though no data are yet available to assess vaccine 
efficacy in immunocompromised persons, fortunately Phase III trials of 2 vaccines, HZ/su and 
V212, are ongoing.  The efficacy and safety data from these trials will inform vaccine policy in 
this high-risk group.  Importantly, there are no head-to-head comparisons of VE between HZ/su 
and Zostavax®. 
 
Based on the review of the evidence for critical and important outcomes, the WG’s interpretation 
is that the vaccine is safe, efficacious, and maintains high protection against HZ 4 years 
following vaccination among immunocompetent adults aged 50 years and older.  The issues 
under active consideration by the WG are as follows: 
 
 Should recommendations for routine vaccination start at age 50 or age 60?  The substantial 
disease burden in the 50 through 59-year-old cohort must be weighed against increasing 
disease incidence with age, possible waning of immunity, and incremental cost/benefit. 
 
 Should persons previously vaccinated with Zostavax® be revaccinated with HZ/su and if so, 
when?  As mentioned earlier, Zostavax® recipients account for over 30% of the population 
60 years of age and older.  The known waning of immunity of Zostavax® must be considered 
and the forthcoming safety and immunogenicity studies that address revaccination.  More 
information will be presented on this during the June ACIP meeting. 
 
 What policy recommendations may prevent the greatest burden of HZ and PHN if 2 licensed 
vaccines are available for use?  Given the differing VEs, duration of protection, 
reactogenicity profiles, and dosing regimens, how can we prevent the most disease?  
 
 What is the most cost-effective vaccine program?  The price of HZ/su vaccine is not yet 
known, but that will factor into each of the above considerations.  ACIP will hear cost-
effectiveness analyses during the June and October 2017 meetings. 
 
Next steps for the WG include cost-effectiveness analyses for HZ/su in the context of the 
current vaccine program, as well as a GRADE for Zostavax®.  Forthcoming data for 
consideration include co-administration of HZ/su with other adult vaccines and expanded dosing 
schedules, immunogenicity and safety in adults who have previously received Zostavax®, and 
immunogenicity and safety in Zostavax® versus HZ/su. 
 
To recap and review the intended timeline, after today’s review of safety and GRADE HZ/su, in 
June 2017 ACIP will hear a GRADE review of Zostavax®, as well as safety and immunogenicity 
data that will compare HZ/se and Zostavax® and revaccination.  Cost-effectiveness and 
considerations for policy also will be presented in June.  In October 2017, summaries of 






GRADE, cost-effectiveness, and policy considerations will be presented.  With that in mind, she 
asked whether there are additional data that would be helpful to ACIP to inform a 




Dr. Hunter thought there were times when there were lower quality evidence that would diminish 
higher quality evidence, such that the final quality score would be lower. 
 
Dr. Dooling clarified that within any individual outcome, the GRADE level applied is not 
necessarily the arithmetic average of the GRADEing of the studies.  In fact, if there is strong 
level 1 evidence, that carries the most weight.  For the outcomes she presented, the lower 
quality of evidence showed similar effect sizes as the higher quality of evidence; therefore, the 
higher quality of evidence prevailed. 
 
Dr. Hunter asked which would have prevailed if the higher and lower quality of evidence had not 
agreed, and if there is ever a decrease in the final quality score of the evidence when there is 
only one study from one source. 
 
Dr. Dooling replied that the overall quality of evidence would have been downgraded for 
inconsistency.  Therefore, the highest quality would not have been assigned to any outcome 
that demonstrated inconsistency of estimates.  In terms of only one study, one of the areas of 
assessment is heterogeneity or inconsistency between studies.  With only one study, that 
particular parameter cannot be assessed.  This raises a good philosophical point in terms of 
whether it should count against the body of evidence that there is only one large study.  So far, 
the guidance has been to not downgrade if there is one well-done, large RCT. 
 
Dr. Patricia Whitely-Williams (NMA) asked if the group discussed whether having additional data 
on the use of zoster vaccine in a more heterogeneous population, particularly African 
Americans, would be beneficial.  The disparity gap is large for this vaccine and is probably even 
worse for some of the other vaccines.  Not that they could predict that there would be an 
adverse health outcome.  However, if there is, it is important to avoid having any other more 
negative effect or reasons for African Americans not to become immunized, particularly as the 
population ages. 
 
Dr. Dooling responded that the WG agrees that diversity in the population under the study is 
extremely helpful and essential to be able to generalize the results to the entire American 
population for whom ACIP would be making recommendations.  Worldwide, it was only 1% of 
the study population.  Specifically within the US population, the percentage was greater as was 
previously indicated by Dr. Colindres.  Could the study populations achieve better diversity to 
reflect the populations for whom we want to make public health recommendations?  Absolutely.  
The WG has consistently reinforced that in its discussions and has asked for specific ethnicity- 
or race-based breakdowns of safety. 
 
Dr. Bennett asked whether there were any additional data that would be helpful to the ACIP.  No 
other data were requested. 
  










David S. Stephens, MD 
Chair, Meningococcal Work Group 
 
 
Dr. Stephens reported that the Meningococcal WG has been engaged with a number of 
activities, including reviewing newly available data for meningococcal B (MenB) vaccines, 
including antibody persistence and response to a booster dose, considering booster doses of 
MenB vaccine for persons at increased risk, and recently hearing an update on the 
discontinuation of the meningococcal polysaccharide vaccine Menomune® (MPSV4). 
 
The policy option under consideration pertains to booster doses of MenB vaccines for persons 
at increased risk, which states that: 
 
 Booster doses of MenB vaccine should be administered every 5 years throughout life to 





Persons with persistent complement component deficiencies including persons 
taking eculizumab 
Persons with anatomic or functional asplenia 
Microbiologists routinely exposed to isolates of Neisseria meningitidis (as long as 
exposure continues) 
 
 Booster doses of MenB vaccine should be administered to persons identified as at 
increased risk because of a serogroup B meningococcal disease outbreak if it has been 
≥6 months since their last MenB dose 
When multi-year or prolonged outbreaks occur, CDC should be consulted and 
recommendations for additional booster doses will be considered on a case-by-
case basis 
 
The agenda for this session focused on considerations for MenB booster doses in groups at 
increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal disease; and an update on the epidemiology of 
meningococcal disease and guidance for the control of meningococcal disease outbreaks in the 
US. 
 
As mentioned, Sanofi Pasteur is discontinuing production and supply of the meningococcal 
polysaccharide vaccine A, C, Y, W Menomune® (MPSV4) in the US.  The last remaining lots will 
expire in June through September 2017.  Letters to health care providers were sent on February 
8, 2017. 
 
The updated guidance for use of meningococcal vaccines in persons aged ≥56 years is as 
follows: 
 Meningococcal vaccines that are licensed for use in persons aged ≥56 years are not 










 Persons aged ≥56 years who are recommended meningococcal vaccination because 




This includes, meningococcal vaccine-naïve persons aged ≥56 years who 
anticipate requiring only a single dose of meningococcal vaccine (e.g. travelers 
and persons at risk as a result of a community outbreak) 
And persons who were vaccinated previously with MenACWY conjugate vaccine 
and are recommended for revaccination or for whom multiple doses are 
anticipated (e.g., persons with asplenia, HIV, and microbiologists) 
 
A Policy Note regarding the updated recommendations for the use of MenB-FHbp (Trumenba®) 
is soon to be published in the MMWR. 
 
Considerations for Serogroup B Meningococcal (MenB) Vaccine Booster  
Doses in Persons at Increased Risk for Serogroup B Meningococcal Disease 
 
Jessica MacNeil, MPH 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Ms. MacNeil presented the WG’s considerations for MenB vaccine boosters in persons at 
increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal disease.  As a reminder, MPSV4 polysaccharide 
vaccine was first recommended for groups at increased risk in 1980.  MenACWY conjugate 
vaccine was recommended for persons 11 through 55 years of age at increased risk when 
licensed in 2005, which was the original age indication for licensure.  Recommendations for 
children 2 through 10 years of and infants at increased risk were then made as the licensed 
indication expanded.  However, during this time, MPSV4 was available for use in persons at 
increased risks who were outside of the licensed age indication of the conjugate vaccine.  In 
2010, booster doses of MenACWY conjugate vaccine were added for certain groups who 
remain at increased risk for meningococcal disease. 
 
The rationale for ACIP recommending booster doses of MenACWY for persons at increased risk 
included that persons at increased risk for meningococcal disease represent small targeted 
groups with a demonstrated increased risk for meningococcal disease.  There is evidence of 
waning functional antibody 3 to 5 years after a single dose of MenACWY and evidence of a 
booster response to revaccination.  There is a low-risk for SAEs following additional doses of 
meningococcal conjugate vaccine, and vaccination is the accepted standard of care for high-risk 
groups.  Based on these considerations, ACIP recommended booster doses of MenACWY 
every 5 years throughout life for certain persons who remain at increased risk for 
meningococcal disease. 
 
In 2014 and 2015 two MenB vaccines were licensed in the US for persons aged 10 to 25 years 
of age.  MenB-FHbp (Trumenba®, Pfizer) contains two components.  It can be administered 
either as a 3-dose series administered at 0, 1–2, and 6 months among persons at increased risk 
for serogroup B meningococcal disease or as a 2-dose series at 0 and 6 months when 
administered to healthy adolescents who are not at increased risk.  MenB-4C (Bexsero®, GSK) 
contains four components and is administered as a 2-dose series at 0 and ≥1 month of age.  
MenB-4C is also licensed in a number of other countries for use in persons ≥2 months of age. 
  






Shortly after the licensure of the MenB vaccines, in 2015 ACIP recommended routine use of 
MenB vaccine for persons aged ≥10 years at increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal 
disease.  During its February 2015 meeting, ACIP recommended routine MenB vaccination for 
persons with complement component deficiencies, persons with anatomic or functional 
asplenia, microbiologists routinely exposed to isolates of Neisseria meningitidis, and persons 
identified as being at increased risk because of a serogroup B meningococcal disease outbreak.  
In June 2015, ACIP recommended that adolescents and young adults 16 through 23 years of 
age may receive a MenB vaccine to provide short-term protection against most strains of 
serogroup B meningococcal disease.  To date, ACIP has not discussed or made 
recommendations for booster doses of MenB vaccine. 
 
It is known that certain people, including the groups outlined above, who are increased risk for 
meningococcal disease are likely to remain at increased risk throughout their lifetime.  Further 
available data suggest waning of antibodies shortly after vaccination with MenB vaccines 
among healthy subjects.  There are currently limited data available on the immunogenicity of the 
MenB primary series among immunocompromised subjects, the duration of protection of MenB 
vaccines, and the efficacy of MenB booster doses among persons at increased risk.  It is 
unlikely that more data for these groups will become available.  However, there is a need to 
optimize protection for persons at increased risk for meningococcal disease. 
 
During this presentation, Ms. MacNeil reviewed the groups at increased risk for serogroup B 
meningococcal disease who are currently recommended MenB vaccination, and discussed the 
WG’s interpretation of the available data on immunogenicity of MenB-4C among 
immunocompromised subjects and data on the antibody persistence and response to a booster 
dose following a primary series with MenB-FHbp (Trumenba®) or MenB-4C (Bexsero®) among 
healthy subjects.  In addition, she reviewed the proposed policy option for MenB booster doses 
among persons at increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal disease. 
 
In terms of the groups at increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal disease currently 
recommended for MenB vaccination, persistent or genetic deficiencies in the complement 
pathway are well-known to increase risk for meningococcal disease.  Individuals with persistent 
complement component deficiencies are at up to 10,000-fold increased risk for developing 
meningococcal disease often develop recurrent infections.  Complement component 
deficiencies are rare and only affect about 0.03% of the US population1.  Complement 
component deficiencies are often recognized as a result of a meningococcal infection or 
recurrent meningococcal infection.  In the US, it is estimated that between 7% and 25% of 
meningococcal cases have a complement component deficiency2 [1Densen R. Clin Exp 
Immunol. Oct 1991; 86(Suppl 1): 57-62; 2Figueroa JE. Clinical Microbiology Reviews. July 1991; 
4(3):359-95]. 
 
Persons who take eculizumab (Soliris®), which is a monoclonal antibody that is indicated for 
treatment of atypical hemolytic uremic syndrome (aHUS) and paroxysmal nocturnal 
hemoglobinuria (PNH) are also at elevated risk for developing meningococcal disease.  This is 
because the monoclonal antibody binds to C5 and inhibits the terminal portion of the 
complement cascade.  Data presented to the FDA Drug Safety and Management Advisory 
Committee showed that 16 cases of meningococcal infection occurred among persons taking 
eculizumab during 2007–2014, including one death.1 These 16 cases occurred out of 5200 
person years of eculizumab exposure, which means that these patients have 2000 times the 
occurrence of meningococcal disease when compared to the general US population.  Among 
those 16 cases, 1 was serogroup B, 2 were serogroup C, and 2 were serogroup Y.  In 11 cases, 
the serogroup was unknown1.  All of the patients had been vaccinated with a MenACWY 






vaccine.1  Additionally, the first known MenB vaccine failure was recently reported in the UK in a 
person taking eculizumab.2  The number of patients taking eculizumab is unknown, but both 
aHUS and PNH are rare conditions [1http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/DrugSafetyandRiskManag
ementAdvisoryCommittee/UCM423031.pdf; 2Abstract O54: http://neisseria.org/ipnc /2016/ 
IPNC2016 AbstractBook.pdf; 3http://atypicalhus.ning.com/page/what-is-ahus; 4http://imgjp1. 
pnhsource.jp/Downloads/pdf/UnderstandingPNHBrochure.pdf]. 
 
Asplenic persons are also at increased risk for invasive infection caused by many encapsulated 
bacteria, including Neisseria meningitidis.  The asplenic population is quite heterogeneous and 
notably includes patients with sickle cell disease which affects ~100,000 persons of all ages1.  
Importantly, people with asplenia have a higher case-fatality ratio when they do develop 
meningococcal disease (40%–70%)2 compared to the US population.3  In one study from the 
UK, persons with asplenia were shown not to respond as well to 1 dose of MenC vaccine4 
[1http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/sicklecell/data.html; 2MMWR. January 28,2011; 60(3): 72-76; 
3Cohn AC. Clin Infect Dis 2010;50:184-91; 4Balmer P.  Infection and Immunity, Jan 2004, 332-
337]. 
 
Microbiologists are also at increased risk of developing meningococcal disease, with an attack 
rate that was found to be 13/100,000 among those who work with Neisseria meningitidis 
compared to 0.1 to 0.2/100,000 among the general US population.  Microbiologists have been 
shown to have a higher case fatality ratio, possibly due to exposures to higher concentrations of 
the organism or to highly virulent strains.  However, the majority of cases that have occurred in 
clinical microbiologists occurred in those who were not using respiratory protection at the time of 
the exposure [Sejvar JJ. Journal of Clinical Microbiology. Sept 2005;43(9):4811-14]. 
 
Meningococcal disease outbreaks are rare and only account for 2% to 3% of US cases.1 
However, when they do occur, they cause significant anxiety and are devastating for the 
communities in which they occur.  There were 5 serogroup B meningococcal disease outbreaks 
on college campuses during 2008–2014.  During those outbreaks, students were found to be at 
between 200- and 1400-fold increased risk for meningococcal disease during the outbreak 
period.  In 2015 and 2016, there have been an additional 6 serogroup B meningococcal disease 
outbreaks on college campuses [1National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System]. 
 
In the US, data on the number of cases that occur among persons in these groups at increased 
risk are limited.  Through the Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) system, information was 
collected on two of these groups, persons with anatomic or functional asplenia and complement 
component deficiencies.  ABCs is an active laboratory- and population-based surveillance 
system that operates in 10 states and covers approximately 43 million persons, or 13% of the 
US population.  ABCs collects data information from the medical record for all meningococcal 
cases reported in the surveillance area, and has collected information on whether cases had 
asplenia or sickle cell disease since 1995 and complement component deficiencies since 2005.  
One limitation that is of particular relevance for the information on the diagnosis of complement 
component deficiencies is that these deficiencies may not be diagnosed until after 
hospitalization for meningococcal disease and therefore may not be captured in ABCs during 
the medical record review for the acute meningococcal hospitalization. 
 
In terms of the estimated number of people and the reported number of cases reported in each 
group, approximately 270,000 individuals fall into three groups of people at increased risk for 
meningococcal disease.  Although only a handful of cases have been documented in ABCs or 
the published literature, these groups are known to be at increased for meningococcal disease 






and are currently recommended to be vaccinated with both MenACWY conjugate vaccine and 
MenB vaccine.  Looking at the outbreak at-risk populations, approximately 180,000 students 
attend the universities where the 11 serogroup B university outbreaks occurred during 2008-
2016.  This translates into approximately 20,000 students at risk per year or 16,000 students at 
risk on average per outbreak.  During these outbreaks on college campuses, a total of 50 cases 
of serogroup B meningococcal disease and 3 deaths were reported. 
 
In summary, persons at increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal disease represent small 
targeted groups with a demonstrated increased risk for meningococcal disease.  For persons 
with complement component deficiencies or anatomic or functional asplenia and most 
microbiologists, the increased risk for meningococcal disease is ongoing.  For persons at 
increased risk because of a serogroup B meningococcal disease outbreak, the risk period may 
be more limited. 
 
In terms of the immunogenicity among immunocompromised subjects for MenB-4C vaccine, 
Bexsero®, the only available data for MenB vaccine response in immunocompromised persons 
comes from a study that looked at the immunogenicity of a 2-dose series of MenB-4C among 
subjects with complement component deficiency or asplenia compared to healthy controls.  This 
study was a Phase IIIb, open label, controlled, multi-center study that evaluated the safety, 
tolerability, and immunogenicity of 2 doses of MenB-4C administered to 152 subjects 2 through 
17 years of age with complement deficiency or asplenia compared to 87 healthy controls.  
Subjects received vaccine at 0 and 2 months. 
 
Immunogenicity was assessed as the proportion of subjects who achieved an hSBA titer >1:5 
using an exogenous complement source for each of the 4 selected serogroup B strains tested.  
An exogenous complement source means that a complement derived from healthy adult sera is 
added during the hSBA assay.  When comparing baseline to post-dose 2, after receiving 2 
doses of MenB-4C, there was an increased immune response to all 4 strains tested in subjects 
with complement deficiency and asplenia.  However, the response was generally lower in 
subjects with complement deficiency compared to subjects with asplenia or healthy controls. 
 
Immunogenicity was also assessed as an hSBA titer ≥1:4 using an endogenous complement 
source for each of the 4 selected serogroup B meningococcal strains tested.  Endogenous 
complement means that the source of the complement for the hSBA assay is the test serum 
itself.  After receiving 2 doses of MenB-4C, all three groups had an increased response.  
However, the hSBA responses were lower among those with complement deficiency when an 
endogenous complement source is used. 
 
Subjects with complement deficiency were broken down into 3 separate groups, including 7 
subjects who were taking eculizumab, 4 subjects with terminal complement deficiencies, and 27 
subjects with other deficiencies compared to 85 healthy controls.  After receiving 2 doses of 
MenB-4C, there was an increased response among all three groups, but the subjects taking 
eculizumab had the lowest response. 
 
In summary, in the only available data assessing immunogenicity of a 2-dose series of MenB-
4C among persons 2 through 17 years of age at increased risk of for meningococcal disease, 
there was an increase in hSBA responses in subjects with complement component deficiency 
and asplenia, and in subjects receiving eculizumab after two doses of MenB-4C.  Comparable 
responses were observed in healthy subjects and subjects with asplenia.  The lower responses 
were reported in subjects with complement component deficiencies, especially if endogenous 






complement was used in the hSBA assay.  Subjects receiving eculizumab showed an increase 
in hSBA titers, but had the lowest response. 
 
Regarding MenB antibody persistence and response to a booster dose among healthy subjects, 
based on the available data, for healthy adolescents, antibody persistence and booster 
response data are available up to 48 months for MenB-FHbp and up to 11 through 24 months 
for MenB-4C.  Among children 4 through 7 and 8 through 12 years, there are antibody 
persistence and booster response data for MenB-4C up to 24 to 36 months. 
 
In terms of the persistence of hSBA responses ≥1:4 against 4 selected serogroup B 
meningococcal strains up to 48 months in adolescents aged 11 through 18 years following 
completion of a 2- or 3-dose series of MenB-FHbp, 1 month post-completion of the primary 
series for persons who completed both the 2- and 3-dose series, there was an initial increase in 
the percentage of persons with hSBA titers ≥1:4.  However, the percentage of subjects with 
protective antibodies dropped sharply at 12 months post-completion of the primary series and 
then remained stable through 48 months post-vaccination. 
 
Regarding antibody persistence up to 48 months in adolescents 11 through 18 years of age 
after completion of either the 2- or 3-dose of primary MenB-FHbp series and hSBA responses to 
a booster dose at 48 months post-primary series, for each strain tested there was an initial 
increase in the percentage of persons with hSBA titers ≥1:4 at 1 month post-primary series.  
This was followed by a decline at 48 months post-completion of the primary series, then 
followed by another increase in the percentage of persons with hSBA titers ≥1:4 1-month post-
booster dose. 
 
Looking at the percentage of adolescents with hSBA titers ≥1:4 or ≥1:5 1 month after a 2-dose 
primary series of MenB-4C, between 99% and 100% of adolescents had an hSBA titer of ≥1:4 
or ≥1:5 1 month after a 2-dose primary series of MenB-4C.  At 11 months or 18 through 24 
months for each of the strains tested, antibody persistence declined over time. 
 
Among children 4 through 7 years of age and 8 through 12 years of age who received a primary 
series of MenB-4C, there was an initial increase in the percentage of persons who had hSBA 
titers ≥1:4 1 month post-primary series, followed by a decline at 24 to 36 months post-
completion as a primary series, followed by another increase in the percentage of persons with 
hSBA titers ≥1:4 at 1 month post-booster dose at 24 to 36 months. 
 
The WG anticipates reviewing one additional study before the June 2017 ACIP meeting.  Four-
year antibody persistence and booster response data for adolescents from Canada and 
Australia after completion of primary series of MenB-4C are anticipated within the next few 
months.  Data are anticipated to be available for ACIP to review during the June 2017 meeting. 
  
The WG also reviewed the available safety data for both the primary series and a single booster 
dose for the MenB vaccines.  As described to ACIP previously, MenB vaccines are more 
reactogenic than other vaccines given during adolescence, with the most common AE reported 
being pain at the injection site.  However, the overall safety and tolerability profiles are similar 
for the primary series and one additional booster dose. 
 
In summary, the available data demonstrate that there is evidence of waning antibody for both 
MenB vaccines as early as 12 months after completion of the primary series.  However, different 
waning rates were observed for antibodies to each vaccine antigen or strain tested.  The data 
from the two MenB vaccines are not directly comparable, as each was evaluated against 






different strains at different intervals following the primary series, and in subjects of different 
ages.  These data also demonstrated that there is evidence of a booster response to 
revaccination among previously vaccinated subjects at intervals varying from 24 to 48 months, 
and there is a low-risk for SAEs following additional MenB doses. 
 
Overall, the WG’s interpretation of the data presented during this session is that persons at 
increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal disease represent small targeted groups with a 
demonstrated increased risk for meningococcal disease.  MenB vaccines are immunogenic in 
persons at increased risk for meningococcal disease.  Waning of antibody is observed as early 
as 12 months post-vaccination, and booster response is observed in previously vaccinated 
subjects following one additional MenB dose. 
 
Similar to the rationale behind the recommendations for booster doses of MenACWY conjugate 
vaccine, the WG supports MenB booster doses among persons at increased risk because 
persons at increased risk for meningococcal disease represent a small targeted group with a 
demonstrated increased risk for meningococcal disease.  Evidence of waning antibody is 
observed as early as 12 months after MenB vaccination, and there is evidence of a booster 
response to revaccination.  There is also a low-risk for SAEs following additional doses of MenB 
vaccine, and vaccination is the accepted standard of care for high-risk groups. 
 
The WG discussed the appropriate timing or interval for MenB booster doses extensively for 
persons who remain at increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal disease and in the setting 
of an outbreak.  There is a desire to harmonize the timing of the booster recommendations with 
MenACWY for persons who remain at increased risk if possible to improve compliance with 
booster doses of both vaccines, and to ensure that some level of protection is maintained over 
time in these individuals.  There was recognition that there is evidence of waning antibody as 
early as 12 months after the MenB primary series.  However, the WG felt that harmonization of 
the booster doses made sense at the time given the currently available data.  Outbreaks 
represent quite a different scenario, and there may be additional benefit to an individual if a 
booster dose is given at a shorter interval to a person previously vaccinated to ensure that 
antibody and potential protection is maximized during the outbreak period. 
 
The overall consensus of the WG was to support routine MenB booster doses for persons at 
increased risk of serogroup B meningococcal disease, and to harmonize the timing of the 
booster doses with MenACWY boosters for groups at prolonged increased risk for 
meningococcal disease.  In outbreak settings, the WG supported providing booster doses if it 
has been at least 6 months since their last MenB dose.  Based on this, the WG proposed the 
following policy option: 
 
 Booster doses of MenB vaccine should be administered every 5 years throughout life to 




Persons with persistent complement component deficiencies including persons 
taking eculizumab 
Persons with anatomic or functional asplenia 
Microbiologists routinely exposed to isolates of Neisseria meningitidis (as long as 
exposure continues) 
 
 Booster doses of MenB vaccine should be administered to persons identified as at 
increased risk because of a serogroup B meningococcal disease outbreak if it has been ≥6 
months since their last MenB dose 






 When multi-year or prolonged outbreaks occur, CDC should be consulted and 
recommendations for additional booster doses will be considered on a case-by-case 
basis 
 
A GRADE evaluation of the evidence supporting MenB booster doses is currently underway and 
will be presented to the ACIP in June 2017.  In addition, an ACIP vote will be proposed during 
the June 2017 on routine MenB booster doses in persons aged ≥10 at increased risk for 
serogroup B meningococcal disease. 
 
Ms. MacNeil posed the following questions on which the WG desired feedback: 
 
 Are there additional data that ACIP would like to review? 
 
 Does ACIP agree with the proposed policy option language and timing for booster doses in 
persons with complement component deficiencies, asplenia, and microbiologists? 
 




For persons previously vaccinated who later are in an outbreak?  




Dr. Atmar requested further information about the relative risk of MenB disease in high risk 
groups versus the groups involved in outbreaks at a population level. 
 
Ms. MacNeil replied that increased risk varies for each group.  For complement deficient people, 
it is up to a 10,000-fold increased risk, and is also extremely high for eculizumab.  For asplenics, 
the risk is primarily for streptococcus pneumoniae, though there is also increased risk for 
Neisseria meningitidis.  The primary risk for that group is increased mortality when they do 
become infected.  For microbiologists, it is 13/100,000 and in outbreaks there is about a 200- to 
1400-fold increased risk. 
 
Dr. Atmar observed that the recommendation was for outbreak, which on a population-based 
level seemed to have a lower risk than the total complement deficient patients.  Boosting at a 
shorter interval seemed like it should be the other way around, or it should be a shorter interval 
for all of them.  He questioned the 5-year interval.  While he understood that this made it easier, 
it would potentially leave more than 75% to 80% at risk during that 5-year period if immunity is 
waning by a year. 
 
Ms. MacNeil indicated that the WG discussed this extensively and felt that based on the data 
available, it made sense to harmonize with the MenACWY recommendation for the groups at 
increased risk.  There remains a question for the outbreak setting about whether the appropriate 
interval is 5 years or a shorter period. 
 
Dr. Szilagyi requested additional information about the extent of waning after the booster dose. 
 
Ms. MacNeil replied that there are data for only 1-month post-booster dose currently, but it is 
hoped that there will be additional data eventually.  
 






Dr. Kempe requested a reminder about the duration of immunity after ACWY, which she 
recalled was in the 4- to 5-year range. 
 
Ms. MacNeil indicated that the vaccine begins to wane within a few years after vaccination.  The 
waning curve is slightly different for ACWY in that it wanes somewhat more slowly.  Decreases 
were observed in protection in the hSBA and effectiveness data as early as a few years after 
vaccination with only a single dose. 
 
Dr. Messonnier noted that routine revaccination was included on the same slide with the 
outbreaks, but routine revaccination of people with complement deficiency is every 5 years 
across their entire lifespan as opposed to the outbreak recommendation which has occurred 
once a year in a limited population.  This is the question faced from a public health perspective 
when a university calls CDC in the middle of an outbreak and is trying to decide what to do.  
Putting them together on the slide mixed the messages.  Those on eculizumab are a small 
number of people, but they are at exceedingly high risk.  However, the data with at least one 
vaccine do not look reassuring.  She asked whether there was certainty that vaccination would 
help them, or if there is any other information that would help to make a data-based 
recommendation for that group of people. 
 
Ms. MacNeil responded that the data reviewed so far suggested that vaccine may not protect 
these individuals.  The WG is considering whether there are additional measures that should be 
used in this population to ensure protection.  The WG felt that vaccination should be 
recommended for this group based on the chance that there would be some protection since the 
risk is so high.  However, other interventions probably should be considered for that group as 
well. 
 
Regarding Dr. Atmar’s comments, Dr. Moore reported that there was not consensus about this 
issue among the WG members and there was a lot of concern about the 5-year benchmark 
because they recognized that the evidence of waning immunity showed that they would not be 
protected for a good portion of that time.  While there was not an agreement, what people were 
weighing and the dilemmas they faced included the fact that there was a concern about people 
not getting the vaccine at all if it was recommended at a high frequency and also concern about 
trying to understand cost-benefit or the cost per case prevented among these high-risk 
populations, acknowledging that the population is very small and the absolute case count 
among that population is very small.  It is very difficult to get a sense of how much would have 
to be spent and how many doses would have to be administered in that population to prevent a 
single case of MenB.  There was a tension in those issues of trying to harmonize with the 
schedule that exists and how frequently doses would have to be given in order to provide 
consistent MenB protection at the highest level, and whether it would be worth it in terms of the 
potential for cases prevented.  She did not believe the WG concluded with a firm answer on 
that, and would like to have ACIP’s input into that dilemma. 
 
Dr. Stephens added that it is unclear what will happen with a subsequent booster.  It could 
provide a much longer period of protection, but those data are not available at this point in terms 
of making a specific recommendation.  Regarding the terminal complement component inhibitor, 
these are people at very high risk.  There is previous experience with polysaccharide and 
conjugate vaccine in complement deficient individuals.  Even though ESBT cannot be boosted, 
which is what the data are based on, some protection is observed even though they persistently 
have complement deficiency.  So, there may be other advantages to optimization of other 
components that may be simulated by a vaccine that would not necessarily be reflected in an 






SBA type of assay in that instance.  There may be other considerations for this particularly very 
high-risk group that they need to focus on. 
 
Regarding the question about additional data, Ms. Pellegrini pointed out that typically when 
discussing meningitis, ACIP hears data on cases and deaths.  It is known that for the people 
who survive, there are often dramatic and life-altering, lifelong health consequences.  It would 
be helpful in the future to capture some of that nuance, because it would help ACIP get a 
clearer picture of cost-benefit in that there is more than preventing just death.  There are 
disabilities and other issues involved. 
 
Dr. Thompson (NVAC) Requested clarity about the term “microbiologist” regarding how the WG 
was using it and how that might be interpreted with respect to laboratory personnel, more 
broadly, and routinely or just in the context of an outbreak. 
 
Ms. MacNeil reminded everyone that two years ago when the recommendation was made, the 
WG engaged in considerable discussion about how to define that group.  The original language 
was kept, which was that employee health or microbiologists will have to determine who fits that 
category.  The research microbiologists who routinely work with Neisseria meningitidis clearly 
fit.  The clinical microbiologists are somewhat more challenging to define.  Those who work on 
outbreaks should be vaccinated already, because those who routinely work with Neisseria 
meningitidis would be in a public health or in a clinical laboratory.  The WG has not discussed 
microbiologists in that setting in particular. 
 
It was not clear to Dr. Savoy (AAFP) what data the WG reviewed to make them feel comfortable 
to spread out the timeframe for a booster to 5 years, when the vaccine wanes in a year.  She 
values harmonization because family doctors have to deal with so many things already, but not 
at the risk of someone’s life.  Given that this pertains to a very small number of people, the cost 
cannot be that much. 
 
Dr. Romero pointed out that exposure by clinical microbiologists is not uncommon.  His 
institution had an exposure this year, and it has happened at three times in the 10 years he has 
been at his institution.  They are not cavalier.  These people are very careful in what they are 
doing, but there are exposures in the clinical laboratory. 
 
Dr. Hunter suggested that perhaps ACIP should say they cannot make a change because there 
are no data to support doing so. 
 
Dr. Messonnier pointed out that the way the language is currently written, a dose is 
recommended every 5 years for the rest of one’s life.  This requires a lot of investment and 
decision-making.  She suggested that the WG think about the short-term versus obliging 
something for which there are no data across the lifespan.  The recommendation already states 
that duration of protection is not known after one booster dose. 
 
Dr. O’Leary (PIDS) expressed confusion about the process situation since the most someone 
could have had since the vaccine has been in use in the US is 2 years.  With only 2 years of 
data, it was unclear to him why they were talking about 5 years.  He suggested waiting a few 
years before deciding on a 5-year booster. 
 
Dr. Reingold inquired as to what the current policy is in the military in terms of revaccination for 
people who are living in a barracks for 20 years, and if there are any data from the DoD that 
might be accessed. 







A DoD representative indicated that for regular inductees, this has not been included. 
 
Dr. Moore asked what additional information the WG might consider to make a different 
recommendation, such as the concept of a range. 
  
Dr. Stephens replied that it is known that there is significant waning at 12 to 18 months with the 
primary series.  For individuals at risk, it is because of that waning that the WG is 
recommending the booster dose.  The other question pertains to what should be done after that, 
and there are no data for that.  Perhaps as Dr. Messonnier suggested, the recommendation 
should be narrowed in the hope of hearing additional data on persistence after the booster dose 
for future recommendations. 
 
Dr. Atmar noted that an economic analysis had been alluded to, and it may be beneficial to see 
what the cost would be with various assumptions that might inform the WG’s deliberations.  He 
agreed with the suggestion to consider 1.5 to 2 years, but even for that an economic analysis 
could be beneficial. 
 
Update on the Epidemiology of Meningococcal Disease and  
Guidance for the Control of Meningococcal Disease Outbreaks in the US 
 
Sarah Meyer, MD, MPH 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Meyer described the epidemiology of meningococcal disease and outbreaks in the US, 
reviewed the current guidance for the evaluation and management of meningococcal disease 
outbreaks, described the proposed updates to CDC’s meningococcal disease outbreak 
guidance, and discussed the next steps. 
 
Since the late 1990s, a sustained decline in the incidence of meningococcal disease has been 
observed in the US, decreasing from 1.3 to 0.12 cases per 100,000 population from 1996 to 
2015.  This decline in incidence began prior to the introduction of a quadrivalent meningococcal 
conjugate, or MenACWY, vaccine in adolescents or the availability of serogroup B, or MenB, 
vaccines.  Incidence has decreased in all three primary disease-causing serogroups, B, C, and 
Y, shown in the blue, purple, and green lines in the graph below, with incidence of serogroup W 
and other serogroups remaining stably low: 
 
 







Incidence and serogroup distribution vary by age group.  The highest incidence is observed in 
children aged less than 2 years and adults aged greater than 85 years.  A peak in incidence is 
also observed among adolescents and young adults aged 16-25 years.  Serogroup B is the 
predominant serogroup in children aged less than 5 years.  In children and adolescents aged 5 
through 20 years, serogroup B accounts for approximately half of cases, and in adults aged 
greater than 20 years, serogroups C, W, or Y cause the majority of disease. 
 
Although information on outbreak-associated cases is collected through the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), reporting is likely incomplete.  In 2014, CDC and state 
health departments conducted a retrospective review of all meningococcal disease cases from 
2009-2013 to identify and characterize clusters/outbreaks.  For the purpose of this analysis, 
clusters were defined as 2 cases of the same serogroup within 3 months.  Outbreaks were 
defined according to the current outbreak threshold as 3 or more cases of the same serogroup 
with an attack rate of >10 cases/100,000 population within 3 months.  Clusters and outbreaks 
were classified as either organization-based in which there is a common affiliation other than a 
shared geographic space, or community-based in which there is no affiliation other than a 
shared geographic space.  From 2009-2013, among the 3,683 cases reported to NNDSS, 195 
primary cases from 41 clusters that met criteria were identified. 
 
Regarding the epidemiologic features of these clusters, among the 41 clusters or outbreaks, 22 
were community-based and 19 were organization-based.  Among the community-based clusters 
or outbreaks, 2 occurred among men who have sex with men (MSM) during this time period. 
Compared to other community clusters or outbreaks, these clusters had higher cumulative 
attack rates.  The other community-based clusters or outbreaks generally had low attack rates, 
with a median of 1 case per 100,000 population, with only 2 of 38 clusters meeting the outbreak 
threshold.  Among the 19 organization-based clusters, 9 occurred among university populations 
and 10 occurred among other organizations such as a correctional facility, health-care facility, 
high school, et cetera.  In general, organization-based outbreaks had high cumulative attack 
rates.  Cases associated with organization-based clusters and outbreaks are primarily due to 
serogroup B; whereas, those associated with community-based clusters are primarily serogroup 
C.  In contrast, sporadic cases are primarily due to serogroups B and Y, followed by serogroup 
C. 
 
Dr. Meyer examined in more detail two commonly reported cluster or outbreak types in the US: 
serogroup B organization-based clusters among university populations and serogroup C 
community clusters among MSM. 
 
From 2008-2016, 11 serogroup B university-based clusters or outbreaks were reported in the 
US.  The epidemiology of these clusters or outbreaks varies, with duration lasting from a few 
days to nearly 3 years, with a cluster size of 2 to 13 cases and undergraduate university sizes 
ranging from 4,000 to 35,000 students.  MenB vaccine was first used in response to a 
serogroup B university outbreak in 2013 prior to licensure of the vaccine in the US.  Since that 
time, 7 of 8 universities implemented MenB vaccination in response to a cluster or outbreak of 
meningococcal disease. 
 
Since 2010, 5 clusters or outbreaks of serogroup C meningococcal disease among MSM have 
been reported.  To date, these clusters have ranged in duration from 4 months to two and a half 
years, with 3 to 22 cases reported.  MenACWY vaccination has been implemented in four of 
these clusters or outbreaks. 
 






In summary, rates of meningococcal disease have declined from approximately 1 to 0.1 cases 
per 100,000 population in the past 20 years, with a decline seen in all serogroups, including 
serogroup B.  Each cluster or outbreak is unique, with a range in number of cases, population 
size and characteristics, and duration.  This creates challenges in applying guidance for the 
control of meningococcal disease outbreaks that is applicable to a wide variety of outbreak 
situations.  In recent years, several serogroup B outbreaks in universities and serogroup C 
outbreaks among MSM have been reported. 
 
Regarding the current guidance for the evaluation and management of meningococcal disease 
outbreaks and proposed updates to this guidance, guidance was originally developed in 1997 
and updated in 2013 in Appendix B of the ACIP “Prevention and Control of Meningococcal 
Disease” statement.  Interim guidance was developed in 2014 for the control of serogroup B 
outbreaks in organizational settings prior to the licensure of serogroup B vaccines in the US, 
specifically to guide use of unlicensed serogroup B vaccines under a CDC-sponsored 
Investigational New Drug (IND) program [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  
Prevention and Control of Meningococcal Disease; Recommendations of the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).  MMWR 2013;62(No. RR-#2): 1-28]. 
 
The key components of these meningococcal disease outbreak guidance documents include 
the following: 
 
 Cases to be included in the case count for vaccine decision-making, 
 The affected population, classified as organization or community-based 
 Outbreak thresholds and the decision to vaccinate 
 Defining the vaccination group 
 The role of molecular genotyping 
 Other control measures, such as mass chemoprophylaxis 
 
The current guidance was originally developed under a different epidemiologic context and prior 
to the availability of conjugate MenACWY or MenB vaccines.  Several recent outbreaks have 
identified challenges in managing outbreaks using the current guidance.  As a result, state and 
local health departments expressed a need for updated guidance better adapted to the current 
situation. 
 
The objective of the revised guidance is to update and harmonize guidance for the investigation 
and public health management of suspected outbreaks of meningococcal disease due to all 
serogroups, accounting for the changes in the epidemiologic situation and available outbreak 
response measures.  To develop this guidance, subject matter experts (SMEs) were consulted 
from September 2015 to March 2016 to review the current guidance and available data, and 
discuss challenges in managing outbreaks using the current guidance.  A review of the literature 
also was conducted to describe the use and impact of meningococcal vaccines in outbreak 
settings. 
 
CDC, with input from SMEs, reviewed all components of the current guidance previously 
mentioned.  However, this presentation focused on a few key areas:  cases to be included in the 
case count for vaccine decision-making, outbreak thresholds and the decision to vaccinate, and 
the role of molecular genotyping as it pertains to defining outbreak-related cases.  Two 
additional topics were added to the updated guidance document:  serogroup B vaccine selection 
based on expected vaccine coverage against an outbreak strain, and re-evaluation of outbreak 
status. 
 






Regarding the cases to include for vaccine decision-making and the role of molecular 
genotyping, this presentation was limited to the discussion on the role of genotyping in terms of 
its application in defining outbreak-related cases.  In the current guidance, only primary cases of 
the same serogroup are included in the case count for vaccine decision-making, as primary 
cases indicate ongoing transmission within a population.  A primary case is defined as a case 
that occurs in the absence of previous known close contact with another patient.  Co-primary 
and secondary cases are those that occur among close contacts of a primary case, with co-
primary cases occurring within 24 hours of the primary case and secondary cases occurring 
more than 24 hours after the primary case. 
 
There are several challenges to the current guidance.  Determining whether cases had close 
contact may be challenging in some populations, such as homeless or MSM populations.  In 
addition, there are differences in the community versus public health perception of what 
constitutes an outbreak.  It may create confusion and communication challenges when some 
cases “don’t count.”  In some situations, serogroup alone may not be sufficient to determine 
whether cases are related.  New tools for molecular typing are available.  Whole genome 
sequencing (WGS) provides the highest resolution for determining relatedness of strains.  The 
role of WGS is becoming increasing important, particularly with the availability of serogroup B 
vaccines.  However, there will continue to be cases in whom an isolate is not available for WGS. 
 
In the updated guidance, cases will no longer be classified as primary, co-primary, or 
secondary.  In addition, evidence of related or identical strains by WGS will not be required for 
inclusion of cases in the case count.  However, if sequencing demonstrates that a case is 
unrelated to others in the outbreak, this case should not be included.  Thus, in the proposed 
guidance, all cases of meningococcal disease of the same serogroup are included in the case 
count unless there is evidence of genetically distinct strains by WGS. 
 
In terms of the outbreak thresholds and the decision to vaccinate, in the published guidance, the 
outbreak threshold is 3 cases of the same serogroup with an attack rate of greater than 10 
cases per 100,000 population in 3 months.  In the interim guidance, which applies only to 
serogroup B organization-based outbreaks, the outbreak threshold is 2 cases of the same 
serogroup in a population of less than 5000, and 3 or more cases of the same serogroup in a 
population of greater than or equal to 5,000 in 6 months. 
 
There are many challenges to the current guidance.  Meningococcal outbreaks are not “one size 
fits all.”  There is a need for flexibility in the guidance to evaluate each outbreak on a case-by-
case basis.  The threshold of 10 cases per 100,000 population is a hundred times higher than 
the current US national incidence.  However, in the absence of data, it is difficult to define a 
more appropriate threshold.  This creates challenges in situations in which the outbreak 
threshold is not reached despite a clear need for intervention, such as in the 2016 serogroup C 
outbreak in Southern California in which 21 cases among MSM were reported but the 
cumulative attack rate reached only 6 cases per 100,000 population.  In addition, there is little 
tolerance for additional cases that are viewed as preventable, and many communities and 
health departments are not comfortable with watchful waiting for additional cases.  Finally, 
attack rates are challenging to calculate in community outbreaks and those occurring among 
special populations due to difficulty in defining the denominator. 
 
While calculation of an attack rate is useful for comparison against baseline trends in the 
affected population, in the proposed guidance, the threshold for vaccination would not be 
determined through a specified attack rate.  Rather, each outbreak should be evaluated on a 






case-by-case basis to determine the appropriate threshold for implementing vaccination. 
General guidance includes the following: 
 
 For organization-based outbreaks: 2 to 3 cases of meningococcal disease of the same 
serogroup within 3 months 
 
 For community-based outbreaks:  Incidence of meningococcal disease of the same 
serogroup that is above expected in the affected community during a 3-month period. 
 
The guidance will provide some flexibility in how an increase above expected is defined, such 
as comparison against a historical baseline in the community or, in the event that the community 
baseline is 0 cases, a comparison against national incidence.  Considerations for vaccine 
decision-making include the size of the population, the ability to define a target group for 
vaccination, whether ongoing transmission is likely, or rather, if cases likely represent a single 
transmission event (for instance, among household contacts, roommates, boyfriend/girlfriend), 
the feasibility of a vaccination campaign, and timing of potential vaccination in relation to cases. 
 
Currently there is no guidance related to selection of MenB vaccines for use during an outbreak, 
as no MenB vaccines were available at the time of writing.  Unlike conjugate MenACWY 
vaccines which target the polysaccharide capsule, MenB vaccines induce an immune response 
to subcapsular proteins, which vary by strain.  While WGS can identify the presence of MenB 
vaccine antigens in the outbreak strain, it cannot determine expression of the antigen or 
expected coverage by MenB vaccines.  Furthermore, there are challenges to conducting 
additional testing to determine coverage of a MenB vaccine against the outbreak strain in real-
time during an outbreak.  Thus, in the proposed guidance, identification of MenB vaccine 
antigens by molecular characterization should not drive the choice of MenB vaccine during an 
outbreak of meningococcal disease at this time.  No vaccine preference is stated for outbreak 
control; however, the recommended schedule will be 2 doses if MenB-4C is used and 3 doses if 
MenB-FHbp is used. 
 
Regarding re-evaluation of outbreak status, there currently is no guidance on when to declare 
an outbreak as being “over.”  Meningococcal disease epidemiology is dynamic and 
unpredictable, with outbreak-associated cases sometimes reported months after the last known 
case. Nevertheless, public health officials need guidance on how long to continue vaccination 
and other interventions following the declaration of an outbreak.  For instance, after vaccinating 
undergraduates at a university with MenB vaccine, do incoming freshman the following year 
need to be vaccinated?  Prematurely declaring an outbreak as being “over” can erode public 
trust if further cases are identified. 
 
Because of the unique epidemiology of meningococcal disease outbreaks, it is difficult to predict 
the course of the outbreak and risk of further cases.  Thus, the proposed guidance does not 
provide criteria for determining when to declare an outbreak as being over.  However, for public 
health decision-making, after one year without any new reported cases, the risk of 
meningococcal disease likely returns to baseline. 
 
In summary, all cases of meningococcal disease of the same serogroup are included in the 
case count for vaccine decision-making unless there is evidence of genetically distinct strains by 
WGS.  Each outbreak should be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine the threshold 
for implementing vaccination, though in general organization-based outbreaks are defined as 2 
to 3 cases of meningococcal disease of the same serogroup within 3 months.  Community-
based outbreaks are defined as incidence of meningococcal disease of the same serogroup 






above expected in the affected community during a 3-month period.  No preference is stated for 
MenB vaccine selection at this time, regardless of molecular typing results.  After one year 
without any new cases, the risk of meningococcal disease likely returns to baseline. 
 
The next steps are the finalization of the CDC guidance document for control of meningococcal 
disease outbreaks.; publication of the updated guidance document on CDC’s website, to 
replace current guidance in Appendix B of ACIP’s Prevention and Control of Meningococcal 
Disease” statement and the interim guidance for MenB outbreaks; and continued efforts to 




Dr. Szilagyi requested further information about how “community” is defined for a community-
based outbreak, and noted that the incidence above a baseline is 1 case. 
 
Dr. Meyer replied that defining “community” was probably the topic with the most discussion 
among WG members while trying to revise these guidance documents.  A community would be 
defined as the geographic area and cases in space and time that are related.  That would be 
defined at the local level.  Typically, this would include the smallest area for which a border 
could be drawn around the cases.  That could be a neighborhood, town, or county and depends 
upon the epidemiology of the cases.  With the incidence of disease being so low in the US, 
many communities will not have had any cases of meningococcal disease in recent years.  This 
is where the idea to compare against other sources such as national incidence to offer an 
example of where that has been applied recently.  In some of the MSM outbreaks that have 
occurred in communities, often it is pretty difficult to compare against a baseline because data 
are just starting to be collected in those populations.  The incidence of disease among adult 
men has been used as the baseline comparison to help health departments make those 
decisions.  That is why there is an emphasis on making these decisions on a case-by-case 
basis, because the situations are all unique, especially in terms of the community outbreaks.  
One case would not be considered an outbreak. 
 
Dr. Moore added that in thinking about organization- or community-based outbreaks, in the past 
the organization or community has not been considered if the cases were clearly 
epidemiologically linked one to another (girlfriend/boyfriend, household contact).  Having a 
secondary case in a household contact would not define the organization within which that 
household resides as an organization-based outbreak.  It is the identification of cases that are 
matched where epidemiologic links are lost. 
 
Dr. Meyer responded that this was discussed while revising the guidance.  In a lot of cases, it 
was communicated that it is sometimes difficult to define epidemiological links in real-time, 
especially among certain populations where it is not clear whether there were any 
epidemiological links.  For the purposes of broad general guidance, in expert consultations and 
through various outbreaks, it was felt that having this extra layer of classification of cases often 
can create confusion and may not be necessary, but describing a sample situation could be 
helpful.  For example, if two roommates both had meningococcal disease and there were no 
other cases, that would not necessarily prompt a 30,000-student university to launch a multi-
dose MenB vaccination campaign.  This is where the flexibility in the guidance and some of the 
considerations for vaccine decision-making should be taken into account. 
  






Dr. Reingold asked what the implications would be upon declaring that an outbreak is over (no 
longer vaccinating, no further chemoprophylaxis), and how the WG arrived at 1 year. 
 
Dr. Meyer replied that the purpose of having something in the guidance document is for vaccine 
decisions and public health interventions.  The goal is not necessarily to be able to announce 
this or for communication messaging.  This is especially relevant in university or community 
outbreaks when trying to determine when to stop, and whether vaccine should be given to new 
people entering the population.  Regarding how the WG arrived at the 1 year cut point, the 
epidemiology of all of the outbreaks of which CDC is aware were assessed.  Things varied by 
outbreak, but this conservative approach was taken to feel relatively confident that the risk has 
decreased to baseline.  The intent was not to say that an outbreak is over, because there can 
be additional cases. 
 
Dr. Kempe asked whether based on that, the recommendation invariably would be to vaccinate 
all incoming Freshmen. 
 
Dr. Meyer responded that this type of decision is typically arrived at after consultation with CDC, 
and that type of language would be included in the guidance document to maximize flexibility.  
Vaccinating all incoming Freshmen has occurred in some situations. 
 
Dr. Even (ACHA) pointed out that one issue which arises is media and media requests and how 
to address those, because there is a lot of interest in whether an outbreak is ongoing.  The 
distance between cases in a meningococcal outbreak can make it appear like there is 
something new happening when it may be part of the same situation.  Being able to say that an 
outbreak is back to baseline helps to clarify the decision about advanced preparation for 
immunization for incoming students, whether it is incoming Freshmen or students who are new 
to a campus.  This helps to have some frame of reference for outbreak activity. 
 
Ms. Hayes (ACNA & ANA) asked for clarification about the risk factor that is linked to being a 
gay man and getting this disease, as she was grappling with why this is not occurring among 
other people who are having sex. 
 
Dr. Meyer replied that this is an area CDC is still trying to understand better.  There have been a 
couple of clusters in the US, and sporadic cases among MSM.  HIV is believed to play a role, 
and there is a growing belief that HIV creates an increased risk for meningococcal disease.  
That does not explain the whole picture.  CDC is actively investigating this area, but has not yet 
identified risk factors.  It is known that meningococcal disease is spread through close contact, 
which is often observed with people sharing close spaces, going to clubs, smoking, all of which 
increase risk.  Therefore, it could be assumed that some of that plays a role.  This area is still 
being investigated. 
 
Ms. Hayes (ACNA & ANA) asked whether a specific questionnaire has been developed to be 
used specifically to collect data on these outbreaks among MSM, and what risk factors are 
being examined. 
 
Dr. Messonnier recalled that there was a discussion about this a couple of ACIP meetings ago.  
There was a 20-minute presentation from the WG specifically on this issue. 
 
Dr. Sun (FDA) pointed out that both of the available vaccines were licensed based on 
immunogenicity, and that it is still conceivable that for a particular outbreak, one vaccine may be 
better than the other in terms of bactericidal activity.  He wondered whether consideration had 






been given to examining this type of evidence, and selection of a particular vaccine for a 
specific outbreak. 
 
Dr. Meyer said the reason they were saying that molecular genotyping should not drive vaccine 
selection at this time is because they do recognize that more work is ongoing to try to correlate 
identifying vaccine antigens by WGS with immunologic responses.  These data are not currently 
available to make recommendations in this guidance, but that work is ongoing.  Molecular 
genotyping is used in the management of these outbreaks, but they are saying that this should 
not drive vaccine selection at this time.  As new data become available, consideration will be 
given to whether that data can be used. 
 
Dr. Gorman (NIH) asked whether there is any role for nasal carriage surveillance after an initial 
case to inform vaccine decision making for an outbreak, or if data are being collected for the 
isolated cases to see if they are surrounded by people who carry even if they do not have the 
disease. 
 
Dr. Meyer responded that this is not part of current public health practice.  In general, there are 
logistical challenges and utility issues that play into that.  One is that the priority is to provide 
chemoprophylaxis to persons who are close contacts of patients.  Swabbing them for carriage 
delays the whole process.  Also, carriage is dynamic and transient.  Someone could have been 
a carrier, but by the time they are swabbed they could no longer be a carrier or at the time of 
swabbing, was not a carrier, only to subsequently become a carrier. This has not been identified 
as being very useful for active public health management during an outbreak. 
 
Dr. Hahn (CSTE) said that as a state epidemiologist, she like the proposed language and 
thought it would be a very helpful tool. 
 
Dr. Stephens indicated that WGS is being used as an approach, but it is not necessarily 
predictive based on the sequence data in terms of what the immune response is going to be 
and what will be protective.  Work is ongoing and they will continue to learn more about the 





Global Polio Eradication Initiative 
 
Abhijeet Anand, MBBS, MPH 
Polio Eradication Branch 
Global Immunization Division 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Anand presented a status update on polio eradication, reviewing the four key objectives as 
described in the endgame strategic plan.  The objectives are: 1) detection and interruption, 
which is essential to the core set of eradication objectives; 2) oral polio vaccine (OPV2) 
withdrawal, inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) introduction, immunization system strengthening; 3) 
containment and global certification; and 4) legacy planning. 
 
Global Measles/Rubella Elimination Initiative 
 
 






The following map and the table lay out the number of cases that have been observed in the 
three endemic countries where there is polio transmission (Nigeria, Pakistan/Afghanistan, 




The total case count in 2016 was down to the lowest point ever seen.  In Afghanistan, there 
were 13 cases and in Nigeria there was 1 case of Wild Poliovirus Type 1 (WPV1).  There were 3 
cases of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses 1 (cVDPV) in Laos in 2016.  There were more 
cases in 2015.  In Nigeria, there was one cVDPV Type 2 case reported in 2016 and another 
was reported much later.  In Pakistan, there was 1 cVDPV Type 2 case.  The key message is 
that in 2016, the only type seen was Type 1.  The last time Type 3 virus was seen was in 
November 2012. 
 
There has been a tremendous amount of progress in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the lowest 
number of cases that have been seen.  There has been a dramatic reduction in the total number 
of cases for Type 1 virus, which is unprecedented in terms of the total number of cases that 
have been seen in Pakistan.  It is not only a reduction in the total number of cases, but also a 
reduction in the geographical distribution of these cases.  The number of districts that have 
been affected is much lower, the genetic diversity of the virus is reduced, and there has been an 
improvement in the program quality in the transmission zones in Pakistan, which has essentially 
led to the virus being seen outside of the core transmission districts in Pakistan.  There are 
clearly gaps that still exist in the country for population immunity as well as surveillance, which 
has led to a few viruses that have emerged and ongoing transmission that has been seen 
outside of the core transmission zones and a reduced transmission in the core transmission 
zones. 
 
Afghanistan has shown similarly remarkable progress in program implementation.  In 2016, the 
total number of Type 1 cases reported in Afghanistan was 13.  More than half of those cases 
came essentially from one province in the Southeast part of the country, Paktia Province.  Most 
of those cases came from one small district, Bannu District, with a total population of about 
100,000 people.  Essentially, that district had vaccine refusals and security issues.  Two cases 
have been reported in 2017 in Kandahar, with another reported in Helmand, which is the 
adjoining province. 
 






Afghanistan and Pakistan are treated as one epidemiological block.  The political borders 
between the countries is just an artificial line drawn on the land, but there is free movement of 
people from known and not so known points of crossing, which facilitates transmission.  Three 
corridors of active transmission link reservoirs on both sides of the border:  
 
 Nangarhar/Kunar:  Khyber/Peshawar 
 Paktika:  FATA / Bannu 
 Kandahar/Helmand:  Balochistan (Quetta block) 
 
Overall, these two countries have shown improvements in surveillance quality and 
supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) quality, and a decrease in the number of polio 
cases and environmental positive samples.  There has been progress in the highest risk areas 
of Peshawar, FATA and Quetta, with a reduction in intensity of transmission and genetic 
diversity of circulating virus.  There is strong coordination between the countries, with new 
National Emergency Action Plans (2016-2017) endorsed by TAGs.  Emergency Operation 
Centers (EOCs) are now operational in Kabul and the 3 high-risk Afghanistan regions.  
However, there have been some concerning developments.  There is continued viral 
transmission in South KP/FATA and adjoining South Eastern Afghanistan (Paktika Province), 
and recent positive environmental samples from Pishin (Quetta Block, Balochistan).  The 
common themes that unite the countries are the issues of accessibility, conflict, and security.  
While these issues complicate program management, they do not rise to the same level that 
has been seen in other countries such as Nigeria. 
 
Turning to Nigeria and Lake Chad, the last set of cases of Type 1 were seen in Nigeria in 2013.  
Since then, there has been no known transmission in Nigeria.  The biggest setback to the 
program was the transmission in Nigeria in 2013.  An environment sample of cVDPV2 was 
observed in March 2016, which was a long-term transmission different from Sabin type.  This 
transmission had been missed for a long time.  In July 2016, long-term transmission was noted 
for WPV1.  This circulation was missed for at least 5 years.  Each of the 4 cases that were 
picked up were genetically different from each other by long-term, and represent the “tip of the 
iceberg.”  The key issue that defines this challenge is accessibility in Borno.  There are 
numerous areas the program and Nigerian Army cannot access, because they are controlled by 
Boco Haram.  Boco Haram does not negotiate for safe passage of vaccination teams, so even 
some small areas that have been cleared by the Nigerian Army are not accessible because of 
the necessity to access through Boco Haram-controlled areas.  Therefore, they have to be 
accessed by helicopters or mechanisms from other countries to conduct surveillance and 
administer vaccines.  The key linchpin here is changing access in Borno.  Without improved 
access in this area, transmission cannot be properly controlled.  This has been declared as a 
Level 3 health sector emergency by the United Nations (UN).  There is also starvation, famine, 
and even a measles outbreak reported in that area. 
 
Lake Chad coordination has been established in N’djamena with partner agencies and 5 
governments.  Lake Chad Countries have declared a regional public health emergency, and a 
regional Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Coordinator was appointed by WHO/AFRO. 
This has led to a multi-country response in this entire area.  The multi-country response plan 
includes 5 bOPV SIAs followed by mOPV2; surveillance enhancement, including active case 
search as well as enhanced laboratory capacity; strategies to reach children in inaccessible 
areas; advocacy, communications and social mobilization strategies; and  
strong linkages with humanitarian response. 
 






In summary, there has been unprecedented progress with the lowest global case count ever 
observed.  Interruption of WPV1 remains challenging.  At the same time, there are inaccessible 
areas in Borno, Nigeria. 
 
At the same time, the Nigeria situation has been a lightning rod for the program and has led the 
program to look deeper into all of the areas associated with conflict and limited access, mapping 
them out, and assessing the risk based on the available data.  There also is an understanding of 
the importance of looking beyond the indicators.  The traditional polio indicators did not reveal 
the surveillance gaps noted in Borno, so it is important to look beyond these indicators to find 
ways to access these populations.  Vaccination teams must be set up in coordination with the 
military, so the teams can move as rapidly as the military moves into an area. 
 
Moving on to Objective 2, withdrawal of OPV and introduction of IPV is essential for achieving 
eradication.  SAGE has recommended a phased approach, starting with OPV2.  This was 
preceded by introduction of IPV to provide population immunity to Type 2 in 2015-2016, 
followed to a switch from trivalent (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) in April-May 2016.  
Eventually, after achievement of certification, OPV use will stop.  In April-May 2016, in a period 
of two weeks, all of the countries using tOPV stopped and switched to bOPV.  This was a 
remarkable achievement for the program to manage an entire vaccine replacement worldwide.  
Independent monitoring of the switch began two weeks into the switch, with people visiting 
facilities to look for any potential vials of tOPV.  Nearly 150,000 facilities were monitored all over 
the world to find tOPV vials.  Did this go perfectly?  Probably not.  Some vials have been 
discovered outside of the areas that were monitored, and this has been published in an MMWR 
and also has recently been noted in Nigeria. 
 
The key achievement for removal of tOPV has really been a dramatic decline in the number of 
cVDPVs.  Of the total number of cVDPVs reported, cVDPV2 used to account for approximately 
85% to 90% percent of the total.  Now there has been a dramatic decline.  As noted, the switch 
from tOPV was preceded by introduction of IPV.  There was a clear set of criteria from Tier 1 to 
Tier 4 countries of introduction of IPV.  A single dose of IPV was recommended by SAGE 
administered by 14 weeks of age.  This has been delayed in several countries because of IPV 
supply issues.  The supply situation remains bleak and continues to worsen.  This led the 
program to rapidly evaluate how to prioritize use of IPV for eradication purposes or routine 
immunization.  Introduction has been delayed in 21 Tier 3 and 4 countries.  An additional 
approximately 22 Tier 3 and 4 countries will be forced into stock outs.  The supply will remain 
constrained into 2018.  Countries considered to be at highest risk for cVDPV2 outbreaks are 
currently all receiving IPV. 
 
In terms of the policy response to this, SAGE developed a new recommendation that was 
published in a WHO Polio Position paper in March 2016 in which SAGE reaffirmed two 
fractional doses of intradermal IPV in lieu of one full-dose intramuscular.  Uptake of this has 
been fairly slow.  India has replaced two-thirds of its states with fractional IPV.  The entire 
country is likely to be using fractional IPV by about the second quarter of 2017.  Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh have switched to fractional IPV.  The remaining countries are still using 
intramuscular IPV when available. 
 
In summary of the endgame, the OPV withdrawal and ability of GPEI to introduce IPV 
was a success in a short two-week window that has impacted risk.  The supply situation clearly 
has an impact on the risk of cVDPV2, and impacts GPEI credibility. There has been slow uptake 
of the SAGE recommendation for 2 fractional IPV doses.  Fractional IPV would ease the supply 
situation. 







Moving on to containment and global certification, 23 countries reported hosting 58 designated 
Poliovirus-Essential Facilities (PEFs).  These are all of the laboratories that have said they are 
hosting potentially infectious material to OPV2.  There are other countries that probably will be 
hosting Sabin Type 2.  That depends on the survey.  There are countries that are running 
behind schedule on completing the survey to note whether they are holding Sabin 2. 
 
Regarding transition planning, GPEI has learned many lessons on the road towards eradication, 
including the following: 
 
 Accessing insecure and hard-to-reach areas 
 Accountability 
 Communications 
 Social mobilization/community engagement 
 Working in complex global partnership 
 Achieving and maintaining political commitment 
 Global disease surveillance networks 
 
How can these lessons be used for greater benefit?  GPEI-funded staff already report spending 
more than half of their time on health priorities other than polio, including natural disasters and 




The majority of GPEI staff are in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria.  Of the endemic countries, 
they have the largest footprint.  There were 16 high priority countries that developed transition 
plans for using polio resources for other programs, as well as listing out the polio operations that 
need to continue beyond the presence of the GPEI.  Another 14 countries and 5 regional offices 
will be expected to have transition plans prepared by the end of 2016, and 2 countries and 2 
regional offices will be expected to have transition plans prepared within 12 months of 
interruption in the endemics.  Specific timelines have been laid out for transition planning.  The 
only country that actually has completed its transition plan as of now is India.  Other countries 
are behind schedule and are expected to complete their transition planning some time in 2017.  
Obviously, there is a greater set of challenges in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria which are 
the endemic countries and are focused more on the response at this time. 
 






In terms of program priorities for the next 6 months, the biggest priority clearly is the Nigeria 
outbreak in all 5 Lake Chad basin countries ensuring that high quality campaigns can be 
achieved.  There were no high-quality campaigns for the Nigeria response, but the campaign 
quality has slowly improved.  There is a need to continue to support Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
The program has turned around dramatically over the last few years to improve surveillance and 
response, but there now must be a focus on the final set of transmission zones and the weak 
spots in the country.  It also is important to recognize transmission so that it is not missed as 
occurred in Borno.  Is it possible that transmission has been missed elsewhere, what are the 
other conflict affected areas and how can surveillance quality be improved in those areas?  
There has clearly been a dramatic focus of the program on surveillance quality and 
establishment of new focus and new teams to look at surveillance.  This is from the point of view 





Dr. Hunter inquired as to why there is a shortage of IPV. 
 
Dr. Anand replied that this has largely been due to production challenges that the manufacturers 
faced.  Some batches of production went bad, which has led to shortages.  There also has been 
a large increase in demand for IPV because of increased needs.  Promises were made to 
increase the amount of infrastructure that the managers had to increase production, and those 
also have not lived up to the timelines. 
 
Global Measles/Rubella Elimination Initiative 
 
Gavin Grant, MD, MPH  
Global Immunization Division 
Center for Global Health 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Grant presented an update on the goals, strategies, and status of measles and rubella 
activities, many are coordinated by the Measles and Rubella Initiative (M&RI).  The M&RI is a 
collaboration between the American Red Cross, United Nations Foundation, CDC, UNICEF and 
WHO.  The Global Measles and Rubella Strategic Plan offers a context of the activities that are 
underway toward measles and rubella elimination. 
 
Global elimination of measles and rubella elimination is important in the US; a great reminder is 
the 2014 Philippines measles outbreak.  The graphic below illustrates how quickly measles can 
spread globally when measles is poorly controlled outside of the US:  
 








This large outbreak in the Philippines led to multiple importations in the US.  Strains could be 
traced to the Philippines based on the sequence information.  Most of the viruses that were 
exported were genotype B3, but genotype D9 was circulating in Southern Philippines and was 
imported to the US and is associated with a very large outbreak in Ohio.  Another importation is 
very well-known because it was a theme park-associated outbreak after exposure at a Disney 
Land theme park.  This outbreak led to multiple importations of measles virus throughout the 
world in addition to the US, including Europe, Australia, and Canada.  The point is that trying to 
control measles and rubella on a global level has a direct impact on the US. 
 
A framework to reach measles and rubella elimination was put forth in the Global Measles and 
Rubella Strategic Plan 2012-2020, which was developed by the M&RI partners.  The vision for 
that plan is to achieve and maintain a world without measles, rubella, and congenital rubella 
syndrome (CRS).  This plan establishes several targets and milestones, which are as follows: 
 
Milestones by 2015 
 Reduce annual measles incidence to < 5 cases per million and maintain that level 
 
 
90% coverage with routine MCV1 nationally and > 80% vaccination coverage in 
every district or equivalent administrative unit 
95% coverage with M, MR, or MMR during SIAs in every district or equivalent 
administrative unit 
 Establish a rubella/CRS elimination goal in at least 1 more WHO Region 
 Establish a target date for the global eradication of measles 
 
By End of 2015 
 Reduce global measles mortality by at least 95% compared with 2000 estimates 
 Achieve regional measles and rubella/CRS elimination goals 
 
By End of 2020 
 Achieve measles and rubella elimination in at least five (of the six) WHO Regions 
 
  






Key Strategies to Reach Goals 
 High population immunity through vaccination with two doses of M and R containing 
vaccines  
 Effective surveillance, monitoring, and evaluation 
 Outbreak preparedness and response and case management 
 Communication to build public confidence and demand for immunization 
 Research and development 
 
In terms of achievement of the goals set forth, from 1980 to approximately 1990, coverage with 
the first dose of measles vaccine increased from 17% to about 70%, and continued to slowly 
increase until 2009, when coverage plateaued, at approximately 85%, and has remained at the 
same level today, globally.  Data from 2016 is not presented because these data are the official 
WHO data, which are aggregated annually.  The data for 2016 will not be available for several 
more months.  The coverage milestone is a national milestone, which shows that 119 (61%) of 
countries have > 90% MCV1 coverage and are maintaining that milestone; however, the 
remaining countries failed to meet that milestone with 42 (22%) of countries having a very low 
measles coverage of < 80% MCV1 coverage. 
 
In order to fill some of the immunity gaps, campaigns are conducted within countries.  In 2015, 
39 countries conducted 66 campaigns.  These campaigns reached 180 million children.  Of the 
66 campaigns, 40 (61%) attained 95% coverage, which was the target.  Because administrative 
coverage is not always accurate, coverage surveys are recommended to be used with many of 
these campaigns.  Of the 66 campaigns, 18 (27%) had surveys.  Of the 18 campaigns that had 
surveys, 4 surveys documented >95% coverage.  These campaigns occurred in various 
countries, but not all countries, as measles campaigns occur intermittently according to the 
epidemiology and they are not expected to take place annually in any country. 
 
The second milestone pertains to measles incidence.  There has been a decrease in cases 
since 1980.  Since 2000, there also has been a decrease of incidence.  The current measles 
incidence is 36 / million, a decrease of 75% since 2000.  This is great progress, though it did not 
achieve the milestone of < 5 cases / million population.  This decrease has been concurrent with 
the increase in second dose measles campaigns, which have been occurring since the mid-
1990s that has helped decrease the number of cases and measles transmission globally. 
 
The third milestone is mortality reduction, with a target of a 95% decrease in mortality relative to 
2000.  From 2000 to 2015, a 79% decrease has been observed.  This did not reach the target of 
95%, but the decrease in mortality is quite significant.  Approximately 20.3 million deaths have 
been averted in the past 15 years by measles vaccination, which is a remarkable achievement 
within itself. 
 
Many measles elimination activities are taking place, and the rubella program has taken 
advantage of this opportunity to move rubella elimination forward.  Over half the world’s children 
are not vaccinated against rubella.  Clearly, some progress needs to be made in order to 
increase global coverage of infants.  Rubella vaccination coverage is not equal globally.  Some 
regions of the world have very high rubella coverage of over 80%.  In the Americas, Europe, 
and West Pacific Regions, there has been introduction of vaccine in all countries in each region.  
The Eastern Mediterranean Region tracks approximately with global coverage, just under 50% 
of the infants vaccinated, while the Southeast Asian and African Regions have coverage of < 
20%, primarily because either most countries have not introduced vaccine or countries with very 
large populations have not introduced vaccine. 
 






Modeling data have provided an estimate of CRS incidence globally.  Africa, Southeast Asia, 
and some countries in the West Pacific Region have relatively high incidence of CRS where the 
burden is great.  Therefore, it is important to ensure that rubella vaccines are introduced at the 
global level.  India delayed introduction of the vaccine until 2017.  Overall, 148 (75%) of 
countries have introduced a rubella-containing vaccine, with 11 others expected to introduce 
one this year.  It is good to note that also in the next 3 years, 17 countries are expected to 
introduce rubella vaccines.  There has been rapid uptake of rubella vaccine.  This introduction of 
rubella vaccine is in part supported by additional funds from the GAVI Alliance to support rubella 
introduction in the least developed countries. 
 
Regarding regional progress in terms of the strategic plan, all regions have a measles 
elimination goal.  Three regions (Americas, European, and Western Pacific) have rubella 
elimination goals.  The Western Pacific Region has agreed on rubella elimination; however, the 
actual year they would like to reach that target has not been agreed upon in the region.  Another 
area of note is the Southeast Region has declared a rubella control goal has been established, 
but an elimination goal has not been established. 
 
One of the tools for elimination is establishment of Regional Verification Committees.  Each of 
the 6 WHO regions is in the process of developing or utilizing their Regional Verification 
Committees.  These committees review the data and evaluate whether elimination has been 
achieved, and also can provide guidance to countries to help with achieving that goal.  Two 
regions are currently in the final stages of developing a verification committee for at least 
measles (African and Eastern Mediterranean Regions).  However, a committee has not been 
convened in the South-East Asian Region, so they have not noted any elimination.  The 
Americas Region has been the most successful in terms of measles and rubella elimination and 
have reached the elimination goal in all 36 countries for measles and rubella.  In Europe, 
approximately 40 countries have been validated for measles and 45 countries for rubella.  As of 
the last meeting, the Western Pacific Region has verified 7 countries for elimination.  They have 
recently established guidelines for evaluating rubella verifications, which will be implemented at 
the coming meeting in 2017. 
 
There also is a regional scorecard that evaluates the progress toward measles and rubella 
elimination.  The African region is clearly off track to reach their 2020 goal, and they do not have 
a rubella target within that region.  A lot of effort needs to be made to support Africa in reaching 
their targets and goals.  The Americas Region has verified elimination of measles and rubella, 
which is a great success.  Measles was verified in 2016 and rubella was verified prior to 
measles verification in May 2015.  Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean Regions are off track 
to reach their targets as are the South-East Asia and Western Pacific Regions to reach their 
2020 targets. 
 
In terms of the regional situation, different regions have different challenges.  Some challenges 
have been encountered in all regions.  The Americas have eliminated rubella, but they have a 
risk of importation, so it is important to maintain a strong surveillance system.  Rapid response 
to outbreaks of importations will be critical to sustaining their elimination status.  In the African 
Region, there are weak immunization and health systems, which has resulted in a reliance on 
campaigns to achieve high population immunity.  However, this has challenges for 
sustainability.  Reliance on campaigns also increases the risk of mortality from other vaccine-
preventable disease as campaigns tend to be much more vertical than the routine program.  
The European Regions have experienced problems with vaccine hesitancy, susceptible adults, 
and variable surveillance quality within the countries.  The Eastern Mediterranean Region had 
some countries that were doing very well, but due to security issues that limited access, 






coverage in some of those countries decreased.  Some countries in that region have 
persistently low coverage.  In the South-East Asia Region, there are two large federalized 
countries, India and Indonesia, which constitute about 80% of the infants within that region.  
Those two countries have heterogeneous coverage, and they need to strengthen and expand 
their case-based surveillance.  In the Western Pacific Region, there has been very high 
coverage for several years, but there has been a resurgence of measles in China and the 
Philippines, which the region is working to address.  All regions have a need for increased 
visibility and political commitment to regional elimination goals.  There also are susceptibility 
gaps, including among older children and adolescents who are not commonly targeted for 
measles vaccination, other challenges include a lack of human and financial resources and 
vaccine hesitancy in various populations. 
 
The Measles and Rubella Initiative requested a mid-term review of the strategic plan to 
understand the status, the challenges, and what needs to be done to move forward towards 
elimination.  This review found that while a tremendous amount of progress has been made 
since 2001, neither measles nor rubella elimination is on track to achieve the plan’s ambitious 
goals.  The basic strategies articulated are sound; however, full implementation has been 
limited by inadequate country ownership and global political will. This is reflected in inadequate 
human and financial resources.  It is premature to set a timeframe for measles eradication at 
this point.  A determination should be made, not later than 2020, whether a formal global goal 
for measles eradication should be set with timeframes for achievement.  Disease incidence is 
the most important indicator of progress.  There is an urgent need to strengthen the collection 
and use of surveillance data to better guide program strategy and implementation.  
Strengthening of immunization systems is critical to achieving regional elimination goals.  Two 
doses of measles or measles-rubella vaccine delivered through ongoing services is the 
standard for national programs.  Regular preventive campaigns should be conducted if 
coverage is insufficient for high population immunity. 
 
In summary, the US is still at high risk of importation due to ongoing global transmission.  
Effective vaccination strategies exist, resulting in major achievements, but targets have not 
always been met.  The mid-term review summary stated, “The basic strategies are sound, 
however, the main impediments to full implementation have been inadequate country ownership 
and global political will, reflected in inadequate resources.”  Global efforts to assist countries to 
introduce rubella-containing vaccine are needed.  Mid-term review recommendations are being 





Dr. Schaffner (NFID/IDSA) observed that according to the data presented, measles 
immunizations rates are very high in Europe.  However, he was under the impression that that 
was not the case.  It was not so long ago that there was a huge outbreak of measles in France.  
He wondered whether this had turned around so quickly. 
 
Dr. Grant replied that there are some countries in Europe that do not have very high measles 
coverage.  Like the US, countries have outbreaks in populations that are susceptible, but it does 
not necessarily extrapolate to the entire country.  There are a lot of advocacy efforts to try to 
make sure these countries move forward, especially in Europe.  The Regional Verification 
Committee has gone into Italy to try to advocate for the country to increase their resource 
control.  His understanding is that France is working on it, but still has gaps in its program, but it 
may not be a national gap. 







Dr. Belongia emphasized what an accomplishment averting 15 million deaths in 15 years is.  He 
asked what level of vaccine coverage is needed to prevent sustained transmission. 
 
Dr. Grant replied that this is close to 95%, which supports the importance of two doses of 




Lynn Bozof, President 
National Meningitis Association (NMA) 
 
Most of you know that I lost my college age son to meningococcal disease several years ago.  
While NMA applauds the Category B recommendation for serogroup B meningococcal disease, 
I would like to remind the committee of the personal toll of this disease.  The average family is 
not having a discussion about serogroup B vaccination with their healthcare providers.  Over the 
last several months, I have been getting emails and phones calls from families whose college 
age children have come down with serogroup B.  Some have died.  Others are facing limb 
amputations.  The question I always get is, “How did this happen?  My son (or daughter) was 
vaccinated.”  College campuses are rushing to vaccinate after the fact, after the whole campus 
is in a panic, after all the parents are in a panic.  Although the number of cases isn’t high, the 
individual loss and suffering is immeasurable.  I hope that in the coming months, these Category 
B recommendations can be readdressed.  Thank you. 
 
Christina Hildebrand 
A Voice for Choice 
 
I wanted to speak to new research that was done and published in the International Journal of 
Vaccination looking at micro- and nano-contamination.  The CDC hasn’t come out with any 
comments that I know of, but it shows that all vaccinations, barring one which was a veterinarian 
vaccination, showed contamination with organic and inorganic particles, particulate matter, 
including tungsten and silver and a whole bunch of others.  I can give you the journal article.  
The concern there is that the CDC hasn’t said anything about that.  These vaccines, every one 
of them on the CDC schedule, have been contaminated.  Some of these particulate matters are 
known to cause cancer.  Section 13.1 of every single vaccine package insert states that the 
vaccine has not been tested for carcinogenic, mutagenic, or infertility.  It’s really concerning that 
you aren’t doing anything about this, or researching it more, or making it known that you’re 
researching it more.  So, I would ask you to look into that because we should not have vaccines 
that are dirty.  And then the other piece of it—I guess that was my comment on that.  I just ask 
you to do the research and to look into it, because our children should not have these vaccines 
that are dirty going into them.  Thank you. 
  
Claire Hannon 
Association of Immunization Managers (AIM) 
 
We are a membership association whose members direct immunization programs in the 50 
states, 8 territories or federated states, and 6 large cities.  I just wanted to share some 
information that we collected in the last week from some of our members about the impact of 
Day 1:  Public Comment 
 
 






the live-attenuated influenza vaccine in this flu season.  We had 26 of 64 awardees give us 
some input, 10 who tracked coverage rates in real-time using an IIS and one tracking according 
to vaccine ordering.  Of those 11, one reported higher rates currently this season, 6 lower 
coverage rates, and 4 coverage rates were about the same.  Twenty-two of those 26 replaced 
an entire LAIV order for an equal amount of QIV, 4 did not.  We will follow up with those 22 later 
in the season to see if those replaced doses were all used.  Eight reported that the loss of LAIV 
impacted their ability to vaccinate in the same capacity as previous years, 12 reported no 
impact, and 6 were not sure yet.  Where we saw the greatest impact was in the school-located 
flu vaccination programs.  Of the 18 awardees reporting that school-located programs are 
conducted in their area, 15 reported a reduction in the number of clinics conducted due to the 
lack of LAIV, 1 reported a 42% decrease in vaccine, several report schools and counties 
declining to participate, 3 report large counties or entire school districts declining to participate 
when they had previously participated using LAIV, 1 reported 40,000 less doses administered 
this year, 17 awardees reported that their providers are interested in having a non-invasive flu 
option available again, and 9 said they did not know, and none said that providers were not 
interested.  And then we just asked, “Assuming if it was recommended, and it was added to the 
government contact, and it would be available for second round orders next year, would you 
order?” and 7 say yes they would order, 5 said no, 15 said it would depend on the demand.  
And that’s an order that would come later in the season in October.  Just to reiterate the key 
challenges that you all mentioned for a return of LAIV (which many of our programs really rely 
on the LAIV product for their school clinics):  the timing of the availability would be very 
important, confidence in the vaccine, and the evidence supporting the vaccine effectiveness.  




Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
 
Dr. Messonnier reported that CDC is gearing up for National Infant Immunization Week that will 
take place April 22-29, 2017.  Each year, state and local immunization programs, coalitions, and 
partners plan and hold local events to celebrate the positive impact that infant immunizations 
have on babies, families, and communities.  These events also offer opportunities for 
communities to focus time and attention on addressing local barriers and challenges to on-time 
immunization.  She expressed her hope that everyone would engage locally to help support 
those efforts. 
 
Another issue of importance is lot number differences, which affects the immunization 
community daily in terms of practical issues.  Some vaccine manufacturers use different lot 
number patterns on the units of use (vials and syringes) than on the unit of sale (cartons) for 
specific vaccines.  This has caused a lot of chaos in provider offices that are using bar codes to 
track use of vaccines, as well as to order vaccines.  CDC is working with providers to try to 
resolve these issues, but this could take some time to resolve. 
 
As a follow-up to the discussion on the first day of the meeting concerning polio containment, 
one of the major activities pertains to laboratories that potentially have polio-containing 
materials.  A number of steps have been taken domestically.  One effort has been to survey any 
laboratory in the US that might have either polio-containing material or potentially polio-
containing material.  This is defined broadly as gastrointestinal or respiratory specimens from a 
country that was using oral polio vaccine (OPV).  A number of laboratories potentially have 
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those materials, and containment is the process of making sure that laboratories that wish to 
continue to hold the specimens, do so under a variety of conditions that ensures no one will be 
exposed.  In order to support this process, CDC is standing up a new unit under the Office of 
Public Health Preparedness and Response (OPHPR) to address containment.  This work will 
begin in the laboratories that know they have polio-containing material. 
 
In conclusion, Dr. Messonnier announced that NCIRD has a new Management Officer, 
Alexander Harrington. 
  
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
 
Ms. Hahn reported that the voluntary course on quality measures in the Medicaid program has 
been revised to reflect the new adolescent quality measure that incorporates all of the 
adolescent quality measures into one.  The individual HPV quality measure has been retired. 
 
Department of Defense (DoD) 
 
Dr. Deussing reminded everyone that influenza vaccination is mandatory for all uniformed 
personnel, including Active Duty, Coast Guard, Reserve, and National Guard with an 
immunization goal of 90% by mid-December.  Influenza vaccination also is mandatory for HCP 
who provide direct patient care in military treatment facilities, and is recommended for all other 
HCP in these facilities.  DoD achieved its 90% goal during the 2016-2017 influenza season by 
mid-December, despite using only injectable vaccine.  The live intranasal vaccine, which usually 
accounts for 1 million or more doses of DoD’s vaccine allocation each year, was unavailable 
following ACIP recommendations.  DoD procured enough injectable vaccine at its military 
treatment facilities for all age groups be immunized against influenza.  As of February 9, 2017, 
1.9 million influenza vaccinations were given, with 96% compliance among DoD HCP.  
Regarding Yellow Fever (YF), the Defense Health Agency (DHA) Immunization Healthcare 
Branch (IHB) continues to work with Army, Navy, and Air Force services as well as the 
manufacturer on mitigating strategies to conserve available doses of YF vaccine and continues 
to monitor this situation very closely. 
 
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) 
 
Dr. Kim reported that a relationship between the VA and Walgreen’s was established for the 
2016-2017 influenza season to promote access to seasonal influenza vaccination for veterans 
receiving care at the VA.  The intent of this relationship is to improve veteran access to 
influenza immunization.  More than 77,000 immunizations were administered through this 
program through December 2016.  In addition, the VA recently released an electronic decision 
support tool called a “Clinical Reminder” for HPV immunizations in February 2017.  This Clinical 
Reminder can be used in the Veterans Information Systems and Technology Architecture 
(VistA), which is the VA EMR.  In addition, development has begun on another electronic 
decision support tool for meningococcal immunization. 
 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
 
Dr. Sun reported that the FDA’s legacy is still in transition.  They are still waiting on the 
nomination of their new Commissioner, as well as senior leadership guidance to implement the 
21st Century Cure Act.  The FDA had a busy year in 2016 in terms of vaccines, with one 
approval of a new original Biologics License Application (BLA) new vaccine, nine major 
approvals of supplements, seven of which involved influenza and two of which involved 






Trumenba® two-dose and HPV-9 two-dose.  On the developmental side, the FDA has been very 
busy in working with other government agencies such as CDC, NIH, the Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority (BARDA), World Health Organization (WHO), and the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA) on developmental vaccines in areas such as Zika, 
Respiratory Syncytial Virus (RSV), Ebola, and healthcare-associated diseases, such as 
Clostridium difficile (C. difficile), Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus), and multiply-resistant 
bacterial organisms. 
 
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) 
 
Dr. Nair shared three updates for the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP).  There 
continues to be an increase in the number of claims.  In fiscal year 2016, there were 1120 
claims filed.  That is the highest number since the inception of the program in 1988.  Of these 
claims, 856 were adjudicated.  Of those, 677 were found to be compensable and 179 were 
dismissed.  Compensation totaled $250 million for petitioners and their attorney fees.  For this 
fiscal year, 219 claims have been filed and approximately $52 million in awards have been paid 
to petitioners and $7 million has been paid in attorney fees.  More information about the 
numbers can be obtained from the website.  As a result of the 21st Century Cures Act, the VICP 
will now cover vaccines that are recommended for routine use in pregnant women.  Previously, 
VICP covered vaccines that were recommended for routine use in children only.  Now those 
liability protections for manufacturers and vaccine-administrators are extended for vaccines that 
are recommended for use in pregnant women.  The Final Rule that modifies the Vaccine Injury 
Table was published in January 2017.  Those changes will go into effect in March 2017. 
 
Indian Health Services (IHS) 
 
Ms. Groom reminded everyone that IHS implemented a mandatory influenza vaccination policy 
for HCP, but had not successfully bargained it with the unions.  They were able to only partially 
implement the policy.  They now have successfully bargained the policy with the unions, so it 
did go into effect this year.  Preliminary data suggest that healthcare vaccine influenza vaccine 
coverage was 89.9% in IHS facilities as of December 2016.  IHS is very optimistic that they 
might achieve the Healthy People 2020 goals this year.  In terms of clinical decision support, 
IHS included the two-dose HPV vaccine series into its clinical decision support in the IHS EHR.  
They also are working on an algorithm to identify individuals with chronic liver disease (CLD) 
and HepC for the purposes of HepA and HepB vaccine.  That reminder should go into effect 
later this year.  IHS recently began a collaboration within Johns Hopkins Center for American 
Indian Health to assess maternal immunization in some tribal communities.  They have been 
working with communities on messaging and with provider intervention with the hope to create a 
reminder for maternal immunization in the IHS EHR in the future. 
 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
 
Dr. Gorman first shared a personnel update.  Dr. Francis Collins has been asked to remain as 
NIH’s Director by President Trump.  It is unclear at this point from the announcements made 
whether this is a reappointment or, in fact, just an extension for transition.  Major General James 
K. Gilman, MD has been named the new Director of NIH’s Clinical Center (CC).  He has 35 
years of experience commanding virtually every large US Army hospital in the US.  He is a 
Cardiologist and highly decorated leader, with rich expertise in commanding the operations of 
numerous hospital systems.  “His medical expertise and military leadership will serve the NIH 
Clinical Center well,” said Dr. Collins.  Dr. John Gallin, the former Director of the CC, stays on 
as the Associate Director for Clinical Research and the Chief Scientific Officer of the CC.  Inside 






NIAID, Dr. Emily Erbelding is the new Director of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (DMID).  
She is an Infectious Disease Physician with broad research and clinical experience in both 
government and academic medicine.  She has served as the Deputy Director of the Division of 
AIDS at NIAID since 2010.  She has been involved in all aspects of scientific program 
management and support, helping to design and implement new initiatives involving basic, 
translational, and clinical research.  She has administered complex extramural grant programs 
and complex research infrastructure.  Prior to joining NIAID, she spent 14 years on the faculty of 
Johns Hopkins University.  As an interesting link, General Gilman and Dr. Erbelding are both 
graduates of a medical school in Indiana.  Dr. Catherine Laughlin of the Virology Branch (VB) is 
retiring in March 2017 after 29 years of government service.  Dr. Cristina Cassetti has been 
announced as the Acting Branch Chief of the VB.  Dr. Clare Schmitt was announced in late 
January 2017 as the Acting Branch Chief for the Enteric and Hepatic Diseases Branch (EHDB).  
Dr. Schmitt is acting in that capacity until a permanent replacement for Frederick Cassels can 
be named.  Dr. Gorman also will be retiring in late April 2017 after nine years in government 
service. 
 
Regarding some specific activities of interest, NIH funds additional medical centers to expand 
the Precision Medical Research Program.  Four regional centers have been added to clinical 
care, hoping to engage more than 1 million US participants to enable research that will, over 
time, improve the ability to prevent and treat diseases based on individual differences in 
lifestyles, environments, and genetics.  The new awardees are the California Precision Medicine 
Consortium, Geisinger Health System, the New England Precision Medicine Consortium, and 
the Trans-American Consortium for the Health Care Systems Research Network. 
Dr. Collins and Dr. Kathy Hudson have published an article in the New England Journal of 
Medicine (NEJM) about the 21st Century Cures Act and the view from NIH.  To summarize, they 
felt that the 21st Century Cures act would cut bureaucratic red tape related to paperwork and 
scientific conferences, enhance data sharing and privacy protection for volunteers, improve 
support for the next generation of researchers, and encourage NIH to extend its efforts to 
include diverse populations.  Drs. Collins, Hudson, and Michael Lauer also published in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) in which they talked about a new era of 
trust and transparency in clinical trials and clinical trials reform.  The authors described a multi-
faceted approach to improve the quality and efficiency of clinical trials.  This effort focuses on a 
variety of key points along the lifespan of a clinical trial, and the initiatives will reengineer the 
process by which clinical investigators develop ideas for new trials, how NIH reviews and 
selects clinical trials for support and oversees the process, and how results and aggregate data 
are shared both broadly and rapidly. 
 
The first HIV vaccine efficacy study in seven years has begun.  The experimental vaccine being 
tested is based on one investigated in the RV144 clinical trials in Thailand led by the US Military 
HIV Research Program and the Thailand Ministry of Health.  The Thailand trial delivered 
landmark results in 2009 when it found for the first time that a vaccine could prevent HIV 
infection, although moderately.  For the new HVTN 702 HIV Vaccine Study, the design, 
schedule, and components of the RV144 vaccine have been modified in an attempt to increase 
the magnitude and duration of the vaccine-elicited protective immune response.  A new regimen 
has been adapted to the HIV subtype that predominates in South Africa. 
 
In terms of antimicrobial resistance, there are two major efforts at NIH.  The Antimicrobial 
Research Leadership Group and the Vaccine and Therapeutic Evaluation Units (VTEU) have 
been working on some projects.  NIH recently launched a study that is hoping to enroll 400 
children in a clinical trial to determine whether shorter courses of antibiotics, 5 days instead of 
10, are effective in treating community-acquired pneumonia in children who show improvement 






after the first few days of antibiotics.  That study is being conducted at Duke, Cincinnati, 
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, and Children’s Hospital at Pittsburgh.  NIH recently 
published the results of a different clinical trial that examined shortening the treatment for middle 
ear infection, which showed that 5 days of therapy is less effective than 10 days of therapy.  Of 
the 229 participants, 77 or 35% in the 5-day treatment experienced clinical failure or worsening 
of symptoms compared to only 39/238 or 16% in the 10-day treatment group. 
 
Dr. Bennett thanked Dr. Gorman for his service to ACIP, emphasizing that he would be missed 
very much. 
 
National Vaccine Program Office (NVPO) / NVAC 
 
Dr. Gellin reported on both NVPO and NVAC.  He reported that NVAC met earlier in the month.  
The highlights are that they completed and approved the mid-course review of the National 
Vaccine Plan (NVP).  Essentially, this review constitutes the reprioritization of the aspects of the 
plan going forward.  The 21st Century Cures Act came up at NVAC as well.  This is a 1000-page 
bill, approximately 20 pages of which focus on vaccines.  There is a piece that asks the 
Secretary to develop a report on the state of vaccine innovation.  NVAC is in the process of 
assembling the approach to that report, but among them is to reach out to stakeholders broadly.  
NVAC will be the convener of that stakeholder session and is working on the timing, which 
probably will be in conjunction with the June NVAC meeting.  This is a way to ensure that 
stakeholders are at the NVAC table, and for others to contribute their views on vaccine 
innovations. 
 
Turning to NVPO, the National Adult Immunization Plan: A Path to Implementation is now 
available.  This is a companion piece to the National Adult Immunization Plan (NAIP).  Along 
with partners in HHS, NVPO is now launching an awards program for people in non-federal 
organizations who are engaged in work to support the goals of the NVP.  Nominations are due 
by April 26, 2017 and the non-monetary awards will be announced at the June 2017 NVAC 
meeting.  Information regarding the criteria are on the website. 
 
In terms of the transition, with Dr. Gellin’s departure, Dr. Jewel Mullin, who has been the 
Assistant Secretary for Health, will be the Acting Director of NVPO going forward as the 
department is now assembling a national search.  He said it had been a treat to be involved with 
ACIP for many years.  Dr. Bennett thanked Dr. Gellin for everything, noting that there are not 
enough words to sum up the incredible contributions Dr. Gellin has made to keeping America 





Tom Shimabukuro, MD, MPH, MBA 
Immunization Safety Office 
National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Shimabukuro explained that the mission of the Immunization Safety Office (ISO) is to assess 
the safety of vaccines administered to children, adolescents, and adults.  Post-licensure vaccine 
safety monitoring includes activities to rapidly identify new or rare AEs of clinical importance; 
Vaccination Errors 
 






monitor changes in patterns for known AEs; assess safety in special populations (e.g., pregnant 
women); and determine patient risk factors for particular AEs. 
 
ISO’s post-licensure vaccine safety monitoring infrastructures include: 1) Vaccine Adverse 
Event Reporting System (VAERS), a collaboration between CDC and FDA, which is a US 
frontline spontaneous (or passive) reporting system to detect potential vaccine safety problems; 
2) Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD), a collaboration between CDC and healthcare plans, which is 
a large linked database system used for active surveillance and research; and 3) Clinical 
Immunization Safety Assessment (CISA) Project, a collaboration between CDC and academic 
medical centers, which conduct individual clinical vaccine safety assessments and clinical 
research. 
 
For the purpose of this review, a vaccination error is defined as a preventable event that might 
reflect incorrect use and/or potentially result in patient harm.  It is important to understand that 
VAERS is a passive system.  The reporting limitations of VAERS include reporting bias, 
inconsistent data quality and completeness, lack of an unvaccinated comparison group, and 
inconsistent pregnancy reporting.  It is important to remember that it is generally not possible to 
assess whether a vaccine caused an AE from VAERS data alone. 
 
The data Dr. Shimabukuro reported during this session were from a study published in 2015 by 
Hibbs et al in Vaccine titled Vaccination Errors Reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event 
Reporting System (VAERS).  During this time period, there were just over 300,000 total reports 
to VAERS.  Of these, just over 20,000 (7% of the total) were classified as vaccination error 
reports.  Of the 20,000 just over 15,000 (75%) did not document an AE in the report and just 
over 5,000 (25%) did document an AE in the report.  In the early 2000s, there were not many 
reports of errors in VAERS and the percentages were quite low.  In the later years of this study 
period, there were increases in total reports, the number of error reports, and the percentage of 
error reports.  This trend has persisted to the present, though there have been some slight 
differences in the actual types of errors reported to VAERS. 
 
The vaccine error groups were created by investigators who assigned specific Medical 
Dictionary for Regulatory Activities (MedDRA) Preferred Terms to the error groups. Multiple 
MedDRA codes are assigned to error groups.  The reports by error group in VAERS from 2000-
2013 are shown in the following table: 
 
 







Note that there are slightly more errors than there are reports.  That is because reports may be 
assigned more than one MedDRA term (i.e., not mutually exclusive).  Therefore, a report might 
be included in more than one vaccine error group. The top three rows are highlighted as they 
represent the top three error groups.  Inappropriate scheduling accounts for 27% of the errors 
reported, storage and dispensing is 23%, and wrong vaccine is 15%.  These comprise two-
thirds of all errors reported to VAERS during the time period. 
 
Inappropriate schedule errors include wrong age and wrong timing between doses.  Of these 
errors, 57% occur in children 0 through 18 years of age.  Within this age group, 53% of these 
errors were reported in children less than 1 year of age.  This probably is not unexpected, given 
that a lot of vaccine is administered during the first year of life in a fairly complicated schedule.  
The most common vaccines associated with wrong timing were quadrivalent human 
papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine and rotavirus vaccine.  Within these two vaccines, commonly 
reported for quadrivalent HPV vaccine were delays between dose 1 and dose 2, based on a 5% 
random sample review of these reports.  Technically, a delay between dose 1 and dose 2 is not 
an error.  The reason these are categorized as errors is because there was documentation in 
the report that there was some type of delay in receiving the second dose.  The median delay 
was 577 days with a range from 179 to over 2067 days.  Also commonly reported for this 
vaccine was dose 3 being given too soon, prior to the 12-week minimum interval.  For rotavirus 
vaccine, the common timing errors were the first dose given after 15 weeks and the last dose 
given after 32 weeks.  It is not recommended to give the first dose after 15 weeks or the last 
dose after 32 weeks according to the prescribing information. 
 
The second most common error, storage and dispensing errors, was 23% of the total.  These 
basically broke down into two groups:  expired vaccine administered (55%) and incorrect 
storage (44%).  Within expired vaccine administered, commonly reported vaccines were 
seasonal LAIV; herpes zoster; and measles, mumps and rubella (MMR).  Within incorrect 
storage of vaccine based on a 5% random sample of reports, vaccines kept outside of proper 
storage temperatures were reported 88% of the time, so that appears to be the most common 
type of error for incorrect storage of vaccine.  In 55% of these reports, the vaccine was exposed 
to temperatures below recommended storage temperatures, so they were stored too cold. 
 
The third most common type of error reported was wrong vaccine administered at 15% of the 
total errors reported.  This appears to occur commonly among vaccines with similar names, 
acronyms, and antigens.  The following table shows common wrong vaccine mix-ups: 
 
 
Common Wrong Vaccine Mix-Ups in Either Combination 
 
Varicella (VARIVAX®) with  Herpes zoster (ZOSTAVAX®) 
Diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis 
(DTaP) 
with Tetanus, diphtheria and pertussis 
(Tdap) 
One type of trivalent inactivated 
influenza vaccine (IIV3) 
with Another type of IIV3 with a different age 
indication 
Pneumococcal conjugate with Pneumococcal polysaccharide 
Hepatitis A with Hepatitis B 
 






Adverse health events were reported in 25% of the errors.  Of these, 92% were non-serious and 
8% were serious.  These percentages are similar to non-error reports to VAERS.  The most 
common adverse health events were injection site erythema (13%), injection site pain (11%), 
and pyrexia (11%).  This is similar to what is observed in non-error reports as well. The 
administration error group had the highest percentage of reports with a documented adverse 
health event (in 60% of administration error reports).  The types of errors were wrong site, 
wrong technique, and incorrect route. 
 
A number of reports of error clusters were detected.  A cluster is defined as the same error in 
multiple individuals at the same location or clinic.  There were 936 error clusters involving at 
least 6141 patients.  The cluster size ranged from 2 to 501 patients, with a median of 5.  Of the 
clusters, 110 involved 10 or more patients.  In 586 clusters, the specific number of patients 
affected was stated as “unknown” or “several.”  They basically submitted a report saying there 
was a cluster error, but did not specify the number.  That is why the total estimate is said to be 
“at least” 6141, because it is likely to be an underestimate.  Storage errors were the most 
common type of error clusters at 72% of all cluster reports.  Incorrect storage (582 clusters, 
1715 patients) and expired vaccine administered (96 clusters, 1340 patients) were the most 
commonly reported.  LAIV was the most commonly reported expired vaccine administered (45 
clusters, 990 patients). 
 
Moving to case series reports of vaccination errors, the first case series involved a VAERS 
review of rotavirus vaccine error reports.  For the purpose of this presentation, Dr. Shimabukuro 
focused on the vaccine injection errors.  In the following graphic, the two types of rotavirus 
vaccines licensed in the US are shown, RotaTeq® and Rotarix®.  In the VAERS review, there 
were 39 total reports of rotavirus vaccine being injected.  Of these, 33 were with the Rotarix® 
product and 6 were with RotaTeq®.  With the Rotarix®, there was one cluster of 6 that occurred 
on the same day with the same provider.  Reasons documented in the report for this error 
included misinterpretation of instructions, inadequate training, not reading the package insert, 
confusing the oral applicator syringe with the syringe for injection, and confusing the vial with a 
vial for injectable vaccine.  On the righthand side of the graphic, the Rotarix® vaccine is in the 
process of being reconstituted.  The person is holding the syringe component, and then there is 
an adapter and a vial.  The way this works is that the syringe is plunged to reconstitute the 
vaccine, withdraw, remove it from the adapter, and use the syringe the squirt into the infant’s 
mouth: 
 







To test the theory that the syringe is being used to inject, Ms. Beth Hibbs, the lead for this 
project, went into the field and tested as many needles as she could find.  The conclusion is that 
a needle simply cannot be attached onto this syringe.  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that this is 
occurring because there is a freestanding needle syringe unit that is being injected.  There is 
some other mechanism by which these errors are taking place.  There was not sufficient 
information in the reports to draw conclusions.  The following is an example of the current 
Rotarix® package, which shows the universal sign for do not inject and then prominently 





Graphic Courtesy of GSK 
 
The next case series is a VAERS review of meningococcal conjugate vaccination error reports 
involving the Menveo® product, which is supplied in two vials that must be combined before 
administration.  The liquid component shown in the left side of the following graphic is used to 










Administration errors involved only one component of Menveo® being given to patients.  A total 
of 390 reports were detected from the period 2010-2015.  Of these, 66% of recipients received 
only the liquid component and 34% received only the lyophilized component.  When there was 
information about how that actually occurred, some common diluents used were sterile water, 
saline, HepB vaccine, and Diphtheria and Tetanus Toxoid and Pertussis (DTaP) vaccine.  That 
is, other vaccines were used to reconstitute the lyophilized component.  There also were reports 
of errors occurring with another two-component vaccine.  There is a combination DTaP/IPV/Hib 
vaccine that needs to be reconstituted, and similar reports were detected for that vaccine as 





On the left side, the old label has pink and smaller font.  On the right side is the new label with 
changes in the font size and color so that “NOT TO BE USED ALONE” stands out more clearly 
to the provider reading the labels. 
 
Another interesting investigation was of unintentional administration of insulin instead of 
influenza vaccine.  This involved an apparent mix-up in which a cluster of 5 adult patients 
unintentionally received insulin instead of influenza vaccine.  These patients were teachers who 
received their injections at a school clinic.  All 5 experienced symptoms of hypoglycemia and 
two required treatment in the emergency department (ED) for severe hypoglycemia.  This 
investigation was conducted by the St. Louis County Department of Public Health with 
assistance from the state health department, CDC, FDA, and the vaccine manufacturer.  The 
conclusion was that improper storage, including inadequate segregation of insulin and influenza 
vaccine products in clearly labeled containers or bins, lack of standardized procedures for 
confirming the contents of vials, and decreased vigilance in preparation and administration likely 
contributed to the incident [Clogston et al. Unintentional administration of insulin instead of 
influenza vaccine: a case study and review of reports to US vaccine and drug safety monitoring 
systems. Drugs & Therapy Perspectives. 2016;32:439-446]. 
 
In summary, vaccination error reports comprised 6% to 15% of all reports to VAERS during the 
period 2007-2013.  The number and percentage of total VAERS reports of vaccination error 
reports have increased substantially from 2000-2013.  Of the vaccination error reports to 
VAERS, 75% did not document an adverse health event.  Of the 25% of vaccination error 






reports to VAERS that did document an adverse health event, the adverse health events were 
generally similar to non-error reports.  Based on reports to VAERS, vaccination errors usually 
do not appear to pose a substantial safety risk.  However, errors do have an impact in terms of 
additional costs, possible effect on immunological protection, patient/parent inconvenience, and 
loss of confidence in the healthcare delivery system.  Some errors do or have the potential to 
cause patient harm, such as the following: 
 
 Unintentional administration of insulin instead of vaccine 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40267-016-0333-2 
 
 Reuse of syringes on multiple patients at a vaccination clinic 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6449a3.htm  
 
 Incorrect reconstitution of measles-rubella vaccine using atracurium instead of the 
approved diluent in Syria, which resulted in 15 deaths 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/interim-findings-idleb-syria/en/ 
 
Current strategies for reducing vaccination errors include: 1) Education and training on vaccine 
timing and spacing, especially for vaccines with complex schedules; 2) Training on proper 
administration technique, including general injection safety; 3) Improved monitoring of vaccine 
storage temperatures and expiration dates; 4) Improvements in differentiating vaccines and 
other products with similar sounding names and acronyms; and 5) Implementation and 
enforcement of procedures to properly screen for vaccine contraindications.  A future strategy 
that has promise is passive engineered interventions that take human judgment and human 
behavior out of the process, which can prevent or substantially decrease the likelihood that an 
error will be made.  One example that has been discussed is an indicator on the label of a 
vaccine that changes color when the vaccine has been out of temperature for too long; that is, a 
visual que to let the provider know that the vaccine needs to be discarded. 
 
Following are some resources for reporting vaccination errors and strategies to prevent errors: 
 
 VAERS guidance on reporting vaccination errors https://vaers.hhs.gov/esub/index, 
https://vaers.hhs.gov/esub/eSubpopup.htm   
 
 Strategies to Prevent Administration Errors (in the Pink Book) 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/vac-admin.html  
 
 CDC Vaccine Storage & Handling Tool Kit 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/storage/toolkit  
 
 One & Only Campaign   https://www.cdc.gov/injectionsafety/1anonly.html  
 












Dr. Szilagy asked Dr. Shimabukuro to describe how some of the interventions are woven into 
AFIX (Assessment, Feedback, Incentives, and eXchange) visits. 
 
Dr. Melinda Wharton (Director, ISD/NCIRD) replied that as part of quality assurance visits 
immunization programs make, generally to participating VFC providers, built into the visits are 
reviews of storage and handling procedures and vaccine management. That is the primary 
quality control the system schedules into the program. 
 
Ms. Pellegrini asked whether there is a process for going to the settings where larger clusters 
are occurring to engage in some type of remedial action to ensure that it does not happen 
again. 
 
Dr. Shimabukuro said he thought that was more of an institution and local health department 
issue.  CDC primarily performs surveillance and investigations.  He can report on the number 
and type of clusters and why they occur. 
 
Dr. Melinda Wharton (Director, ISD/NCIRD) added that for single reports which come in 
routinely, there is not necessarily a high level of follow-up.  Certainly, for some of the incidents 
where there are clusters, this is more concerning.  For example, with syringe reuse or 
mishandling of vaccines in clinics, state or local public health would be involved in follow-up 
generally speaking.  This is not something CDC would necessarily be involved in.  In general, 
CDC learns about these incidents because a problem is identified and reported to state or local 
public health departments.  They may be reported later to the VAERS system, but usually those 
types of incidents raise a sufficient level of concern that state or local health authorities are 
alerted. 
 
Dr. Cohn observed that additional immunizations added specifically to the adolescent schedule 
seemed to comprise a number of the errors described.  She asked whether Dr. Shimabukuro 
could say anything about the number of doses that were given over that period of time in 
relation to the number of reports received. 
 
Dr. Shimabukuro replied that in 2007, there was a large increase in reports and also an increase 
in the number of error reports and the percentage of error reports as a total.  The short answer 
is that it is not exactly clear why this happened, but several reasons are suspected.  About that 
time, a number of new products appeared on the market.  Zostavax®, Gardasil®, and RotaTeq® 
were licensed in 2006 and ACAM® started being used in 2007.  It appears to be a combination 
of more new vaccines on the market, more vaccines being administered, and a period of getting 
used to the schedule.  When a new vaccine comes on the market, there tends to be a spike in 
reports in VAERS which then decreases and levels off.  Relatively speaking, a substantial 
number of reports in that spike are errors when the roll out is occurring and providers are getting 
used to the schedule.  It also may be that there is just more awareness of errors and less 
reluctance to report errors, or a combination of all of those things. 
 
Dr. Bennett observed that one of the problems with VAERS is the inability to calculate rates of 
AEs or errors.  She wondered whether there was any potential going forward that EMRs would 
help to identify errors, or if errors do not make it into EMRs. 
 






Dr. Shimabukuro said he thought there were some ICD codes for medical errors.  CDC could 
perhaps assess how frequently errors are reported.  This work has not been done in VSD yet, 
but it is something they could look into. 
 
Dr. Stephens asked whether there are any active, prospective studies that are examining error 
rates in settings. 
 
Dr. Shimabukuro replied that he was not aware of any ongoing studies examining error rates for 
vaccines.  There have been more studies assessing drug errors than vaccination errors.  That 
may be because most vaccination errors do not cause patient harm. 
 
Dr. Weinbaum (ISD/NCIRD) reported that there is a study looking at schedule errors, which is 
one of the top errors, using a centralized system of Immunization Information Systems (IIS) 
(microphone issues) 
 
Dr. Bridges indicated that the National Adult Influenza Immunization Summit WG also 
recognized these problems with errors that may be more common in temporary or seasonal 
clinics, and developed a checklist that is available on the Summit website on which they would 
like feedback. 
 
Dr. Moore commented that in the future, it would be helpful when discussing vaccine safety and 
VAERS reports to identify vaccines that are new to the market separated from those that have 
been on the market for a long time or errors that are reported based on multiple vaccines.  This 
will make it easier to distinguish when an increase like this occurs that is associated with a 
number of vaccines coming onto the market how much of that is reports about these new 
vaccines that may be errors because of unfamiliarity with a new product as opposed to errors 
that are occurring with vaccines that have been on the schedule for a long time.  She asked 
whether there was any change in the reporting, such as making it easier to report online, that 
also could have contributed to an increase in reports. 
 
Dr. Shimabukuro replied that one possible reason was that in 2007, there was a switch from 
COSTART (Coding Symbols for a Thesaurus of Adverse Reaction Terms) coding to MedDRA 
coding.  MedDRA coding evolves and the codes tend to get more specific from more general.  
With the switch to MedDRA coding, there were more options for errors with more specific codes.  
There were still error codes in COSTART, so it could be argued that an increase in errors 
should still be observed because there were COSTART options to select for an error.  However, 
the wider variety of error codes available in MedDRA may have changed some of the coding 
behaviors of the coders because they have more options to choose from and are more aware of 
error codes. 
 
Ms. Hayes (ACNM) indicated that her concern with the number of vaccines that were given 
when they had previously been stored at an improper temperature range and may lose their 
efficacy.  In the clinics she has worked in, they are required to take a daily temperature of the 
refrigerator.  There are extensive materials on vaccine handling procedures on CDC’s website, 
but they have not been updated in a while, so she was curious as to whether there were any 
plans to work on improving the language around proper storage and handling. 
 
Dr. Shimabukuro clarified that this is probably not administration of vaccine that was known to 
be out of temperature.  These were realizations after the vaccine was administered. 
 






Dr. Melinda Wharton (Director, ISD, NCIRD) emphasized that issues pertaining to vaccine 
storage and handling have been a major focus of the ISD program state immunization programs 
and quality assurance visits for the past several years.  An increase in the use of digital data 
loggers has made it easier to identify excursions and make appropriate interpretations of their 
significance.  Often excursions might occur that are not of sufficient duration or magnitude that 
the vaccine potency is affected and, therefore, it is safe to use the vaccine.  Assuring that 
offices have appropriate vaccine management practices in place, including recording and 
monitoring temperatures and taking appropriate actions when there are excursions is clearly an 
important priority for CDC.  An extensive update was done over the summer of storage and 




Kelly L. Moore MD, MPH  
Director, Tennessee Immunization Program  
Chair, Mumps ACIP Work Group 
 
Dr. Moore introduced the Mumps WG that has recently been constituted.  She reported that 
numerous mumps outbreaks have been reported in the US since 2006, particularly among 
highly vaccinated college populations.  The second largest number of reported cases since 
2006 occurred in 2016.   Widespread distribution of these outbreaks across the US resulted in 
increased interest from state and local health departments and universities to implement third 
dose of MMR vaccination campaigns to control these outbreaks.  However, data on the effect of 
a third MMR dose for outbreak control are limited.  This map reflects the distribution of reported 




Mumps outbreaks are not required to be reported to CDC; however, state and local health 
departments and universities have voluntarily reported numerous outbreaks.  In 2016, at least 
19 university-based outbreaks were reported.  The stars in the map represent states that 
reported outbreaks last year.  When these outbreaks occur, the disease itself has not been 










and expense for local and state public health, including public health laboratories, has been 
significant. 
 
Dr. Moore shared the list of the Mumps WG members and expressed appreciation for 
everyone’s expertise as they try to address new information available on this topic.  Regarding 
the proposed terms of reference for the Mumps WG, the objective is strictly to evaluate and 
propose policy options to prevent or control mumps outbreaks in the US.  The activities related 
to that in the coming months are to: 1) Review the epidemiology of mumps in the 2-dose 
vaccine era, including the international experience; 2) Review available evidence on duration of 
immunity for mumps after 2 doses of MMR and other risk factors for vaccine failure; 3) Review 
the available evidence on benefit provided by a third dose of MMR for mumps outbreak control; 
and 4) Evaluate programmatic implications and cost of various policy options for a third dose of 
MMR to prevent or control mumps outbreaks. 
 
Regarding the timeline, the goal of the February 2017 meeting is to inform ACIP of the new WG, 
members, terms of reference, and kick off with a presentation focused on an overview of current 
mumps recommendations and epidemiology in the US.  The first WG conference call is 
scheduled for March 2017.  During the October 2017 ACIP meeting, an update will be provided 
on the WG’s deliberations.  During the February 2018 ACIP meeting, the WG anticipates 
presenting recommendations to ACIP. 
 
Mona Marin, MD 
Division of Viral Diseases 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases  
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
In anticipation of the WG deliberations and presentations to ACIP, Dr. Marin reviewed mumps 
vaccination recommendations and epidemiology in the US.  For this presentation, she provided 
an overview of mumps disease and transmission, described mumps vaccine and vaccination 
recommendations in the US, presented mumps epidemiology in the US with a focus on recent 
years, and discussed the main topics that the WG will address based on the proposed terms of 
reference. 
 
Mumps is an acute viral illness that classically presents with parotitis in approximately 60% to 
70% of patients.  Other presentations include other salivary gland swelling and non-specific 
respiratory symptoms or asymptomatic infection, which occur in approximately 30% of patients.  
In the pre-vaccine era, mumps complications were common with orchitis and mastitis being the 
most frequent.  More serious complications such as aseptic meningitis leading to 
hospitalizations also occurred.  In the vaccine era, complication rates and hospitalizations have 
been drastically reduced [McLean HQ et al. MMWR 2013; Data from US outbreak investigations 
2006-2015]. 
 
Mumps is transmitted person-to-person by direct contact with infected droplets or saliva or by 
inhalation of infectious respiratory droplets.  It requires close contact for spread.  The 
infectiousness is less than for measles and varicella1.  The infectious period is from 2 days 
before to 5 days after parotitis onset, although virus was isolated outside this period. 
Importantly, transmission can occur from patients with non-specific respiratory symptoms and 
asymptomatic infection.  Mumps has a long incubation period of an average 16 to 18 days. 
Infectiousness before symptoms and transmission from persons with asymptomatic or non-
specific presentation contribute to prolongation of transmission and outbreaks [1Hope Simpson 
RE. The Lancet 1952]. 







Mumps is preventable by vaccination.  In the US, mumps vaccine was licensed as a single 
antigen vaccine in 1967.  Currently, the vaccine is available as combination vaccines either as 
MMR licensed in 1971 or MMR plus varicella (MMRV) licensed in 2005.  These vaccines 
contain a live attenuated mumps strain, the Jeryl-Lynn strain, which belongs to genotype A. 
Effectiveness estimates for MMR for preventing clinical mumps are ~77% for one dose and 
~88% for two doses 1,2 [1 Schaffzin JK et al. Pediatrics 2007, Marin M et al. Vaccine 2008; and 
Cohen C et al. Emerg Infect Dis 2007, Deeks SL et al. CMAJ. 2011, Dominguez A et al. Vaccine 
2010, Sartorius B et al. Euro Surveill 2005, Harling R et al. Vaccine 2005]. 
 
Recommendations for mumps vaccine use have evolved since the vaccine was licensed in 
1967.  It was not until 1977 that ACIP recommended 1 dose for all children at any age after 12 
months1.  In 1989, a second dose of measles vaccine was recommended for improved measles 
control, and it was indicated that both doses of measles vaccine should be given as combined 
MMR, stating that mumps revaccination is particularly important2.  Effectively, the 
recommendation for a second dose of measles vaccine delivered a second dose of mumps 
vaccine.  In 2006, a formal recommendation for 2 doses of a mumps-containing vaccine was 
issued to cover school-aged children in grades K-12 and adults in high risk groups, including 
healthcare facility personnel, international travelers, and students at post-high school 
educational institutions3 [1ACIP. MMWR 1977; 26:393-4; 2ACIP. MMWR 1989; 38(S-9):1-18; 
3ACIP. MMWR 2006; 55(22):629-30]. 
 
Reports of mumps cases declined dramatically following MMR vaccine licensure and the 1-dose 
recommendation.  The second dose of MMR vaccine recommended in 1989 subsequently 
improved mumps control as well.  From 1993 through 2005, only a few hundred cases were 
reported annually and vaccination coverage was high.  However, several large mumps 
outbreaks have been reported from 2006 through February 2017.  It is important to note that 
despite these recent outbreaks, there has still been a 99% decline in mumps cases compared 
with the pre-vaccine era [Source: National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (cases, 
passive surveillance); National Immunization Survey (NIS) (1st dose coverage 19-35 year olds), 
National Health Interview Survey & NIS-Teen (2nd dose coverage); 2016 case data is 
preliminary (Feb 9, 2017) and subject to change]. 
 
The first large outbreak of the last decade occurred in 2006, with more than 6500 cases 
reported in 8 Midwestern states.  This was the first multi-state outbreak attributable to 2-dose 
vaccine failure.  Incidence was highest in young adults age 18 through 24 years, most of whom 
were college students.  The 2-dose MMR coverage rate in affected colleges was 90% to 99%, 
with most students having received their second dose more than 10 years previously.  
Dormitory living, freshman class status, and time since the second dose were risk factors in 
college investigations.  Standard control measures, including isolation and vaccine catch-up 
campaigns, were implemented to control this outbreak [Dayan GH et al. N Engl J Med 2008; 
Cortese MM et al. Clin Infect Dis 2008; Marin M et al. Vaccine 2008]. 
 
Then in 2009 -2010, two large outbreaks occurred among highly vaccinated populations and 
accounted for most of the mumps cases reported nationally during this period.  In the 
Northeastern US outbreak, 97% of the cases were among members of the Orthodox Jewish 
community.  In this outbreak, adolescent males were the most affected group and 89% of them 
had 2 doses of MMR vaccine.  This community has unique schools with high densities and 
partner-style learning, as well as large households.  These characteristics resulted in prolonged, 
intense exposures that likely overcame the protection afforded by the vaccine1.  The second 
outbreak occurred in Guam.  In this outbreak, the highest attack rate was in school-aged 






children 9 through 14 years of age, of whom 96% were vaccinated with 2 doses of MMR, as well 
as among ethnic minorities with higher household densities2.  A third dose of MMR vaccine was 
used for outbreak control in these settings [1Barskey AE et al. N Engl J Med 2012; 2Nelson GE 
et al. Pediatr Infect Dis J 2013]. 
 
Moving on to the most recent 6 years, an increase in the number of mumps cases and 
incidence and numerous outbreaks have been reported.  In 2016 in particular, a high number of 
mumps cases and outbreaks were reported.  For cases, even if the states with the 3 largest 
numbers of cases (Arkansas, Iowa, Oklahoma) are removed, the number of cases and 
incidence remain the highest of the past 6 years.  Genotyping G virus has been the most 
commonly identified virus since 2006 when laboratory surveillance was established.  Regarding 
outbreaks, during the second half of 2010 through 2015, 23 outbreaks with 20 or more cases 
have been reported in 18 states.  Of these, 22 occurred in close contact settings, of which 18 
were universities.  In these outbreaks, the highest incidence was in those 18 through 25 years 
of age.  In half of university outbreaks more than 85% of case-patients had documented 2 MMR 
doses.  The spread outside the affected community was minimal, in only 3 outbreaks.  Also, size 
of the outbreaks was limited.  About 56% had less than 50 cases [Source: National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (cases, passive surveillance); 2016 data is preliminary (Feb 9, 
2017) and subject to change; Clemmons N, CDC, personal communication Feb 2017 
(outbreaks)]. 
 
Several factors may contribute to the increasing number of mumps outbreaks.  With a vaccine 
effectiveness of 77% for 1 dose and 88% for 2 doses, cases can still occur among vaccinated 
persons.  Evidence also points to waning of vaccine-induced immunity, especially in the era of 
low disease incidence and absence of boosting from wild disease.  Serologic studies have 
shown that seropositivity and neutralizing antibody titers decline over time1-5.  However, there 
are no established correlates of protection3.  Therefore, the implications of declining titer remain 
uncertain.  Additionally, mumps vaccine also induces cell-mediated immunity.  Although the 
contribution of the cell-mediated immunity to protection against mumps infection has not been 
clearly defined, evidence indicates that it declines over time less than seropositivity, if at all6.  
Epidemiologic studies also suggest waning of immunity with decreased vaccine effectiveness7 
and increased odds of contacting disease with time since vaccination8-9, but evidence is still 
limited.  However, waning of immunity itself does not explain the general geographical focal 
nature and that the oldest vaccinated cohorts are not always most affected [1Davidkin I et al. J 
Infect Dis 2008; 2LeBaron CW et al. J Infect Dis 2009; 3Rubin SA et al. J Infect Dis 2008;4 Date 
AA et al. J Infect Dis 2008; 5Kontio, J Infect Dis 2012; 6Jokinen S et al. J Infect Dis 2007; 
7Cohen C et al. Emerg Infect Dis 2007; 8Cortese MM et al. Clin Infect Dis 2008; 9Vygen S et al.  
Euro Surveill 2016]. 
 
Intense exposure settings account for these features.  Therefore, force of infection based on 
observations that outbreaks have occurred in settings with high population density and contact 
rates that facilitate transmission, such as college campuses or close-knit communities, is 
frequently postulated as a risk factor for current mumps outbreaks.  Concern was raised that 
mumps vaccine-induced immunity may be less effective against other strains.  There is no 
evidence to date.  All sera collected from vaccinated children neutralized diverse mumps virus 
strains1,2.  However, antigenic differences among strains led to lower antibody levels against 
non-vaccine strains1-3.  These differences might become more important with increasing time 
since vaccination.  Several examples that support these factors will be provided next. [1Rubin 
SA et al. J Infect Dis 2008;  2Rubin SA et al. J Virol 2012; 3Orvell C et al. J Gen Virol 2002]. 
  






This graph shows the results of a study that documented decreasing vaccine effectiveness with 




Vaccine effectiveness was calculated during a mumps outbreak in UK in 2004-2005 with more 
than 56,000 cases primarily among under-vaccinated persons.  The yellow line represents the 
first dose vaccine effectiveness which overall was 88%, while the aqua line represents the 
second dose vaccine effectiveness which overall was 95%.  However, as seen from the graph, 
for the first dose, effectiveness declined from 96% in 2 year olds to 66% in 11 through 12 year 
olds.  For the second dose, effectiveness declined from 99% in 5 through 6 year olds to 86% in 
11 through 12 year olds.  Assuming that age serves as a proxy for time since vaccination, these 
findings support waning immunity [1Cohen C et al. Emerg Infect Dis 2007; 2Anderson RM, May 
RM. Nature 1985]. 
 
For serologic evidence of waning of vaccine-induced immunity, the following table presents data 
from a study that assessed mumps neutralizing antibodies against the Jeryl Lynn strain, which 
is the vaccine strain (shaded line), and a genotype G strain identified during the 2006 outbreak 










Neutralizing antibody is considered to contribute to protection, but the level required for 
protection has not been established.  In this study, testing was performed on specimens 
collected days before receipt of the second dose of MMR (second column titled 2-5 years after 
MMR1), 1 month after the second dose MMR (third column) and 10 years after MMR2 (last 
column).  This study found that antibody induced by vaccination effectively neutralized the 
genotype G virus for all study subjects at each time point tested, including 10 years after 
vaccination.  However, the geometric mean titers (GMTs) against the genotype G strain were 
lower than the titers measured against the Jeryl Lynn strain, reflecting variability in antibody 
responses between strains.  Titers to both viruses decreased over time since vaccination.  As 
previously mentioned, in the absence of a correlate of protection, the clinical significance of 
these findings cannot be conclusively ascertained [Rubin SA et al. J Infect Dis 2008]. 
 
The hypothesis that waning immunity is a cause for mumps outbreaks led to interest in the use 
of a third dose of MMR vaccine for outbreak control.  As mentioned earlier, third dose 
intervention campaigns were conducted in New York/Orange County where 81% of eligible 
students were vaccinated with a third dose1 and in Guam where 33% of eligible students 
received a third dose2. As indicated by the two epicurves shown below, attack rates declined 
after a third MMR dose was administered in both school-based studies: 
 
           
                    New York/Orange County           Guam 
 
However, in Guam, statistical significance could not be established due to the small number of 
cases recorded and in both studies, because of the late timing of the third dose campaigns 
during the course of the outbreaks, the possibility of the declines being unrelated to the 
intervention could not be excluded [1 Ogbuanu IU et al. Pediatrics 2012; 2 Nelson GE et al. 
Pediatr Infect Dis J 2013]. 
 
These data were presented to ACIP in 2012.  At that time, ACIP determined that the data were 
insufficient to recommend for or against the use of a third dose of MMR vaccine for mumps 
outbreak control.  Subsequently, CDC issued guidance for consideration for use of a third dose 
in specifically identified target populations along with criteria for public health departments to 
consider for decision-making.  That includes settings with high 2-dose coverage, intense 
exposure, and ongoing transmission. 
 
Data on laboratory evidence of the impact of a third MMR dose became available more recently. 
A study of neutralizing antibody titers in young adults 18 through 28 years of age found that very 
few subjects had titers that were negative (0.8%) or low (5.8%) before the third dose.  
Compared with pre-third dose considered baseline, GMTs were modestly but significantly higher 
at both 1 month and 1 year after the third MMR dose.  However, as seen in the graph, the 






distribution curves show only minimal shifts in mumps titers from baseline (the continuous line) 




These findings raise the question of short- versus long-term benefit of a third dose and 
implications for routine use versus outbreak policy recommendations.  The qualitative aspects of 
the mumps immune response (e.g., antibody avidity, B-cell memory, or cell-mediated immune 
responses) have not been assessed [1Fiebelkorn AP et al. Open Forum Infect Dis 2014]. 
 
To conclude, use of the mumps vaccine reduced disease levels by approximately 99% since 
vaccine introduction in the US.  Since 2006, mumps outbreaks have occurred in highly 2-dose 
vaccinated populations.  The current 2-dose schedule is sufficient for mumps control in the 
general population, but outbreaks can occur in well-vaccinated populations in specific settings. 
Intense exposure settings and waning immunity appear to be risk factors for secondary vaccine 
failure.  The benefit of a third MMR dose still needs to be assessed. 
 
Dr. Marin ended with a summary of the main topics for WG discussion.  The WG will review the 
available evidence for risk factors for mumps among 2-dose MMR vaccine recipients, including 
whether mumps vaccine protects against currently circulating mumps virus genotypes in the US.  
The WG also will review available evidence on benefit provided by the third MMR dose, whether 
there is an additional benefit and, if so, whether it is a short- or long-term benefit.  More 
epidemiologic and laboratory evidence is forthcoming for the WG to review, including vaccine 
effectiveness in Iowa during the 2015 outbreak and Arkansas during the 2016-2017 outbreak, 
and antibody kinetics more than 5 years after the third MMR dose.   Finally, the WG will 
examine the programmatic implications and conduct a cost analysis of various policy options for 




Dr. Reingold inquired as to whether more natural boosting at an earlier time period when the 
virus was circulating might explain why a reduction in vaccine effectiveness does not seem to 
be as true in older individuals. 
 






Dr. Marin clarified that when she referred to the older cohort, she meant within college 
investigations and the age span was narrow from 18 through 24 years of age.  Higher rates of 
disease were seen in students 18 through 20 years of age, but not in those 21 and older.  Given 
their year of birth, they were unlikely to be exposed to natural disease.  The population over 30 
to 40 years of age may have had exposure to natural disease. 
 
Dr. Reingold noted that the pace seemed leisurely for the WG to report back to ACIP on 
forthcoming data.  If these are important policy questions for health departments, he wondered 
whether the pace could be accelerated somewhat. 
 
Dr. Marin replied that the Iowa investigation is almost complete.  The analysis is largely finished, 
so those data will be available in a few months. 
 
Dr. Messonnier agreed about the timeframe, but emphasized that the WG had not had their first 
meeting yet.  One of the questions regards whether ACIP will be comfortable making a new 
recommendation based on the clinical efficacy data from existing investigations, or if they would 
like to see additional information, including some of the questions related to strain changes that 
will require more serological studies and will take longer.  The WG certainly would welcome 
moving faster if they can. 
 
Dr. Bennett noted that while Dr. Marin reported on the immunization rates overall at the 
institutions where there were outbreaks, but not on the rates comparatively between cases and 
non-cases.  She wondered whether there has been any attempt to assess that and, if so, 
whether ACIP would see those data.  In addition, she asked whether additional risk factor 
analyses could be performed.  These seem like good opportunities potentially for case-control 
studies. 
 
Dr. Marin indicated that the college investigations examined the coverage rate among cases 
versus non-cases in 2006, 2009, and 2010 but not so much in the past year.  Most students in 
college now came from a time when 2-dose coverage was pretty high among children 4 through 
6 years of age.  There is a large portion of the population for which immunization status is not 
known.  It is more difficult to get coverage information, but 2-dose coverage is high for college 
populations. 
 
Dr. Moore assured Dr. Reingold that the WG would not be any more leisurely than absolutely 
necessary.  Given that two universities reported cases to her in the previous three weeks, she 
personally feels the urgency to have the evidence to make an appropriate evidence-based 
decision.  As soon as the WG feels that they have sufficient evidence presented to them to 
make an evidence-based recommendation, they will bring it to ACIP post-haste.  
 
Dr. Schaffner (NFID/IDSA) asked whether there are epidemiologic or molecular data suggesting 
the source of these mumps virus outbreaks that are occurring, particularly in universities in 
terms of whether they are domestic or international mumps viruses. 
 
Dr. Marin responded that the virus tested in 2006 was similar to the virus that cause the UK 
outbreak in 2005-2006.  The index case in the outbreak in the Orthodox Jewish community was 
a 11-year old 2-dose vaccinated child who returned from the UK and two weeks later developed 
mumps.  The genotype circulating is similar to the genotype circulating in Western Europe. 
  






Dr. Pallansch emphasized that unlike measles and rubella, mumps has not been eliminated 
from indigenous circulation in the US.  It is just that currently genotype G is the most 
predominant, but is not exclusive.  Importations are recognized, but genotype G being widely 
distributed globally makes it very difficult to say specifically in most situations.  For some of the 
college outbreaks, it is not going to be possible to answer that question definitively. 
 
Dr. Schaffner (NFID/IDSA) pointed out that while wild mumps is often an asymptomatic 
infection, not a lot of studies have been done about asymptomatic infections in the context of 
these outbreaks to his knowledge.  He wondered whether this opportunity could be taken to 
study how frequently asymptomatic infection occurs among people who have been vaccinated, 
because they may be subtle transmitters. 
 
Dr. Marin responded that this was an important point in 2006 when they went to Iowa.  In the 
two colleges that were investigated, only 16% of students with mumps reported contact with a 
known mumps case.  That suggested that there was a lot of asymptomatic disease that 
contributed to transmission. 
 
Dr. Thompson (NVAC) pointed out that there is now an MMRV vaccine.  She thinks that the 
timing of MMRV introduction and its increased use in 2006 is completely coincidental with the 
outbreaks.  It is important for ACIP to examine this in its review and present the evidence.  In 
the context of a third dose recommendation, she also thinks ACIP will need to say something 
about MMR versus MMRV, or if it is just MMR-containing vaccines. 
 
Dr. Marin indicated that MMRV is licensed through 12 years of age.  She agreed that it was 
coincidence, because MMRV was licensed in the US in 2005 and was not available during 
2008-2009 due to a shortage.  Also, after the ACIP MMRV Safety WG made recommendations 
for MMRV use, not many providers are using it for the first dose. 
 
Dr. Even (ACHA) thought it was striking that none of the recent outbreaks have been reported in 
the military, which is comprised of the same age group and close quarters.  She wondered 
whether DoD was doing something different. 
 
Dr. Marin replied that the experience of the military has often been mentioned in support of a 
third dose.  The military implemented vaccination of recruits regardless of their vaccination 
status in 1991, so those entering the military probably received a third dose.  They made some 
changes based on serology, but the protocol is primarily giving a dose to everybody regardless 
of their status. 
 
Margaret Yacovone (DoD) indicated that for all recruits entering the military, if there is no 
evidence of 2 doses of MMR, their antibodies are checked.  If they are negative on any, they 
receive 2 doses of MMR.  As a result, the military has very high immunity such that even if there 
is an isolated case, there is not transmission.  Not all services in all recruit sites check for 
mumps.  The DoD is trying to change this so that it will be unified across the services, especially 
with the outbreaks of mumps that have occurred throughout the US. 
 
Dr. Romero indicated that in Arkansas, children under 10 years of age comprise most of the 
outbreak population. 
 
Dr. Marin indicated that based on the age distribution of cases in Arkansas through the previous 
week, it was true that there have been a lot of cases in the younger age group.  However, there 
are cases in the older age groups as well, 57% of case patients in Arkansas have been 5 






through 17 years of age.  A potential explanation for the age distribution is case finding.  Cases 
are reported primarily by schools.  There is not good reporting from workplaces or other 
settings. 
 
Dr. Riley asked whether there are good data to suggest for the college outbreaks that even for 
international students, the vaccination rates are just as high as for US-born students. 
 
Dr. Marin said she did not think they specifically assessed international students, but national 
serologic surveys, examined mumps immunity by place of birth.  People born outside the US 
have somewhat higher levels.  One explanation might be that about 38% of the countries do not 
vaccinate against mumps.  The mumps epidemiology is such that by 14 to 15 years of age, 90% 
of people have antibodies.  College students coming from abroad from countries with no 
vaccination probably are immune. 
 
Dr. Whitley Williams (NMA) asked whether Margaret Yacovone from DoD knew what percent of 
the recruits tested have negative mumps serology. 
 
Margaret Yacovone (DoD) responded that she did not have that information, but they were 
finding higher antibody titers in some of their populations who were born abroad.  They can 
share these data if it would help with ACIP’s decision-making.  The DoD has examined this a 
few times over the past several years. 
 
Dr. Marin replied that this would be useful. 
 
Dr. Maldonado said she understood that the patients from Arkansas may differ in other ways.  
For example, many of them are Marshallese students and tend to be younger and their 
symptoms are distinct as well.  They have recurrent parotitis, which is generally not seen in a 
normal mumps outbreak situation. 
 
Dr. Marin pointed out that it is difficult to confirm recurrent disease, especially in a situation like 
mumps where parotitis can be determined by other agents.  Confirmation would be needed of 
both episodes, and she did not know how often that happened in Arkansas.  There is evidence 
in the literature of symptomatic mumps after a previous infection occurred.  Those were 
documented by laboratory confirmation and the profile of the immune response which supported 
reinfection. 
 
Dr. Romero added that interesting about the Arkansas outbreak is that they are not seeing the 
secondary complications.  For example, they would expect to see many more cases of aseptic 
meningitis, encephalitis, hearing loss, and orchitis.  However, they are not seeing that.  They do 
see some cases of orchitis, but not the central nervous system (CNS) disease that is anticipated 
with mumps.  He would interpret that to mean that there is some protection from the vaccine. 
 
Dr. Duchin (NACCHO) reported that Washington State is also experiencing an outbreak, 
primarily in King County.  On an encouraging note, when they had to exclude students from a 
school district with about 15,000 total students who are unimmunized or did not have up-to-date 
MMR vaccination, over half were immunized and returned to school rather than staying out the 
entire exclusion period that would have been required.  This is encouraging to see, and it 
suggests that there is not a true objection to vaccination and may just be other barriers.  A 
certain percentage refuses to be vaccinated and are staying out of school for a prolonged 
period. 
 






Ms. Pellegrini noted the disproportionate share of Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islanders 
with mumps in 2016. That is because about half of US cases in 2016 were reported from 






Emmanuel (Chip) Walter, MD, MPH 
Chair, Flavivirus Vaccines Work Group  
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
 
Dr. Walter reminded everyone that this WG was renamed the “Flavivirus Vaccines Work Group” 
to encompass work on Japanese encephalitis (JE), Yellow Fever (YF), dengue, and Zika 
vaccines.  During the last few months, the WG began a review of dengue epidemiology, 
immunology, and diagnostics to prepare for submission of a dengue vaccine BLA.  During the 
past few months, the WG also has monitored the YF vaccine supply and worked with the 
manufacturer on contingency plans to address shortages. 
 
In terms of the dengue vaccine tentative timeline, Sanofi Pasteur is expected to submit a BLA 
during 2017.  In June 2017, Sanofi Pasteur will present dengue vaccine data to ACIP.  In 
October 2017, the WG will present modeling and cost-effectiveness data to ACIP.  In February 
2018, the WG will present the GRADE evaluation and proposed recommendations to ACIP. 
 
Dengue Virus Vaccines 
 
Steve Waterman, MD, MPH 
Chief, Dengue Branch  
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
San Juan, Puerto Rico 
 
Dr. Waterman discussed the need for a dengue virus (DENV) vaccine in terms of the clinical 
disease burden and lack of primary prevention tools, vaccines constructs and candidates, 
epidemiologic challenges to vaccine evaluation, and results of the lead-candidate vaccine trial 
from Sanofi Pasteur.  As a reminder, dengue viruses belong to Flavivirus genus of the 
Flaviviridae family.  There are four antigenically distinct serotypes:  DENV-1, DENV-2, DENV-2, 
DENV-4.  These are enveloped single-stranded viruses with 3 structural proteins, the envelope, 
capsid, and membrane proteins.  This phylogeny dendrogram based on the complete amino 
acid sequence of the polyproteins of important flaviviruses pathogens show that dengue, Zika, 
and YF viruses all share primate hosts and Aedes mosquito vectors.  Dengue is relatively 
closely related to Zika virus: 
 
Dengue Virus Vaccine 
 
 







Lazear and Diamond 2016, Journal of Virology 
 
DENV is primarily transmitted through a man-mosquito-man transmission cycle, with incubation 
periods in humans and mosquitos of roughly a week in each species.  Dengue is arguably the 
most important arbovirus in terms of morbidity and mortality.  It is an emerging disease, which is 
both epidemic and endemic in tropical and sub-tropical regions with an expanding distribution.  
The estimated global burden based on literature review and modeling is that there are an 
estimated 390 million infections annually with 96 million clinically apparent infections, 2 million 
severe dengue cases, and 20,000 deaths worldwide. 
 
Severe illness has a distinct pathology involving shock, hemorrhage, and severe organ 
involvement.  Shock involves systemic vascular permeability leading to vascular hypovolemia 
and Dengue Shock Syndrome (DSS).  Hemorrhage involves bleeding manifestations, which are 
commonly due to the combined effects of thrombocytopenia and deranged hemostasis. Severe 
organ impairment such as encephalitis and hepatitis can occur.  Risk factors for severe dengue 
have been studied extensively.  One of the major risk factors is secondary infection with a 
second dengue serotype, although not all severe dengue is as a result of a secondary infection.  
Virus strain, host genetics, co-morbidities (especially in older adults), young age, and being 
female also have been identified as risk factors for severe disease. 
 
The pathogenesis of severe disease seems to be related to viral burden, which often has been 
linked to heterologous non-neutralizing antibody enhancing infection.  The immune response 
triggers inflammatory mediators, cytokines and chemokines which are thought to promote 
capillary permeability syndrome, although the exact mechanism is unclear.  Coagulopathy is 
probably a result of the loss of essential coagulation proteins, but this is not completely 
understood in terms of the pathogenesis. 
 
Regarding dengue vaccine status, one vaccine has been registered by Sanofi Pasteur in 
several countries including Mexico, Brazil, and the Philippines.  There are multiple other vaccine 
candidates and many clinical trials underway.  The vaccines would be indicated in pediatric and 
adult populations.  The diagnostics necessary for clinical management and for assessing 
dengue vaccine trials are very good for acute disease, but antibody assays need to be 
improved.  The recent co-circulation of Zika and DENV in many countries, which cannot be 
distinguished reliably by current available IgM tests, underscores this situation. 
  






Large disease and economic burdens associated with hospitalizations and clinical care during 
outbreaks drive the rationale for a dengue vaccine.  The primary prevention of vector control, 
has not been effective in the last 50 years as evidenced by the expanding number of cases and 
distribution of the disease.  An effective primary prevention tool is needed for dengue.  
Secondary prevention currently involves medical management of severe dengue, which can be 
quite effective in reducing mortality with severe dengue to less than 1%, but again the 
healthcare burden could be ameliorated significantly by having a primary prevention tool such 
as a vaccine. 
 
A publication by Bhatt et al in Nature recently reviewed the evidence and modeled the likely 
burden of disease.  As shown on the following map, DENVs circulate throughout the tropics and 




The largest burden of disease is in Asia, followed by the Americas in terms of documented 
disease, with Africa likely having a similar disease burden, but not very well-documented.  
Puerto Rico, the most affected US territory, experiences two or three large epidemics each 
decade with thousands of hospitalizations and dozens of deaths.  Roughly 80% of the 
population of Puerto Rico is infected with dengue by the second decade of life. 
 
This WHO Dengue Prevention Framework highlights the potential importance of vaccines for 
primary prevention, with key roles for surveillance and diagnostics in assessing vaccine efficacy 
[Dengue: Guidelines for Diagnosis, Treatment, Prevention and Control. New Edition. WHO, 
2009; Global Strategy for Dengue Prevention and Control 2012-2020. WHO, 2012]. 
 
The conventional correlate of protection for dengue is neutralizing antibodies by the plaque 
reduction neutralization titer (PRNT50-70) test and cell culture using cells that are not actually the 
primary targets of infection in vivo, which are Fc receptors (FcR)-bearing cells.  Homotypic 
antibodies against the infecting serotype are protective for many years, if not for life.  
Heterotypic antibodies develop after infection to non-infecting serotypes and provide cross-
protection against dengue infection for a limited time interval of 6 months (Sabin, 1952) or 
perhaps longer. 
 






As mentioned, secondary dengue infections have been shown to be a risk factor for severe 
dengue.  In vitro studies demonstrate enhanced infection in cell culture in the presence of 
heterotypic (non-neutralizing) antibodies, a phenomenon known as antibody dependent 
enhancement (ADE).  Animal and mouse models have demonstrated similar results.  The most 
convincing evidence for heterotypic antibody playing a role in pathogenesis for dengue is in 
infants where primary dengue infection in the presence of passively acquired maternal antibody 
has been shown to lead to dengue hemorrhagic fever (DHF).  Cohort studies of school children 
also have documented secondary infection being a risk factor. As a result of such studies, the 
ideal product profile has been viewed for some time as a tetravalent vaccine for all four 
serotypes.  The ideal characteristic, as for other vaccines, would be logistically easy to deliver 
vaccines with high efficacy and without the need for booster doses. 
 
A number of dengue vaccines are in development.  The commercial vaccines furthest along are 
live-attenuated cell culture-adapted infectious cloned chimeric virus vaccines as well as a 
vaccine combining chimera with attenuated by site directed mutagenesis, recombinant subunits 
of DENV envelope proteins, and inactivated dengue viruses.  Next generation in development 
include viral vectored subunits, virus-like particles (VLPs), peptide chimeras, and DNA.  The 




Chimeric flavivirus vaccine technology involves using either YF 17D backbone or dengue 
genome cloned as complementary DNA (cDNA).  The prM and E protein genes are then 
inserted into the structural backbone, chimeric cDNA is transcribed to RNA, transfected into cell 
culture and grown, which results in the chimeric vaccines with the envelope proteins having 
heterologous viruses as illustrated below: 
 








Good animal models are lacking for vaccine evaluation.  A Macaque model does not produce 
disease and does not predict immunogenicity in humans.  An AG 129 interferon deficient mouse 
model does produce DHF.  A human challenge model is rarely used, although such human 
challenge is under consideration by NIH.  Human clinical trials are the gold standard that are 
going to be required to determine the performance of dengue vaccine candidates. 
 
Dengue epidemiology is a challenge to vaccine evaluation.  Dengue is an acute febrile illness 
(AFI) syndrome, which can only be defined by diagnostic testing.  Many look-alike AFIs in 
dengue endemic areas include:  malaria, influenza, leptospirosis, meliodosis, hepatitis A, et 
cetera.  Other challenges are the cyclical and seasonal transmission in endemic areas with 
multiple serotypes, varying age-specific incidence in various parts of the world, and a spectrum 
of illness with a large percentage of asymptomatic infections and a small proportion of severe 
disease.  These epidemiologic characteristics dictate a large population base for phase III trials 
because of the focal nature of dengue.  Febrile illness surveillance needs to be set up to identify 
dengue fever (DF) syndromes, gather data on age-specific disease incidence, determine 
variation in incidence over several seasons, and have molecular and immuno–diagnostic testing 
capability.  Molecular testing is good for the first few days, and then after that serologic 
capability is needed [ Guidelines for Clinical Evaluation of Dengue Vaccine in Dengue Endemic 
Areas. Vaccine 2008;26:4113-4119]. 
 
This graphic illustrates the period of viremia during which an rRT-PCR or NS1 antigen detection 
can be diagnosed in the first few days of illness and post-fever onset.  After about 5 days, IgM is 
present for a couple of months: 
 








In terms of some of the preparatory studies that have been conducted, a prospective cohort 
study was conducted in Ratchaburi, Thailand during 2006-2009.  This study illustrates some of 
the complexities.  This study included approximately 3000 children 3 through 13 years of age.  
Active surveillance was conducted for absences and febrile episodes in schools and home 
visits.  Fever was defined as 37.5°C oral irrespective of duration.  In this study, 0.53 febrile 
episodes were found per child per year.  In terms of clinic visits by day post-fever onset, the 
investigators were able to examine 53% of the children within 1 to 2 days after fever onset, 30% 
after 3 to 4 days, and 14% after 5 to 6 days.  Clinic evaluation included an initial and follow-up 
blood draw, with diagnostic testing by PCR and IgM anti-DENV.  In this study, dengue incidence 
varied considerably year-by-year, ranging from 1.7% to 5.7%.  The serotype incidence also 
varied markedly by year, ranging from 43% overall for DENV-1 to 8% overall DENV-4 over this 
3-year time period.  The majority of the infections were mild illness or undifferentiated fever 
(UF).  All of the DHF cases, 84% of classic DF cases, and 15% of the UF cases were 
hospitalized.  Of the infections, 86% were secondary in these children in this highly endemic 
area [From Sabchareon, A et al.  PLoS NTD 2012; 6: e1732]. 
 
The Sanofi Dengue Vaccine Efficacy Trials (CYD) were randomized, blinded, placebo-controlled 
trials among children 2 through 16 years of age.  The children were given 3 doses of tetravalent, 
live, attenuated vaccine at 0, 6, and 12 months.  The control groups were given a normal saline 
vaccine diluent placebo.  The endpoint was symptomatic, confirmed DF requiring clinical acute 
febrile illness and PCR-detected viremia.  The follow-up period was 25 months total, including 
13 months after the last dose.  Longer-term follow-up of 48 months is being conducted. 
 
This table shows the characteristics of three published trials with large sample sizes in which 
pre-existing DENV antibody was present in approximately 70% to 80% of the children: 
  











Ratchaburi, Thailand  Phase 2B 4002 4-11 69.5 
Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, 
Vietnam  
Phase 3 10,275 2-14 67.5 
Latin America Colombia, 
Brazil, Mexico, Puerto Rico, 
Honduras   
Phase 3 20,869 9-16 79.4 
     
 
In terms of the results of these trials, overall VE was about 61%.  However, VE varied 
considerably by serotype.  The lowest efficacy with this vaccine was for DENV-2 at 42% with 
higher VE for DENV-1 at 50%, DENV-3 at 74% and DENV-4 at 78%.  In terms of clinical 
outcomes of dengue, there were no differences between the vaccine and placebo groups in 
clinical features or severity of dengue, including: duration of clinical syndrome, fever, 
hospitalization, bleeding, plasma leakage, thrombocytopenia, shock, or organ impairment.  
Regarding other outcomes, no safety signals were observed in the short-term.  Long-term, 
blinded follow-up is ongoing.  Immunogenicity and protection in children without previous DENV 
infection is poor. 
  
In conclusion, tetravalent, DENV – chimeric yellow fever-dengue vaccine (CYD) has been 
shown, and is reflected in some recent recommendations from WHO’s Strategic Advisory Group 
of Experts on Immunization (SAGE), to be safe when administered to children living in a dengue 
endemic area and with a high background of previous DENV infection.  A caveat is that in the 
Asian study, a higher rate of DHF was seen in the vaccine group in Year 3.  Only partial 
protection has been shown against dengue, with lowest protection against DENV-2, followed by 
DENV-1, and highest protection against DENV-3 and 4 [From: Sabchareon, A et al.  Lancet 
2012; 380:1559-1567; Capeding MR, et al Lancet 2014; 834: 1358-1365; Villar L, et al.  NEJM 
2015: 372 113-123]. 
 
Sanofi Pasteur will be invited to present to the Flavivirus WG in the coming months, and would 





Dr. Belongia asked whether the type with which children were previously infected was known 
and if that was associated with the lower efficacy for DENV-1 and DENV-2. 
 
Dr. Waterman indicated that there were pre-antibody samples in a limited number of children, 
and it is difficult to tell what the prior infecting serotypes were.  There are additional studies, 
some of which are just coming out.  A study was published recently in JID about the antibody 
response.  This remains a complicated question with no definitive answers. 
 






Dr. Stephens asked whether there were estimates of efficacy for the individuals with poor 
immunogenicity who had a prior dengue infection. 
 
Dr. Waterman replied that it was approximately 40%, and that more detailed data will be 




Marc Fischer, MD, MPH 
Arboviral Diseases Branch 
Division of Vector-Borne Diseases  
National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases  
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Fischer reminded everyone that Zika virus was first isolated from a sentinel rhesus macaque 
monkey in Uganda in 1947.  Prior to 2007, only sporadic human disease cases were reported 
from Africa and Southeast Asia.  In 2007, the first Zika outbreak was reported on Yap Island, 
Federated States of Micronesia.  In 2013–2015, more than 30,000 suspected cases were 
reported from outbreaks in French Polynesia and other Pacific islands.  Prior to 2014, less than 
10 countries reported any type of mosquito-borne Zika virus activity.  In 2015, with the spread to 
the Americas, there was a substantial increase over 2015 and 2016.  The greatest increase was 
in the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) regions of the Americas, but there were 
increases in other countries as well.  As of mid-January 2017, 76 countries or territories around 
the world had reported Zika virus transmission at some point.  In May 2015, the first locally 
acquired cases in the Americas were reported in Brazil.  There likely had been transmission for 
a number of months prior to that.  As of January 2017, local transmission has been reported in 
50 countries or territories in the Americas.  The only countries in the Americas without reported 
local transmission are Bermuda, Canada, Chile, and Uruguay. 
 
The map below on the left shows the time of first reported cases, with lighter countries being 
earlier.  The move into darker colors shows the spread and increase in transmission.  The table 
on the right below reflects the number of locally transmitted Zika virus disease cases reported to 
PAHO by countries and territories in the Americas:  
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As of mid-January 2017, almost 740,000 total suspect or confirmed cases had been reported. 
Brazil and Colombia accounted for approximately 60% of the total reported.  About a quarter of 
the cases were laboratory-confirmed, while the remaining three-quarters of the cases were 
clinical cases that met the suspected case definition and could have included some other 
diseases or viruses, such as dengue.  Most suspected and confirmed locally transmitted cases 
reported to PAHO, as of January 2017, were reported from South America (70%), followed by 
the Caribbean (20%), Central America (8%), and North America (2%). 
 
From 2007–2014, only 14 Zika virus disease cases were identified in US travelers who traveled 
to the Pacific Islands or Asia.  With recent outbreaks in the Americas, recent cases among US 
travelers increased substantially.  Limited local mosquito-borne transmission has been identified 
in two states:  Southern Florida and Southern Texas.  There have been widespread outbreaks 
in three US territories:  Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, and American Samoa. 
 
A total of 4710 travel-associated cases were reported to ArboNET from US states from January 
1, 2015 through January 25, 2017.  It is important to note that travel-associated cases include 
cases in travelers and their contacts with presumed sexual or in-utero transmission, and one 
case with unknown route of person-to-person transmission.  One laboratory-acquired case was 
reported in a researcher. A total of 35,644 locally acquired cases were reported in the territories.  
In the states, 219 locally-acquired cases were reported. 
  
The following map shows these cases broken down by state, with darker shading having more 
cases.  The cross-hatching shows Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the US Virgin Islands, and 
small regions in Southern Florida and Texas having local transmission.  These numbers are 
updated weekly on the CDC webpage.  In terms of the state of residence for these laboratory-
confirmed Zika virus disease cases, the highest reporting travel-associated cases were in New 
York (1001; 21%) and Florida (840; 18%), followed by California (411; 9%) and Texas (294, 
6%).  The majority of locally-acquired cases were reported from Florida (213; 91%), followed by 




Beginning in July 2016, sporadic locally-acquired cases were identified in multiple counties in 
South Florida.  Active ongoing transmission was identified in three small areas of Miami-Dade 
County.  That prompted recommendations for pregnant women to avoid travel to those areas, 
and for pregnant residents to be tested and followed for their pregnancy outcomes.  There was 
an intensive public health response, including unprecedented aerial adulticide and larvicide 






applications, which appeared to help control the outbreaks.  At this time, there is no evidence of 
ongoing, sustained local transmission [Florida Health Newsroom]. 
 
This map shows where that transmission occurred.  The main map is Miami-Dade County and 
then there are three insets that show how small the areas are where active, local transmission 
occurred.  These areas are generally about 1- to 2-miles square, with the area in Miami Beach 




In November 2016, the first case of local mosquito-borne Zika virus infection was reported in 
Brownsville, Texas.  This area borders Mexico and there are frequent border crossings in both 
directions, including people who go across the border daily.  Active Zika virus transmission was 
reported in Mexico near the US-Mexico border.  That continues to this day.  In December, CDC 
designated Brownsville a Zika cautionary area, shown in yellow on the map.  This means that 
there are recommendations for pregnant women to avoid travel to those areas and pregnant 
residents to be tested and followed.  As of January 25, six cases of local mosquito-borne 
transmission had been identified and reported from the Brownsville area.  This map tries to put 
into context the size of the area.  The inset shows the county and area at the very tip of the 











The vast majority of reported Zika virus disease cases in the US territories for the time period 
2015 through January 2017 were locally-acquired (N=33,712), with 97% (N=32,848) being 
reported from Puerto Rico, 2% (N=807) from the US Virgin Islands, and 1% (N=5) from 
American Samoa.  This is a map of Puerto Rico showing cases by municipalities, with the 
darker shades being larger numbers of cases.  The primary point is that all municipalities in 
Puerto Rico have reported local Zika virus transmission, so the outbreak on the island was 
widespread.  The darker shadings are around the major metropolitan areas where the most 
cases were seen in the Northeast in the San Juan metropolitan area and Southwest in the 




This figure shows the age group distribution for reported Zika virus disease cases in the US 
states and territories as of January 25, 2017.  The age distribution was similar for laboratory-
confirmed reported cases of Zika virus disease cases in the states, with a slightly higher 
proportion of cases among children and young adults in the territories. The higher numbers of 
cases in the 20-39 year age group and the 40-59 year age group may reflect, in part, the 
additional testing occurring in pregnant women as well as exposure among travelers in these 
age groups. 
 
This is the epi curve showing month of illness onset for Zika virus disease cases reported in US 
states and territories, with the peak of the outbreak occurring in late summer, with a steep 
decline occurring in the fall and winter. 
 
Returning to Zika virus transmission and clinical manifestations, Zika virus is an RNA flavivirus 
related to dengue, YF, JE, and West Nile viruses.  Transmission to humans is primarily by 
Aedes (Stegomyia) species mosquitoes.  In the Americas, that includes Aedes aegypti and 
Aedes albopictus.  Infection is typically asymptomatic or causes mild dengue-like illness.  
However, recent outbreaks in the Americas and Pacific Islands have identified new modes of 
transmission and clinical manifestations. 
 
In terms of clinical course, most infections are asymptomatic.  The clinical illness is usually mild 
and is characterized by fever, rash, arthralgia, or conjunctivitis.  These symptoms usually last for 
several days to a week.  Severe disease requiring hospitalization is uncommon and fatalities 
have been rare. 
 






Clinical manifestations newly identified in the last couple of years include fetal loss, 
microcephaly and other congenital anomalies, Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) and other 
neurologic syndromes, and thrombocytopenia. 
 
Non-mosquito-borne modes of transmission that have been documented include intrauterine 
transmission resulting in congenital infection, intrapartum from a viremic mother to a newborn, 
sexual transmission, laboratory exposure, and blood transfusion.  Possible modes of 
transmission include organ or tissue transplantation, breast milk, and other body fluids. 
 
Regarding the risk of adverse outcomes of pregnancy, the incidence and clinical spectrum of 
congenital Zika virus infection remains unknown.  The risk of fetal loss and congenital 
anomalies appear to be greater with infections early in pregnancy.  The risk of congenital 
microcephaly following Zika virus infection during the first trimester of pregnancy is estimated to 
be 1% to 13%.  It is probably on the lower end of that for microcephaly, but possibly in that 
range for all other anomalies as reported. 
 
This table shows microcephaly or other CNS malformations possibly associated with Zika virus 
infection reported to WHO by country or territory as of January 20, 2017.  This includes cases 
that may not have laboratory confirmation, and can include cases that were acquired in 
residents in one country who then traveled to another country to deliver: 
 











Colombia 78 (3%) 
United States 41 (2%) 
Dominican Republic 22 (1%) 
Martinique 18 (1%) 
French Guiana 16 (1%) 
Guatemala 15 (1%) 
22 other countries/territories 79 (3%) 
*Includes cases acquired in other countries 
 
As mentioned, the clinical findings in infants with congenital Zika virus infection clearly extend 
beyond microcephaly, although that is one of the most severe manifestations and the first to be 
recognized.  It now includes other brain anomalies including subcortical calcifications that 
appear to be a particular distribution, ventriculomegaly, abnormal gyral patterns, corpus 
callosum agenesis, and cerebellar hypoplasia.  There also have been a number of ocular 
anomalies including microphthalmia, cataracts, chorioretinal atrophy, and optic nerve 
hypoplasia.  Other neurologic sequelae related primarily to the brain anomalies include 
hypertonia or hypotonia, irritability, tremors, swallowing dysfunction, hearing loss, and visual 
impairment.  Congenital contractures due to lack of movement of the fetus can include clubfoot 
and arthrogryposis. 
 
Two cases of Zika virus perinatal transmission have been reported in the literature from French 
Polynesia from the 2015 outbreak.  Both women developed mild rash illness within 3 days of 
delivery.  One infant developed a transient rash and mild thrombocytopenia at 3 days of life.  
The second infant remained asymptomatic.  Both mothers and infants had evidence of Zika 
virus RNA in serum.  The newborns otherwise had unremarkable clinical courses. 
 
Sexual transmission was first identified in sexual partners with discordant travel histories.  The 
first report in 2011 was in a returning traveler from Colorado who went to Senegal.  Little 
attention was given to this until 2016 when sexually transmitted cases were reported from 12 
countries, including 38 cases in the US all among travelers with discordant travel histories.  






Most reported cases have been from men with symptomatic illness transmitting to their female 
or male partner.  One report of transmission was from a woman to a man, and two reports of 
transmission were from asymptomatic men to their partners. 
 
Zika viral RNA has been detected in semen up to 6 months after illness onset and in vaginal 
fluid up to 2 weeks after illness onset.  Zika virus has been cultured from semen up to 70 days 
after illness onset.  However, most of the sexual transmission that has been reported has 
occurred within the first month to 40 days after illness onset in the transmitting partner.  The 
data thus far are primarily from case reports, which may not reflect true incidence or risk of 
transmission.  The full length of duration of RNA or live virus in semen or vaginal fluids and the 
level of risk remains unknown.  There are ongoing studies to better determine that. 
 
The incidence, duration, and risk factors for sexual transmission are unknown.  One modeling 
study from Brazil suggested that the apparent increased incidence of disease in women 
compared to men could possibly be due to sexual transmission.  Obviously, there are many 
other factors like increased awareness and testing because of the concerns about congenital 
infection.  Another model determined that sexual transmission is likely not a significant factor in 
driving an outbreak, that it really is mosquito-borne transmission that drives the outbreak, 
although sexual transmission certainly contributes to cases.  Two prospective cohort studies in 
the US are ongoing to better evaluate the frequency and duration of Zika virus RNA and live 
virus in semen.  One of these is being performed in Puerto Rico, and preliminary data have 
been published on that.  The second is among men in the Continental US (CONUS). 
 
Pertaining to transfusion-transmitted Zika virus infections, Zika virus RNA was identified in 42 
(3%) of 1505 blood donors in French Polynesia in 2013–2014.  None of those products were 
transfused, so there were no transfusion-related events.  In 2016, at least 3 cases of 
transfusion-transmitted Zika virus infections were reported from Brazil.  In February 2016, the 
FDA issued recommendations to reduce the risk of transfusion-transmitted Zika virus in the US.  
From April through December 2016, routine screening identified Zika virus RNA in 360 (0.6%) of 
54,588 blood donations screened in Puerto Rico.  In August 2016, the FDA recommended 
routine Zika virus screening of all blood donations in the US, which is currently ongoing under 
an IND process. 
 
From 1964 through 1980, there were 4 to 6 reports of probable Zika virus infections due to 
laboratory exposure.  Based on the range and probability from some of the publications, it is 
unclear if they overlap with other publications because there are not enough details.  In addition, 
there was at least one case in which a person worked in the laboratory and was conducting field 
work in the Zika forest.  It was unclear whether that person was actually infected and whether it 
was due to mosquitos or work in the laboratory.  In 2016, there was one report of confirmed Zika 
virus infection following a needle stick injury in a US researcher.  That person developed a mild 
symptomatic illness without further complications. 
 
Zika virus transmission through breast milk has not been documented thus far. However, Zika 
virus RNA was detected in breast milk collected several days after onset of illness in the two 
women who had perinatal transmission documented in French Polynesia.  In those cases, 
culture of the breast milk was negative for live virus.  However, since that time both RT-PCR for 
RNA and culture have identified Zika virus in breast milk in one case that was collected 4 days 
after onset of illness in a woman in New Caledonia.  There has since been a subsequent report 
of positive breast milk for both RNA and culture.  The infant in the New Caledonia case 
remained asymptomatic and had no laboratory evidence of infection, and there has otherwise 
not been evidence of transmission thus far.  Therefore, to date WHO and CDC believe that the 






benefits of breastfeeding outweigh the theoretical risk of transmission to an infant through 
breast feeding. 
 
As far as other body fluids, Zika virus RNA has been detected in saliva and tears.  One case of 
possible person-to-person transmission was reported from Utah.  The index patient developed 
fatal septic shock and had a level of viremia approximately 100,000 times higher than average.  
It is unclear why the patient had that high a level of viremia.  Zika virus infection was diagnosed 
in a family member who had close contact (i.e., kissing and touching) with the index case 
outside and inside the hospital in the days leading up to his death.  An extensive investigation 
was performed by the Utah Department of Health with CDC.  No specific source or mode of 
transmission was identified.  In addition, there was an extensive investigation of other family 
members who had contact with the patients, hospital and morgue workers, and the community.  
Among those hundreds of people, no additional infections were identified among people who 
had contact with the patient. 
 
GBS following Zika virus infection was first described in French Polynesia during the 2013‒2014 
outbreak.  An additional 19 countries have now reported at least one GBS case with laboratory 
evidence of Zika virus infection.  There have been 13 GBS cases reported from US states and 
50 from Puerto Rico.  Overall, there are an estimated 1.6 cases of GBS per 10,000 Zika virus 
infections.  Outcomes and increased risk in older adults appear to be similar to GBS due to 
other causes. 
 
In terms of neurologic disease with non-congenital Zika virus infections, there have been rare 
published reports of encephalopathy, meningoencephalitis, myelitis, and uveitis.  In addition, 
there have been reports of peripheral paresthesias, with or without GBS.  The frequency is still 
to be defined. 
 
An estimated 1% of symptomatic Zika virus disease cases may have mild thrombocytopenia 
defined as a platelet count <100,000.  That is based on work done in Puerto Rico.  But, there 
have been rare reports of severe thrombocytopenia with hemorrhage or septic shock, including 
at least two fatal cases.  One of these was the case described in Utah and one in Puerto Rico, 
and similar cases have been reported from other countries. 
 
With respect to Zika virus treatment and prevention, the primary prevention mode is to reduce 
mosquito exposure through vector control and personal protective measures (e.g., insect 
repellent, door screens, window screens, and air conditioning).  As recommended by CDC and 
many other countries, pregnant women are advised not to travel to areas with local transmission 
and to take steps to protect themselves against possible sexual transmission.  Currently, there 
is no vaccine or medication to prevent or treat infection or disease.  Numerous candidate 
vaccines are being evaluated.  There is a coordinated US government effort to facilitate 
development that includes Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response 
(ASPR), Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), NIH, CDC, and 
Department of Defense (DoD).  As far as how these vaccines will be used, the targeted use 
likely will depend on the ongoing incidence and locations of disease, further information on the 
complications related to the disease, and the vaccine characteristics (e.g., safety, efficacy, and 
duration of protection). 
  






Zika Vaccines in Development 
 
Gerald R. Kovacs, PhD 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response 
US Department of Health and Human Services 
 
Dr. Kovacs presented a brief update on what BARDA has done so far on the development of 
Zika vaccines.  This is one of the most challenging, dangerous, and potentially insidious viruses 
the government is working on currently.  While currently there is no licensed Zika vaccine 
available, vaccines for other flaviviruses have been developed and used for over 70 years. 
Active development programs for dengue and West Nile vaccines have been ongoing for over 
30 years; however, knowledge of Zika virus was limited at the outset of the epidemic.  Past 
experience is being leveraged for Zika vaccine development.  Zika research and development 
(R&D) efforts have been accelerated greatly by NIAID, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research 
(WRAIR), and BARDA.  A coordinated, interagency portfolio management team was established 
to oversee and accelerate vaccine development.  A multidisciplinary approach is taken to 
accelerate the types of countermeasures needed at any given time. 
 
Regarding the product development pipeline and how the government works together, each 
agency has particular roles and responsibilities.  In the case of Zika, NIH and DoD took on a 
very important role early in developing and testing candidates.  ASPR/BARDA takes the handoff 
from NIH in this respect and is involved in advanced product development, which in essence 
means taking products through clinical development to manufacturing and scale-up.  This is 
done primarily by partnering primarily with manufacturers.  Suffice it to say that some 
manufacturers come to ASPR/BARDA for funding and some do not.  A number of companies 
are currently developing Zika vaccines, diagnostics, other countermeasures, and therapeutics 
that do not have government funding.  Importantly, the FDA works with all companies.  In the 
traditional sense, the FDA usually works with companies after a certain amount of information is 
gathered pre-clinically, clinically, and toxicologically.  In the case in which countermeasures are 
being developed in response to an epidemic such as Zika, the FDA takes on a different role and 
works with ASPR/BARDA daily to help develop vaccines in such a way that as much important 
information as possible can be gained in the shortest amount of time. 
 
As of February 2016, there were only two US government-funded Zika vaccine projects 
ongoing, one with the NIH and the Institute Butantan and the other at the DNA-Vaccine 
Research Center (DNA-VRC) with a DNA plasmid approach.  Little was being done in terms of 
preclinical development.  These products were in the early phases of discovery, and there was 
nothing in Phase 1 yet.  An interagency consortium of experts on vaccine development was 
formed and developed three aims towards the goal of developing a safe and efficacious Zika 
vaccine to prevent congenital Zika syndrome: 1) 2016-2018, evaluate available vaccine 
candidates to assess safety, efficacy, and immunogenicity and identify protective immune 
correlates during the time of highest disease incidence; 2) By 2018, deploy an available vaccine 
under an appropriate regulatory mechanism to US populations at high risk of exposure; and 3) 
By 2020, work with industry partners to commercialize vaccine(s) for broad distribution. 
 
Aim #1 involves evaluating as many vaccine candidates as possible, assessing a myriad of 
platforms, developing animal models, developing reagents, and developing enough data to 
perhaps apply a correlate of protection that would be useful for clinical developers.  Aim #1 is 
currently being fulfilled with a vast number of candidates.  Aim #2 is relatively aggressive.  This 
involves vaccines at the pre-licensure stage that would be made available under an EUA or 






Expanded Access IND.  These vaccines would be used in CONUS, or Puerto Rico and other 
territories when there are outbreaks.  The government is engaged in partnerships with a number 
of large and medium pharmaceutical companies, with the hope that by 2020 one or more of 
those manufacturers will have submitted a BLA to the FDA. 
 
Before launching into supporting any type of vaccine candidate platform, all platforms available 
at the time were assessed.  Some of these platforms, such as whole virus inactivated and live 
attenuated vaccine platform had been used in the past and placed in the market such as 
Japanese encephalitis, tickborne encephalitis (TBE), and yellow fever vaccines.  The only issue 
with those platforms is that they take a significant amount of time to develop using Good 
Manufacturing Practices (GMP).  Also available were a couple of nucleic acid platforms, DNA 
and mRNA.  These platforms are more easily manufactured using GMP and can be quickly 
placed in the clinic setting as long as the correct antigen needed to vaccinate with is known.  
This was done with DNA and mRNA backbones.  In earlier stages of development were viral-
vectored and recombinant/subunit candidates.  The pros and cons for each candidate are 





Relative to the three aims, a number of candidates are in development.  The NIH Vaccine 
Research Center (VRC) is developing a candidate DNA vaccine.  In addition, an mRNA 
candidate vaccine was developed by Moderna, a commercial company based in Bostin, in 
coordination with NIH and BARDA.  These vaccines are currently in phase 1 clinical trials.   
Inovio, another commercial company, is developing another DNA vaccine without US 
government support and started their Phase 1 trial about a month before the VRC. The hope is 
that some of these vaccines make it to Aim #2, the deployment stage for one or more of these 
candidates.  Based on safety and efficacy data that will accrue over the next year or two, 
potentially the DNA and/or mRNA platforms may fulfill that goal. 
  
The candidates envisioned to fulfill Aim #3 include products such as the two inactivated 
candidates being developed by Sanofi Pasteur and Takeda, and potentially the mRNA 
candidate being developed by BARDA and Moderna.  That would be the first marketed mRNA 
vaccine.  A fourth vaccine, which is being developed by the Laboratory of Infectious Diseases, is 
a live attenuated Zika-chimera.  In addition to all of these, a number of earlier products are in 






R&D including a VSV vectored vaccine (NIAID, Harvard), chimera and VLP (CDC), mRNA 
(VRC, GSK), and PIV (BARDA, Butantan). 
 
The VRC has conducted a Phase 1 trial on the initial construct and is currently conducting 
another Phase 1 trial on a modified construct.  These constructs primarily encode the prM and E 
genes in Zika virus and use the PharmaJet® injector.  The initial results from the first trial are 
being analyzed currently.  The second trial is ongoing and should be completed in a couple of 
months in anticipation of conducting the Phase 2/2b clinical trial.  This trial will be conducted in 
the US in areas where Zika is observed, as well as in Central and South America.  In this trial, 2 
doses of DNA plasmid vaccine will be administered using the needless PharmaJet® injector in 
either 4 mg or 8 mg 3 times in the phase 2a study.  Those data will be analyzed and the best 
regimen and dose will be taken into a phase 2b trial, which is basically a 1:1 randomization of 
placebo to test vaccine in approximately 2400 people in 30+ sites in the US, Caribbean, Central 
and South America.  These data may provide sufficient efficacy information to allow its access 
to be expanded in an IND and/or through an EUA.  That would fulfil Aim #2 of the strategy. 
 
The second nucleic acid candidate is being developed by BARDA in partnership with Moderna 
Therapeutics.  This is a novel technology whereby synthetic mRNAs are used to deliver virtually 
any gene.  It is very useful for the US government to have a platform such as this, because it is 
basically a “plug and play” technology.  There is relatively little difference between different 
vaccines that are made using this platform.  The key to developing this platform for vaccine 
purposes was an ingenious discovery made that nucleotides that are incorporated into the 
mRNA synthetically not only have to be native, but also they have to include pseudouridine.  
Doing so evades a lot of the innate immune responses intracellularly like toll-like receptor 
responses.  Once inside the cell, it acts like a native mRNA to express a foreign gene.  This has 
produced a robust, protective immunological responses in animal models.  Delivery is relatively 
simple with a needle and syringe.  This technology is currently in a clinical Phase 1 trial in the 
US. 
 
There are a number of purified whole virus inactivated vaccine candidates in development by 
two major pharmaceutical companies that have in the past or are currently developing flavivirus 
vaccines, Sanofi Pasteur and Takeda.  They are using a formalin-inactivated Zika virus that is 
alum-adjuvanted.  The proof-of-concept for this technology was done by WRAIR and NIAID last 
year.  The vaccine is currently in Phase 1 clinical trials across the US.  It has been published 
this vaccine is fully protective in non-human primates (NHP) and rodent models.  NIAID and 
WRAIR are conducting Phase 1 clinical trials to evaluate safety, immunogenicity, regimen, 
dose-sparing, and prior flavivirus immunity in subjects who have received yellow fever vaccine.  
WRAIR is transferring the technology to one of its major pharmaceutical partners, Sanofi 
Pasteur, for accelerating development.  Takeda is developing their technology on a different 
platform on their own. 
 
Another candidate is the live attenuated dengue/recombinant Zika vaccine, which is being 
developed by NIAID’s Laboratory of Infectious Diseases (LID).  The dengue quadrivalent 
vaccine described by Dr. Waterman earlier is basically a recombinant dengue 2 with the Zika 
prM and E genes inserted in place of the dengue 2 prM and E genes.  This vaccine is being 
developed in combination with Butantan.  The dengue component is currently in Phase 3 trials.  
The Zika component is currently in development, with a plan to begin Phase 1 with a 
monovalent Zika component probably in the end of 2017.  This could be envisioned as not only 
a monovalent, but also a pentavalent Zika/dengue vaccine. 
  






These tables compare the vaccine landscape in February 2016 to January 2017: 
 
                 
 
There has been a significant amount of activity, with an influx of funding from the US 
government that helped to build this pipeline.  Currently, there are 7 ongoing Phase 1 clinical 
trials with 4 different candidates.  Of those, 3 are being fully supported by the US government.  
A number of candidates are in R&D and pre-clinical phases.  The landscape looks much better 
than this year than it did last year at this time. 
 





In dark blue are the ongoing, ready to begin Phase 1 trials with Zika vaccines.  In red are the 
putative clinical trials that would be conducted based on the clinical development plans of the 
different manufacturers and the US government for the individual vaccine candidates.  By 2019-
2020, at least one of those candidates will have completed Phase 3 studies. 
  











 Will future disease incidence support evaluation of vaccine efficacy?  In order to develop a 
vaccine based on prevention of clinical symptomatic disease, studies must be conducted in 
areas where there is a significant attack rate.  Based on modeling exercises, this will 
become more difficult as time passes.  Efforts are being made to develop animal models 
that will allow for the development of correlates of protection that potentially could be used 
as surrogates for different regulatory mechanisms.  
 
 Which regulatory path will be most feasible?  The regulatory paths include the traditional 
path currently being taken assessing clinical endpoints in field trials.  There also is an 
accelerated approval pathway that potentially could be used if a surrogate becomes 
available.  The last one used in the past for biodefense purposes was the Animal Rule, 
which is presently being put on the “back burner.” 
 
 Will human challenge and/or accelerated approval (correlate of protection) 
facilitate/accelerate evaluation?  This was discussed in an NIH consultation a couple of 
months ago.  The findings of that committee are now published and show that there is not 
sufficient information on Zika relative to its pathology and how it is transmitted from humans 
to humans to support a human clinical study at this time.  As more information is accrued 
about the disease, the potential for this type of study will be revisited. 
 
 Will an animal model(s) provide sufficient data to support efficacy determinations in 
humans? 
 
 Will pre-immunity to other flaviviruses affect Zika vaccine take, and/or vice versa?  This is a 
concern primarily based on antibody-dependent enhancement that has been observed with 
another flavivirus, dengue in particular.  It is important to ensure that Zika vaccines “do no 
harm.”  It also is important to determine, by virtue of so much cross-immunity being 
observed with different flaviviruses, if there is any effect on the actual take of a Zika vaccine 




 Will manufacturers be able to develop a vaccine fast enough to impact the epidemic? 
 Will previous flavivirus vaccine platforms work well enough to prevent congenital infections? 
 Will the market sustain more than one vaccine? 
 
While as many vaccines as possible can be developed, it will be necessary for manufactures to 
stay in for the long-haul.  With cuts in funding and decreasing enthusiasm about Zika, it 
becomes challenging for the US government to continue to engage with manufacturers on these 
types of products.  The hope is that all of the partners will continue their endeavors with the US 
government, but this cannot be guaranteed. 
 
One thing that is incredibly challenging about developing Zika vaccines versus other vaccines is 
that it may be necessary to develop a vaccine that is extremely potent—one that not only 
prevents symptomatic disease in the primary infection, but also one that prevents the 






transmission of virus from mothers to children.  Animal models are being developed in 




Dr. Reingold inquired about safety, particularly with respect to GBS.  He also wondered whether 
there are any trials for younger ages, noting that the trial mentioned was conducted in those 15 
to 35 years of age, which seems like an unusual age in any country. 
 
Dr. Kovacs replied that the trial in 15 to 35 year olds is being conducted to support use in men 
and women of childbearing age, though there are exceptions to that range.  The incidence rate 
of GBS is very low and it will not be possible to see any events in these clinical trials.  The 
greatest concern with GBS is with Zika vaccination with the live attenuated vaccines. 
 
Dr. Messonnier clarified that in thinking through vaccine development, consideration also must 
be given to delivery methodology in terms of other routine vaccinations.  The 15-25 year old 
group is not an age range for which there is a platform for vaccination. 
 
Dr. Hunter asked for clarification regarding whether the mRNA is being placed inside the 
vaccinee and the vaccinees themselves are making the antigen, and how long the mRNA 
persists in the person’s body. 
 
Dr. Kovacs replied that the mRNA delivers only the gene and the body makes the vaccines.  
The active pharmaceutical ingredient is the mRNA nanoparticle.  Studies conducted in small 
animals shows that the vaccine is disseminated throughout the body and expression can be 
seen for weeks.  This technology is being developed not only for vaccine purposes, but also for 
the delivery of therapeutics such as monoclonal antibodies. 
 
Dr. Romero requested further information about mRNA and 5-prime and 3-prime untranslated 
region (UTR). 
 
Dr. Kovacs explained that there is a robust expression level in vivo that can be taken advantage 
of for both purposes.  The mRNA is transcribed in vitro off of a plasmid vector using T7 RNA 
polymerase.  It does not have any fancy 5-prime or 3-prime UTRs.  It looks just like a native 
mRNA.  The insert in this case is prM and E.  The polyadenosine (poly-A) tail is encoded on the 
plasmid, so it is transcribed with a poly-A tail. 
 
Dr. Bennett wondered whether it is possible that what is being observed with the recent decline 
in Zika actually is the end of the epidemic, or if it is more likely due to seasonality. 
 
Dr. Fischer replied that it is likely a combination of both.  It is early in the Americas to determine 
the seasonality.  From other locations where Zika virus is seen, there is likely seasonality that is 
similar to dengue.  This means that in some areas, there is seasonal progression that is related 
either to temperature, rainfall, and humidity.  In other areas, there may be low levels of endemic 
transmission that continues.  With chikungunya, another arbovirus introduced into the Americas 
in 2014, the first season was quite large, the second season was smaller, and there were 
decreases in subsequent years.  That probably offers a better idea with what might be observed 
with Zika virus. 
  






Dr. Gorman (NIH) requested further information on present or future plans to assess infants 
through 2 years of age, a period of time during which the brain continues to grow fairly rapidly. 
 
Dr. Fischer reported that there are follow-up studies of the infants who were congenitally 
infected.  In addition, there are plans for either case-control or a cohort study to follow-up young 
children who are infected postnatally through mosquito-borne infection.  Based on surveillance 
data, thus far there has been no evidence of severe disease in young children or evidence of 
post-effects.  There are other congenital infections for which that pattern would seem to be 
similar, where there are severe effects when transmission occurs in utero but not when it is 






Laura Riley, MD 
Work Group Chair 
 
Dr. Riley provided an overview of the Adult Immunization WG activities over the last year.  The 
2017 Adult Immunization Schedule was published in the Annals of Internal Medicine on 
February 7th and in an MMWR announcement on February 9th.  There was an error pertaining to 
meningococcal vaccination, so an erratum is due to be published in the MMWR on March 3rd.  
There has been wide promotion of the 2017 Adult Immunization Schedule by partner 
organizations, and the schedule has been evaluated for usefulness and usability. 
 
Implementation of Standards for Adult Immunization Practice 
 
David Kim, MD 
Immunization Services Division 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Kim emphasized that low adult immunization coverage has been an ongoing challenge for 
CDC and its partners for a number of years.  It is known that recommendations by HCPs is a 
key predictor for adult vaccination.  Standards for adult immunization practice were published to 
improve awareness among HCPs and uptake of ACIP-recommended vaccines for adults. 
 
Regarding the most recent adult vaccination coverage rates based on the National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS) and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), a brief 
update was published on the CDC website on the same day that the 2017 schedule went live on 
February 7, 2017.  The full article containing the adult vaccination coverage rates for 2015 is 
pending publication in the MMWR.  The key findings include: 
 
 A 3% increase in pneumococcal vaccination for adults 19 through 64 years of age who are 
at high risk from 20% in 2014 to 23% in 2015 
 A 3% increase in Tdap vaccination to 23% for those 19 years of age and older, and a 10% 
increase to 42% for adults living with infants less than 1 year of age who are too young to 










 A 2.7% increase in shingles vaccination to 30.6% for adults 60 years of age and older. 
 Influenza vaccination of 41.7% for adults 18 years of age and older, similar to 2014 
estimates 
 Pneumococcal vaccination of 63.6% for adult 65 years of age and older, similar to 2014 
estimates 
 Hepatitis B vaccination of 24.4% for adults 19 through 59 years of age with diabetes, similar 
to 2014 estimates 
 Persistent racial and ethnic disparities with lower coverage among Blacks and Hispanics, 
similar to 2014 estimates 
 
Standards for Adult Immunization Practice were developed originally in 1990 by the National 
Coalition for Adult Immunization (NCAI) to improve vaccine delivery to adults, and were updated 
in 2014 by the National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC).  The standards state that all 
HCPs, including those who do not provide vaccine services, have a role in ensuring that their 
patients are current on vaccines. 
 
The standards include a call to action for HCP for adults to: 
 
 ASSESS the vaccination status of all patients at every clinical encounter 
 Strongly RECOMMEND vaccines that patients need 
 ADMINISTER needed vaccines or REFER patients to a vaccine service provider 
 DOCUMENT vaccines received by patients in state vaccine registries 
 
The Standards are promoted widely through the National Adult and Influenza Immunization 
Summit (NAIIS) among other venues.  The summit is a large collaborative of public and private 
organizations dedicated to improving the use of ACIP-recommended vaccines by working to 
improve access to immunization, educate providers, identify gaps, develop performance 
measures, and engage in other activities. 
 
To assess the status of the implementation of the Standards, CDC conducted two surveys.  One 
was administered to the general adult population to evaluate the extent to which they received 
care that reflects the Standards during their most recent visit to their HCP or pharmacist in the 
previous 12 months.  The other survey was administered to HCPs and pharmacists to evaluate 
the extent to which they implemented the Standards during patient visits.  These Internet panel 
surveys were conducted on outpatient visits from February through March 2016.  The surveys 
were probability-based and were weighted to be nationally representative using established 
references, such as the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).   The general adult survey 
included a sample of adults 19 years of age or older and asked about their visits to their HCP or 
pharmacist.  The HCP survey included a sample of physicians, nurse practitioners, physician 
assistants, pharmacists, internal medicine, family medicine, OB/GYN, and specialty care.  Black 
and Hispanic HCPs and pharmacists were over-sampled to have sufficient data for analyses. 
 
In terms of the results for the general adult population, of the 3473 panelists invited to 
participate, 2004 (57.7%) accessed the survey and 1905 (95.1%) completed the survey.  Based 
on the data analyzed for the 1905 completed surveys, 1476 (77.5%) had outpatient visits with 
HCP providers or pharmacists in the past 12 months, 459 (68.3%) self-reported as non-Hispanic 
white, 50% were female, the median age was 55 years (range 19–92 years), 1399 (94.7%) were 
insured, and 1203 (59.7%) had at least a college education. 
  






Email invitations were sent to 74,067 HCPs.  Of these, 1907 started the survey, 1684 (88.3%) 
completed the survey, and data analysis was performed on 1641 eligible participants.  Among 
the responding practices, there were 32.3% family medicine, 27.5% internal medicine, 21.3% 
OB/GYN, and 18.8% other specialties.  Among these, 45.8% were private practices and 37.5% 
were healthcare system-owned practices.  There were 65.9% non-Hispanic white participants. 
Email invitations were sent to 9310 pharmacists of whom 320 started the survey and 277 
(86.6%) completed the survey.  Data analysis was performed on 277 eligible participants.  Of 
the respondents, 44.2% were chain drug store pharmacists, 31.9% were retail or grocery store 
pharmacists, 17.7% were independent, 87.2% were employees, 7.2% contractors, 5.6% were 
owners, and 70% were non-Hispanic white. 
 
Of the 1476 adult respondents; 46% were assessed for vaccination; 23% received 
recommendations for vaccination; 19% received a recommendation for influenza; 9% received a 
recommendation for a non-influenza vaccination; and 18% received an offer for vaccination; 4% 
received referrals.  Overall; 11% reporting having received an assessment, recommendation, 
offer, and referral primarily related to influenza vaccination; and 8% received vaccination.  By 
provider specialty, adult patients reported having received the highest percentage for 
vaccination assessment, recommendation, and offers during their internal medicine and family 
medicine visits, followed by visits to OB/GYN and other specialty practices.  Reported 
vaccination assessments by pharmacists lagged compared to clinical providers. 
 
In terms of the responses by HCPs and pharmacists, each specialty reported a much higher 
percentage of vaccination assessment, recommendation, and administration compared to what 
the adult patients reported.  Within each specialty, reported use of an IIS was low at 47% for 
family medicine and internal medicine, 39% for OB/GYN, 22% for other specialties, and 42% for 
pharmacies.  High levels of assessment, recommendation, and administration or referral were 
reported by physicians, nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and pharmacists.  Again, the 
reported use of IIS was low.  Although the two surveys were administered in different 
populations, the results of what the adult patients and HCPs/pharmacists reported were 
compared.  The following table shows the results of a comparison of the first component of the 










Clearly, there is a major difference between what HCPs/pharmacists and the general adult 
population report. 
 
In summary, adult patients reported low levels of receipt of care that reflected the standards.  In 
contrast, HCPs and pharmacists reported high levels of implementation of the standards, except 
for the use of vaccine registries. 
  
Limitations to these surveys might explain some of the differences.  For the adult patient survey, 
adult patients may not have been aware that some vaccination assessments done “behind the 
scene,” such as the staff checking patient records in the vaccine registry or reviewing patient 
medical records without necessarily talking with the patients.  For the HCP survey, healthcare 
respondents may have generalized their immunization practices for some patients to all patients 
or some vaccines to other vaccines.  There are also study design limitation that include 
sampling and recall bias.  There is a potential for sampling bias, given that these were self-
selected internet panels of respondents and there could be differences between respondents 
and non-respondents.  Recall bias is also of concern on self-report surveys and is not verified.  
The survey response rate cannot be calculated because opt-in recruitment sampling does not 
permit enumeration of the denominator. 
 
Dr. Kim stressed that this presentation should not have been a surprise to anyone.  CDC simply 
quantified what most had suspected.  The key messages are that the standards should be 
incorporated into routine clinical practice for every patient and at every visit.  Adult patients need 
to hear from their HCPs and pharmacists about vaccines.  The large discrepancy between what 
HCPs and pharmacists believe they are doing and what adult patients perceive regarding 
vaccination assessment could be improved this way.  As mentioned earlier, an HCP 
recommendation is a key predictor for adults to get vaccination.  Although the data were not 
presented during this session, the adult patient survey found a statistically significant 
association between providers giving a strong recommendation and patients actually getting 
vaccinated.  Consistent implementation of the standards is needed to improve adult 
immunization coverage in the US.  The NAIIS and state and local immunization program 




Dr. Bennett asked whether providers were asked about standing orders and/or engagement of 
other members of their teams to implement immunizations. 
 
Dr. Kim replied that the survey asked about standing orders; documentation; types of 
recordkeeping systems; and knowledge, attitudes, and issues that might play into implementing 
the standards.  There are some analyses on this, for which the information will be coming out 
soon. 
 
Dr. Kempe acknowledged the need to have more effective provider recommendations, et 
cetera.  However, she thought it was somewhat of a false dichotomy to compare patients 
presenting for a visit who have been seen in the last 12 months who may or may not be eligible 
for anything other than influenza vaccine and who generally are not aware that people are 
looking at their immunization records.  She emphasized that while provider recommendation is 
extremely important, all of the systems that support provider recommendations are what really 
gets this done.  Incorporation into adult practice of the systems that have been shown to be 
effective in pediatrics, where all of the action is in immunization, would be highly beneficial. 
 






Dr. Szilagyi pointed out that in the survey of patients, the percentage of patients who said they 
received an influenza vaccination was unbelievably low; whereas, it is known that 40% of adults 
receive an influenza vaccination.  Something is off with the data.  In the interest of not always 
flogging adult providers who are just inundated with chronic disease and managing patients with 
very serious adult problems, it would be great to hear presentations parallel to some pediatric 
presentations about what types of interventions have been found to work and how those could 
be implemented in healthcare systems and practices. 
 
Dr. Belongia encouraged Dr. Kim not to compare the physician survey to the patient survey 
when publishing, because the limitations are great.  That does not discount the message, which 
is important.  However, that direct comparison is not really valid.  He asked whether 
consideration had been given to systematically assessing the system and institutional barriers to 
doing a better job that providers face in their practices. 
 
Dr. Kim replied that some questions have been asked related to barriers, such as questions 
about the obstacles providers face in terms of delivering vaccines to their patients.  Some of this 
information is already known based on other surveys, information contained in the Community 
Guide, and elsewhere.  The barriers can be combined into three major categories: 1) Financing 
(payments, billing coding, et cetera), which is perhaps the most important barrier from the 
provider perspective; 2) Systems (standing orders, EMR) to promote notification for the provider 
to begin the vaccination discussion and for patients to receive notification, perhaps before their 
appointment, so that the patient arrives prepared; and 3) Education and training for patients and 
providers.  Of course, there are many competing priorities for providers.  Vaccination may not 
be at the top or even near the top of their daily activities.  Making it easier and perhaps taking it 
out of the hands of the busy HCP who has many things to address during a 10-minute visit by 
automating the process would be beneficial. 
 
Dr. Foster (APhA) thought the data would be beneficial to share with the APhA members to 
illustrate the realistic perspective.  He pointed out that pharmacists do consider themselves to 
be HCPs, so separating them out is going to result in a lot of feedback. 
 
Regarding standing orders, Dr. Tan (IAC, NAIIS) reported that there is an IAC project called 
Take a Stand!™.  This initiative began in 2016 to help healthcare practices and provider 
systems implement standing orders to boost adult immunization rates.  He expressed gratitude 
to the ACIP for all of their comments about implementation.  Thanks to CDC’s leadership and 
support from the NVPO, the summit has been trying to address the implementation question.  
The summit website has a nice collection of a lot of the resources NAIIS has been assembling 
to address the various comments regarding provider implementation of adult vaccines.  During 
the NAIIS in-person meeting scheduled for May 9-11, 2017 at the Hyatt Regency Atlanta in 
Atlanta, NAIIS will organize a meeting of healthcare systems to work with them to understand 
best practices to improve adult immunization rates.  He acknowledged Dr. Kempe for her 
phenomenal success with her adolescent standing orders immunization project at Denver 
Health. 
 
Dr. Bridges (SME) added that quality measures are known to drive a lot of action in healthcare 
systems, but there is a paucity of measures for adult immunization.  A lot of work is being done 
at NVPO and through the NAIIS on developing additional quality measures for adult 
immunization.  The VA and IHS have participated. 
  






Dr. Hayes (ACNM) applauded the study, recognizing that it created a new level for conversation 
on this topic.  She inquired as to how the public was recruited for the survey, and if Dr. Kim had 
a breakdown of the types of nurse practitioners (adult, women’s health, nurse midwives, 
geriatric, et cetera) who answered the survey. 
 
Dr. Kim replied that the public was recruited through an established internet panel through a list 
of commercially available names and demographic information, and it is an opt-in process.  In 
terms of the breakdown of nurse practitioners, nurse midwives were not specifically identified as 
a recruitment variable.  Recruitment was through a list of providers for physicians, nurse 
practitioners, and physician assistants.  But, they could be practicing in a particular medical 
specialty.  He does have this information and it will be included in any publications that may be 
forthcoming. 
 
Dr. Moore pointed out that it was not clear just how much could be said about a survey with just 
over a 2% response rate among HCPs, which means that there could be a tremendous amount 
of self-selection bias among optimistic practitioners.  It is important to remember that the 
immunization registries represent a very important tool that is very under-utilized for adult 
immunization.  That is where all information about vaccines should be entered in these 
registries.  Clinical decision support is available in registries that can help prompt HCPs so that 
they do not have to remember what an adult is supposed to have. 
 
Dr. Savoy (AAFP) has found that as they expand to use a patient care team in her practice, 
patients may say they were not offered something if she did not specifically offer it herself, even 
if her MA or behavioral health nurse did offer.  This suggests that the questions may need to be 
asked differently.  For example, “When you were in the office, did anyone ask you X?” 
 
Dr. Kim indicated that this was done on the survey.  Respondents were asked who asked the 







Emmanuel (Chip) Walter, MD, MPH 
Chair, Flavivirus Vaccines Work Group  
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
 
Dr. Walter reminded everyone that intermittent production issues resulted in temporary supply 
shortages of yellow fever (YF) vaccine, YF-VAX®, in the US.  Since November 2015, ordering 
restrictions have been in place for YF-VAX® due to supply shortages.  In October 2016, the WG 
briefed ACIP about YF-VAX® production and contingency plans to address any supply 
shortages.  During this meeting, Dr. David Greenberg of Sanofi Pasteur will provide an update 
on yellow fever vaccine supply. 
  
Yellow Fever Vaccine 
 
 






Update on YF Vaccine Supply 
 
David Greenberg, MD 
Associate Vice President and Regional Medical Head, North America 
Sanofi Pasteur 
 
Dr. David Greenberg reported that in the past several years, intermittent production issues have 
resulted in temporary supply shortages.  To improve supply, Sanofi Pasteur invested in and is 
transitioning manufacturing to a new state-of-the-art facility planned for mid-2018.  This 
transition was intended to be seamless and without impact on supply.  In the first quarter of 
2016, a manufacturing issue resulted in the loss of a large number of doses being produced to 
bridge supply until the new facility was online.  Sanofi Pasteur immediately instituted ordering 
restrictions to extend supply to HCPs. 
 
Given yellow fever outbreaks in other countries and global supply issues, stakeholder 
discussions were initiated in the Spring of 2016.  Key participants have included CDC, FDA, and 
DoD.  Sanofi Pasteur’s focus has been to assure a continuous YF vaccine supply for travelers, 
US government employees, military, and other response groups.  Sanofi Pasteur has pursued 
multiple paths to ensure continuous supply of yellow fever vaccine, including product ordering 
restrictions; additional production of YF-VAX® vaccine in the existing facility; and importation of 
Stamaril® via an Expanded Access Investigational New Drug (IND) Program Expedited Access 
Pathway (EAP). 
 
In terms of product ordering restrictions, HCPs are required to verify that vaccine recipients are 
travelling within 30 days to a YF-endemic country or a country that requires proof of vaccination 
for entry.  Account order limits have been activated to avoid account over-ordering.  Regarding 
production of YF-VAX® vaccine, additional product was produced in the existing facility.  Further 
manufacturing issues limited new production; thus, not enough product could be made to fully 
bridge to the new facility.  Restrictions will enable continued use of YF-VAX® vaccine through 
mid-2017.  With respect to importation of Stamaril® vaccine, Sanofi Pasteur worked closely with 
the FDA to rapidly develop and submit an EAP.  The FDA rapidly reviewed the application and 
granted approval in October 2016.  The EAP protocol allows the product to be used at 
authorized facilities in a restricted format.  By mid-2017, Sanofi Pasteur will supply Stamaril® 
vaccine under an EAP to fulfill US YF immunization demand. 
 
Stamaril® vaccine is the YF vaccine manufactured by Sanofi Pasteur in France.  It is a live 
attenuated vaccine that contains the YF virus 17D-204 strain.  This is the same strain as in YF-
VAX® vaccine. Stamaril® vaccine is used globally in more than 100 countries.  It has been 
licensed for more than 30 years, and more than 430 million doses have been distributed.  The 
safety and efficacy for Stamaril® vaccine are comparable to YF-VAX® vaccine.  Stamaril® 
vaccine is supplied as a vial of lyophilized powder and a syringe prefilled with diluent. 
 
As an investigational product, there are protocol and tracking requirements for the sites that 
administer Stamaril® vaccine.  Sanofi Pasteur plans to enroll approximately 150 to 170 high-
volume centers that can dedicate resources and train personnel to counsel, administer, and 
monitor safety.  Outreach will begin in March 2017 in order for sites to review and accept the 
protocol and obtain approval from local Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) as needed.  Sites are 
anticipated to be ready by the end of May 2017, including completion of training.  YF providers 
and travelers will be notified in the May to June timeframe of Stamaril® vaccine sites. 
 






Sanofi Pasteur is working closely with CDC programs, including the Division of Global Migration 
and Quarantine (DGMQ) and the Division of Vector-Borne Diseases (DVBD).  In addition, they 
will share information and are developing support for communications materials and plans, 
product and logistics information, the Stamaril® vaccine site selection process, Stamaril® 
vaccine site location information, and access to state health departments. 
 
In summary, Sanofi Pasteur will provide Stamaril® vaccine under an EAP by mid-2017.  Site 
enrollment and training will begin in March to ensure readiness.  Patients will be directed to 
designated clinics to receive Stamaril® vaccine.  HCPs will be notified to send their patients to 
these sites.  Stamaril® vaccine will be supplied to sites until the new production facility is online 
mid-2018.  Sanofi Pasteur will continue to work diligently to make YF vaccine continuously 




Dr. Hunter asked whether supplies are being diverted to the US that would otherwise go to 
Africa or South America. 
 
Dr. Greenberg replied that the supply of Stamaril® vaccine in the Sanofi Pasteur manufacturing 
facility in France is very robust.  The millions of doses that will be going to other international 
sites are not affected in any way by the relatively small number of doses that will be coming to 
the US. 
 
Dr. Reingold pointed out that there seemed to be lingering misinformation that people need a 
YF vaccine every 10 years, and he wondered whether travel physicians will be counseled to 
determine whether their patients have ever had YF vaccine. 
 
Dr. Greenberg responded that they leave that to the HCP.  It is not Sanofi Pasteur’s place to 
comment on ACIP and WHO recommendations.  The company is bound by the product 
information that is provided with the vaccine.  At the end of the day, they will have to trust that 
providers will act in good faith based on good information.  Sanofi Pasteur has done their best to 
supply the information. 
 
Dr. Gershman (SME) added that the information about the booster dose is well-publicized, and 
that it is going to providers who should be aware of that and a smaller subset who will be 
receiving and administering the Stamaril® vaccine.  That was passed by an ACIP vote in 2015 
and published in the MMWR, and the CDC Yellow Book in hard print and on-line, and CDC’s 
Traveler’s Heath website.  There is fairly wide awareness about the change in the 10-year 
booster policy. 
 
Dr. Fryhofer (ACP) noted that many doctors keep records only for 10 years.  She has 
experienced some instances recently in which a person has lost the yellow book with the stamp, 
and the travel clinic has destroyed the records.  Because she keeps her records for more than 
10 years, she has been having to retrieve records and send them to the travel clinics so they 
can give patients another YF stamp.  She asked whether there is a special registry for YF 
vaccination that could incorporate a lifelong record, or if any thought has been given to this.  
She also wondered if a YF is documented in a state IIS it would be accepted as proof of 
vaccination. 
 






Dr. Gershman (SME) replied that there is no registry for individual patients; however, there is a 
registry of clinics that CDC maintains with the help of state health departments.  It is up to 
individual practices to maintain good records.  Every state has its own practices. 
 
Dr. Moore added that registries do exist in all states except New Hampshire, which is working 
on theirs.  A state immunization registry can accept YF vaccine documentation.  If an 
immunizing provider reported administration of that to the state immunization registry along with 
other vaccines, that could be used as evidence that the person has had a YF vaccine in order to 
reissue a yellow card.  However, she was not certain about International Health Regulations 
(IHR). 
 
Even though she does not administer YF vaccine herself, Dr. Fryhofer wondered if she could 
enter a YF vaccine into the state system even though she does not have the stamp. 
 
Dr. Moore responded that ideally, the person who administers the vaccine should enter it.  That 
is the best possible record.  However, to her knowledge, if Dr. Fryhofer had a patient’s yellow 




No public comments were offered in-person during this session.  However, Dr. Bennett noted 
that the following three letters were submitted for inclusion in the record: 
 
Gilberto F. Chavez, M.D., M.P.H. 
State Epidemiologist 
California Department of Public Health 
 
January 27, 2017 
 
Nancy Bennett, M.D., M.S., Chair 
Amanda Cohn MD, Executive Secretary 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
1600 Clifton Road, N.E., Mailstop A27 
Atlanta, GA 30329 
 
Dear Dr. Bennett,  
 
The California Department of Public Health (CDPH) commends the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices’ (ACIP) ongoing work to protect the nation’s health by setting and 
adjusting national immunization policies based on available evidence.  
 
Despite high coverage rates of immunization with tetanus toxoid, reduced diphtheria toxoid and 
acellular pertussis vaccine (Tdap), pertussis disease in adolescents continues to be reported 
frequently in California.  CDPH respectfully requests that ACIP reappraise its routine 
recommendation since 2006 for a single dose of Tdap vaccine for adolescents and adults in 
light of subsequent data (including references 1-16) on the limited duration of protection from 
acellular pertussis vaccines:  
• Are the current recommendations still appropriate, or are any changes warranted? 
• What are the estimated benefits from the Tdap recommendations to individuals and communities in: 
Day 2:  Public Comment 
 
 






o Preventing or reducing the severity of pertussis, tetanus and diphtheria? 
o Increasing coverage rates of other immunizations recommended for preteens? 
  
Systematic review of the current data, and any adjustments in the recommendations that might 
follow, will help to sustain confidence in immunization, ACIP, and the policies, such as state 
school immunization requirements, that typically are based upon its recommendations. 
 




Gilberto F. Chavez, M.D., M.P.H. 
State Epidemiologist 
California Department of Public Health  
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February 07, 2017 6:09 PM 
To: Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (CDC) <acip@cdc.gov> 




Would you please add to your agenda for the February meeting consideration of adding 
Parkinson's disease (PD) to the chronic medical conditions listing for pneumococcal 
vaccines.  Aspiration pneumonia is the number one cause of death in this chronic progressive 
disease and many people under the age of 65 are being denied these vaccines, yet 15% of PD 
patients are less than 50 years of age.  If there are medical or scientific reasons for this 
exclusion, please let the PD community know. 
  
Thank You Very Much, 
  
Richard P. Hoffmann, PharmD 
Parkinson's Disease Foundation Research Advocate Consumer Representative for the FDA 






Written Comments for February 22, 2017 ACIP Meeting -Pam Rockwell, 1810 Main St., 
Concord MA, 01742, no affiliation, pam@tiac.net The ACIP should change the recommendation 
for flu vaccine so that women who are in their first trimester of pregnancy or are trying to get 
pregnant should not receive flu vaccine. 
 
In 2015 I wrote to the ACIP:  
 
Pregnant women should not receive influenza vaccine in their first trimester. Fever 
and/or influenza infection during pregnancy has been linked to miscarriage and autism. 
There is growing evidence that autism is an autoimmune disorder caused by maternal 
antibodies that attack the fetal brain. In animal models of maternal antibody induced 
autism, female fetuses are reabsorbed, so that only males are born. ACIP discussed 
data in June that influenza vaccine in the first trimester increases the likelihood of 
miscarriage, but no data has ever been published about whether children exposed to 
prenatal vaccines develop normally, since studies are limited to one year. ACIP should 
stop recommending vaccination of women during their first trimester of pregnancy until 
follow-up studies on maternal vaccination can be done to determine if prenatal exposure 
to vaccines cause autism. Women naturally have reduced immune response during 
pregnancy. Such an evolutionary disadvantage must have an explanation. Perhaps 
making antibodies during pregnancy is bad for the future development or immuno-
competence of the offspring. 
  





Parkinson's Disease Foundation Research Advocate Consumer Representative for the 
FDA Advisory Committee on PCNS Drugs 






In November 2016, the very first study published that evaluated whether there was a link 
between autism and maternal vaccination did indeed show a link between influenza vaccination 
in the first trimester and an increased autism risk of 4 cases in 1000 live births (a 20% increased 
risk): 
 
Zerbo O, et al Association Between Influenza Infection and Vaccination During 
Pregnancy and Risk of Autism Spectrum Disorder. JAMA Pediatr. Published online 
November 28, 2016. doi:10.1001/jamapediatrics.2016.3609 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27893896 
 
“We found that influenza vaccination in the first trimester was associated, in an initial 
analysis unadjusted for multiple comparisons, with a slightly increased ASD risk after 
controlling for maternal allergy, asthma, autoimmune conditions, gestational diabetes, 
hypertension, age, education, race/ethnicity, child conception year, conception season, 
sex, and gestational age. However, adjusting for the multiplicity of hypotheses tested 
suggests that the results could be due to chance. If influenza vaccination during the 
first trimester of pregnancy causes ASD, our results suggest that it would amount 
to 4 additional ASD cases for every 1000 women vaccinated. Our finding of a 
possible association between maternal influenza vaccination in the first trimester 
and increased ASD risk parallels previous studies reporting an association 
between maternal viral infection or fever and increased ASD risk in the first 
trimester.” 
 
The maternal autoantibody theory of autism explains the gender bias in autism by supposing 
that female fetuses are more susceptible to these antibodies and are more likely to be 
reabsorbed (in mice) or spontaneously abort (in primates), and this is supported by animal data. 
The Zerbo study only evaluated full term pregnancies, so it would not have noticed if female 
fetuses were at increased risk of spontaneous abortion. But at your June 2015 meeting, ACIP 
discussed a Vaccine Safety Datalink study led by Dr. Jim Donahue, et al. at the Marshfield 
Clinic titled, “Evaluating the risk of spontaneous abortion following administration of influenza 
vaccines containing H1N1pdm09 and H3N2 viral antigens,” which did show correlation between 
first trimester flu vaccine and miscarriages. (You discounted this data because you felt that 
women who do not receive flu shots are less likely to seek medical attention for a miscarriage, 
even though there is no evidence to support this excuse to ignore the data.) The combination of 
increased numbers of males with autism in the Zerbo study and the increased miscarriages in 
the VSD study mirrors the animal models of the maternal autoantibody theory of autism. 
 
One of the confounding factors that is discussed in the Zerbo paper is autoimmunity. 
Autoimmune disorders are much more common in relatives, particularly female relatives, of 
children with autism. Because it is a known link, Dr. Zerbo checked for prior autoimmune 
diagnoses in the women in the study. But the study did not check to see if autoimmune 
disorders were diagnosed in the women after their influenza illness and/or vaccination. If flu 
infection or vaccination triggers a previously undetected autoimmune disorder, then perhaps 
that affects the fetus, either triggering a miscarriage or developmental disorder, as might be 
expected during a flare of an autoimmune disorder during pregnancy.  
 
My 17-year-old son is autistic, although I was not vaccinated or obviously sick during my 
pregnancy. One of the medical interventions that has made a big difference in my son’s 
progress is the drug amantadine, which was prescribed to him by a neurologist because it is a 
glutamate receptor antagonist, like the Alzheimer’s drug memantine, which is also used to treat 
autism. But amantadine also neutralizes influenza M2 proton pumps. I think this is not a 






coincidence – that influenza M2 proton pumps mimic human glutamate receptors to avoid a 
strong immune response. That could mean that the autism and miscarriages described by 
Zerbo and Donahue are due to a specific antigen in the vaccine, and not necessarily a general 
response to any vaccine.  
 
But whatever the mechanism, right now you have evidence in front of you that flu vaccinations 
in the first trimester of pregnancy could trigger autism or miscarriage, and there are some 
animal models of autism and miscarriage that show that antibodies could be the cause. The 
ACIP should change their recommendation to advise women who are trying to get pregnant or 
are in their first trimester not to get vaccinated until you can collect some data that actually 
shows that the vaccines are safe.  
 
Thank you,  
Pam Rockwell 
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Upon reviewing the foregoing version of the February 22-23, 2017 ACIP meeting minutes, Dr. 
Nancy Bennett, ACIP Chair, certified that to the best of her knowledge, they are accurate and 
complete.  Her original, signed certification is on file with the Management Analysis and 
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